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University of Pittsburgh, 2006
 
 
The centralized structure of ownership of the local television industry in the United States 
today has resulted from a combination of regulatory and market pressures. This dissertation 
analyzes the ways in which centralizing tendencies in ownership structure have been 
accompanied by the centralization of operations. As station groups add more stations and seek to 
operate the stations they already own in an ever more profitable manner, changed industrial 
practices are vitally important because they have direct effects upon the product of those stations, 
especially local television news. 
In analyzing such centralizing tendencies, the project focuses not only on centralization 
of ownership and operation, but on two further factors as well: changing interpretations of the 
“public interest” and the development of technologies for local television stations. Changing 
interpretations of the “public interest” provision of regulatory law permitted and encouraged 
station groups to grow larger, redefining the structure of the local television industry, even in the 
times of heaviest restriction. In terms of technological development, after a brief period of 
equipment designed simply to get product on the air, television equipment developers followed a 
consistent guiding principle of staff reduction and job simplification which aided this momentum 
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towards centralization.  The combination of changing ownership structures, shifts in 
understandings of “public interest,” and new technologies has resulted in new business models 
built around invoking economies of scale, including centralcasting and multi-channel operation.  
These new business models have dramatically altered the program product of local 
television stations, especially local news. News programming, which initially entered 
broadcasting in response to the regulatory mandate that broadcasters serve the public in return 
for free access to the public airwaves, has been transformed into a primary source of local station 
revenue. This commodified version of news programming is the logical result of practices begun 
in newspapers and continued in radio broadcasting. The news product of local stations is an area 
of vital concern in the present day media environment, as the quantity of news on the air 
increases without a corresponding increase in newsroom resources, jeopardizing the quality and 
veracity of those news programs. 
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INTRODUCTION: ECONOMICS, STRUCTURE, PRACTICE, AND PRODUCT 
Academics are quick to suggest that television affects society, politics, 
psychology, but rarely remember that the medium is itself an effect of human 
actions. We explore how people do things with television – they “read” or 
interpret it, use it, manipulate it, find gratification in it – but rarely think of 
television as itself something that people do. We find it hard to remember that 
radio and television are not fixed objects to which people react; they are 
themselves collective human actions. (Streeter 1996, 5) 
 
It is doubtful that the narrowness of vision which Thomas Streeter illustrates above exists solely 
in the efforts of academics. In the United States, television is an almost universal source of 
entertainment, news, controversy, and contradiction, much of which inaccurately accepts the 
fundamental neutrality of the medium as a given. While endless debate abounds over the liberal 
or conservative bias present in programming, particularly television news, as supporters of CNN 
or Fox News battle over the “rightness” of their chosen network, the debate fails to reveal, and 
indeed often obscures, the true allegiance of television broadcasting: loyalty to the bottom line.  
Members of the audience at home understand that commercials allow them to watch 
television programs for free, but are likely less aware that the commercial nature of broadcasting 
converts them into a commodity and sells them to the advertisers. The same sleight of hand 
influences discourse critical of the media, which in many cases attempts to critique content 
without looking deeper to discover the economics which underlie that content. It is in this 
fashion that the economics of local television, particularly local television news, are hidden in 
the debates over bias and the distraction offered by the eye-candy tactics of local television news 
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and news promotion, which substitute visual appeal and the comfort of the news family for 
content serving the public interest.   
When these economic influences upon local television news are explicitly addressed, as 
in the outstanding State of the News Media reports,T1 the focus is primarily on the profit or lack 
thereof generated by news broadcasts, or on the general trend towards providing stories which 
will “hook and hold” an audience. It would be highly inaccurate to say that these are not useful 
and valid examinations of the interaction between news and economics, because they contribute 
in significant ways to our understanding of the industry; however, they do not reveal the whole 
picture.  
Hal Himmelstein reveals the broader scope of this interaction in his book on television 
myth. Emphasizing the need for critical scholars to consider the impact of journalists’ work 
routines, Himmelstein observes that the industry places 
an increased reliance on the packaged press release, news conference, public 
speech, and “photo-opportunity” – routinely covered stories, often of questionable 
news value, whose principal value to the news organization is their low cost and 
easy availability. (1994, 248)   
 
The relation of the larger economic picture to the changing workflow of the newsroom is a 
valuable focus of observation, connecting economic factors to journalistic practice and thence to 
the resulting product of local news.2  
The causal triumvirate of economics conditioning practice conditioning product is a 
useful tool for analysis, but still forms an incomplete picture. The image is finished with the 
addition of structure into the mix, conditioned by economics and in turn conditioning practice 
and product. That structure is determined by economics is well documented in most modern day 
                                                 
1 The 2005 report is located at this web address: http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2005/index.asp. 
2 Of course this is not a novel occurrence, as the use of these predictable news sources has been a part of 
newsgathering for over a century. However, it is a useful reminder of the impact of these cost saving measures.  
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industries, as the desire to implement economies of scale results in both growth and new 
complementary structural arrangements. The second part of the model, structure conditioning 
practice, is a fundamental component of another well-respected analytical tool, the Industrial 
Organization Model. 
The IO model is an economic assessment tool which examines the relationship between 
market structure, the conduct of firms in the market, and the resulting performance of those firms 
(S-C-P). The model had been used in media analysis in two ways prior to 1995, for structure-
only analysis and for more robust examination which included the other measures. In the latter 
case, analysts have often equated performance with the fulfillment of the public interest 
obligations of broadcasters, but the results have been less compelling than in the first mode of 
application (Wirth and Bloch 1995, 16, 19-21, 24).3 Since Wirth and Bloch’s 1995 review, the 
model has been employed in useful analyses of broadcast concentration and competition in cable 
and satellite television, and in small media markets, both of which focused primarily on the 
structural component.4
The broader application of the IO model has received criticism for its efforts to append 
social factors to an economic tool. By conflating the quantitative evaluation of market 
performance with less concrete and circumscribed measures of performance, such as freedom of 
speech or diversity of opinion, some media scholars have arrived at conclusions not supported by 
the workings of the model. Notably, these conclusions are based on two suspect premises: 
audience demand for public interest performance measures and the willingness of media firms to 
                                                 
3 For an excellent look at media research which has employed the IO model, see Michael O. Wirth and Harry Bloch, 
"Industrial Organization Theory and Media Industry Analysis," The Journal of Media Economics 8, no. 2 (1995).  
4 See Sylvia M. Chan-Olmsted, "Theorizing Multichannel Media Economics: An Exploration of a Group--Industry 
Strategic Competition Model," The Journal of Media Economics 10, no. 1 (1997). and Benjamin J. Bates, 
"Concentration in Local Television Markets," Journal of Media Economics 6, no. 3 (1993). 
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compete for audience share by providing such programming. The former premise is not 
guaranteed, and the latter has been proven untrustworthy under the self-regulating market 
concept at the heart of the present day deregulated broadcast industry (Fu 2003, 275-278). 
Eileen Meehan addressed the difficulty of equating the commercial success of the 
industry with the quality of the industry product almost two decades prior to Wirth and Bloch’s 
review in her argument for a blended approach to television study. Claiming that both industrial 
and cultural studies of television failed to completely address its unique nature, Meehan instead 
proposed a model which embraced both economic and social considerations by examining each 
topic through the lenses of political economy and cultural studies (1986, 448-449, 455).5  In 
1999, Meehan reiterated the differences between these two approaches in an analysis of their 
differing perspectives on the resistance model, which positions media artifacts as texts to be 
interpreted through dominant, alternative, or oppositional ideologies. Where pure cultural studies 
saw a fantastic opportunity for audience participation and identification, pure political economy 
viewed the model as yet one more effort to sell audiences to advertisers with the illusion of such 
participation and identification. Meehan again called for a blended approach to television study 
as a result (1999, 149-151, 160-162).  
Attempting its own blend, this project attempts to synthesize these approaches into a 
different analytical perspective. Himmelstein’s connection of practice to product is compelling, 
and forms the last part of the analytical chain. The relationship of market structure to firm 
conduct in the IO Model can be logically reduced to a replicate relationship between structure 
                                                 
5 Meehan offered five analytic categories for use in this blended approach: “manufacture/creation, 
commodity/artifact, ideology/culture, consumption/interpretation, [and] audience/publics.” Eileen Meehan, 
"Conceptualizing Culture as Commodity: The Problem of Television," Critical Studies in Mass Communication 3 
(1986): 455. 
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and conduct (practice) within station groups, forming the middle part of the chain.6 Finally, the 
clear economic determinism at the heart of structural concerns across these perspectives provides 
the top end of the chain: economics condition structure, which conditions practice, which 
conditions the cultural news product of the stations. The model, and the project as a whole, seeks 
to supplement existing perspectives on the news product of local television stations, and by 
doing so reduce the divide between studies assessing local television content and studies which 
examine industrial organization. By overlooking industrial context, much content-focused 
research ignores a potential causal agent, and inasmuch as the authors hope to universalize their 
results, the absence of industrial context indicates an important gap.7   
Economic determinism is not a new framework from which to examine either the overall 
media industry or the specific field of television news. The centralization of the media industry 
has long been an area of study for critics and scholars concerned with the public interest aspects 
of broadcasting. “The media system, in democratic theory,” Robert McChesney writes, “was 
charged with providing information equally so that even poor citizens would have the capacity to 
be effective citizens, despite their unequal access to resources” (2004, 22). The dichotomy 
between the democratic purpose of the mass media and its function as profit-making enterprise is 
a question of paramount importance for political economists.  
In a broad sense, studies in the political economic tradition have four characteristics: they 
involve social change and history to uncover the dynamics of capitalism, they approach each 
investigation holistically with an eye to the overall social picture, they focus on both analyzing 
                                                 
6 An example of a similar approach can be found in David Demers, "Revisiting Corporate Newspaper Structure and 
Profit Making," The Journal of Media Economics 11, no. 2 (1998). See pages 25-28 in particular. 
7 That is not to say that such studies are invalid, as long as they resist a universalizing move. However, trying to 
make a comprehensive statement about the content of the medium without considering the economics behind that 
content would indeed be invalid.  
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the economic system and pointing out policy problems and moral issues that it creates, and 
finally, they involve an element of praxis, an attempt to effect social change (Wasko 2004, 310). 
Political economy of communications, specifically, examines the structure and institutions of the 
mass media with an eye towards their inherent ideologies, which clearly resonates with the 
service/profit dichotomy.  There are four main foci within that tradition: conglomeration, 
deregulation and commercialism, the impact of changing technologies on the media, and 
globalization and cultural imperialism (Casey 2002, 163-165). This project fits within the first 
three investigative areas of political economic communication study, which puts it in 
conversation with a great deal of mass media research in the last quarter century.  
In addition to McChesney’s extensive body of work addressing the political economy of 
the media and its implications for the public interest, both domestic and global, there are many 
other noteworthy examples of research that share these concerns. Ben Bagdikian’s The Media 
Monopoly is highly critical of media ownership structure in the present day, equating media 
power with political power and emphasizing the danger of placing so much of that power in the 
hands of so few profit-driven corporations: 
Today, [the] political variety among the mainstream media has disappeared. As 
the country enters the twenty-first century, the news and analyses of progressive 
ideas and groups are close to absent in the major media. Similarly absent is 
commentary on the dangers of this political one-sidedness to American 
democracy (2000, xvi). 
 
As the title of his work suggests, Bagdikian sees the root cause of the media’s lack of attention to 
the democratic needs of this country as a structural problem caused by the fundamental 
economics of the industry and abetted by the policy of deregulation and its complete reliance on 
the marketplace as a regulatory agent. Dennis Mazzocco is even more emphatic in Networks of 
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Power: Corporate TV’s Threat to Democracy, detailing the primary structural danger of the 
current system: 
As the gatekeeper of “truth” in our media-driven society, corporate media 
conglomerates have the extraordinary power to marginalize dissident voices and 
discredit political opponents who may threaten their bottom line…. In helping to 
“manufacture consent,” concentrated media ownership continues to provide elite 
business interests with an awesome state propaganda apparatus for citizen thought 
control (1994, 141).  
  
These works by McChesney, Bagdikian, and Mazzocco all focus their critiques on the top level 
of the media hierarchy, the conglomerates and the networks. 8 This is typical of much of the 
work that examines the political economy of the mass media: because the stakes are so high, the 
majority of research and criticism addresses the largest players. This project addresses a less 
common object of study, examining the industry at the next level of ownership, the non-network 
station group and the local station. This is an important area of investigation, because operational 
changes at this level directly impact the product of the stations, including news and public 
service programming, which has strong implications for the communities they serve. 
A valuable perspective on the causes and effects of structural change in the mass media is 
offered in Susan Douglas’ history of radio, Inventing American Broadcasting. Detailing the 
formative years of the radio industry through intertwined narratives of technology, society, and 
economics, she charts the rise of the medium and its representation to the public during that time. 
Douglas describes the development of the industry at the hands of two realities, the “processes of 
centralization and institutionalization – private, rarely seen, often incremental and amorphous, 
and extraordinarily powerful,” and the “mediation of those processes in the press” (Douglas 
1987, xx). Much of that first reality is as true in the broadcast industry today as it was during the 
                                                 
8 In the most recent edition of The Media Monopoly, Bagdikian refers to these conglomerates as the “Big Six,” and 
bemoans the fact that there are only six corporations that provide the majority of the media we consume.  
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time that Douglas profiled; the processes of centralization are still often private, rarely seen, and 
extraordinarily powerful. Technology plays a major role in Douglas’ analysis, acting as 
prerequisite in some cases and as limitation in others. This project draws from Douglas’ 
approach and offers a similar analysis applied to the impact of television technology on the 
structure and practices of the industry.  
Perhaps the loudest voice speaking directly to consumerism and policy belongs to 
Thomas Streeter’s Selling the Air. He makes the argument that American television is best 
described as “corporate liberal,” a product of social and political choices which privilege the 
commercial nature of the industry over other concerns (Streeter 1996, 6). The impact of these 
social and political choices upon industry structure is important to any analysis of local 
television, because these structures constrain and condition the practices and products of 
television stations, especially local television news. Regulatory policy has also had direct effects 
on news product, requiring or encouraging certain kinds of content. This project will analyze 
both the direct and indirect effects of policy on the product of local television stations.  
It is the purpose of this work to continue the efforts of these authors, looking not at the 
macro level where their gaze generally rests, but instead at the station group and the local 
television station. The same centralizing trend that these authors find in the top strata of the 
industry has occurred no less commonly or dramatically at this lower level, especially in the 
decades since the first efforts towards deregulation in 1979 and in the aftermath of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. Ownership changes in broadcasting during this latter period 
have been many and varied, but always with a centralizing force as single-station ownership 
dissipated under the tide of buyouts generated by the loosening of ownership restrictions. As 
these stations centralized, they changed as well; a station operates one way when it is a solo 
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entity, another way when part of a small station group, and yet another way when part of a larger 
station group. These changes in operation as stations become increasingly centralized are at the 
core of this project, as are the resulting changes in broadcast product.   
In addition to relaxing ownership restrictions in broadcast television, the 1996 
Telecommunications Act also instigated technological upheaval in the television industry by 
requiring each station to surrender its NTSC broadcast license and transition fully to digital 
broadcasting by 2006, a date which has since slipped to at least 2008. The impending expense of 
these transitions accomplished two things. First, those entities who owned a small number of 
stations were faced with an upgrade they might not have the capital to make, which gave them 
motivation to sell their stations to larger station groups. Second, with the guaranteed need to buy 
a whole set of new equipment for the transition to digital, station groups looked for technologies 
that would allow them centralize their operations as much as possible, reducing the need for 
duplicate staff, equipment, and efforts at their stations. This combination of the externally 
imposed need for capital investment and the desire to increase economic efficiency set the stage 
for innovative new models of centralization to emerge. 
Changing structure and changing technology have contributed to changing practices in 
station operation. These changes in practice span all of the departments of a local television 
station, but most importantly affect the on-air operation and the news department. In the case of 
the former, technological and structural change have provoked dramatic alterations of workflow 
and staffing, and in some cases have resulted in the complete elimination of the on-air functions 
at the local station in favor of centralized program delivery. News departments have seen the 
most radical change, as television news has transformed from a burden carried by broadcasters in 
fulfillment of their public interest obligations to a source of limited revenue, and later into a 
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product generating a majority of the profit and brand identity of many local television stations. In 
a desire to increase that profit, the news departments of local television stations have been home 
to many changes in practice which have altered the content of their news products.  
This project seeks to address three primary issues which correspond to the three 
categories of political economy studies described previously. The first of these issues concerns 
structure. The project will detail various organizational structures used by station groups and the 
operational changes that these structures have encouraged. Inherent in this examination are 
discussions of centralization of both operations and management, as well as general cooperation 
among the stations in the groups. It will also examine the overall centralization of structure on an 
industry-wide basis.   
The second issue concerns the levels of cooperation between policy and industry. The 
policy critiques offered by McChesney, Bagdikian, Mazzocco, and Streeter are comprehensive, 
and offer a starting point for analyzing the same issues at the level of non-network station 
groups. A discussion of commercialism is essential to this investigation, as the profit orientation 
behind the new business models is ultimately responsible for changes in the product of the 
stations; this project will examine the economic causes behind the creation and adoption of those 
new models. Included in this question of commercialism is the ever-present antagonism between 
public service and profit motive; at issue is whether the changes in structure and resulting 
changes in content are enhancing or damaging the stations’ ability to live up to the standard of 
‘public interest, convenience, and necessity.’ Both Thomas Streeter and Erik Barnouw,9 among 
others, have discussed this issue explicitly in their work, coming to the general conclusion that 
                                                 
9 Barnouw’s 3-volume history of broadcasting is extraordinarily useful in understanding the historical trajectory of 
the competition between service and profit. Erik Barnouw, A Tower in Babel, vol. 1, A History of Broadcasting in 
the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966).  
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historically the profit motive has always been paramount, and the service component a distant 
secondary concern. This project will attempt to build upon their work in that area, examining the 
impact of changing structures and operations upon the ideal of public service at the local station 
level.    
The third issue concerns the role of technology in the changing structure and practice of 
the television industry. Television in particular is a medium that has experienced revolutionary 
changes in operational practices with each major technological innovation, practices which have 
directly influenced the product of those stations. The transition from black and white to color 
television, the implementation of satellite transmission for content distribution, the ENG camera, 
remote trucks capable of sending live signals back to the station by satellite and microwave, the 
development of digital television formats, the adaptation of satellite videophones for use in news 
coverage; the litany of industry-changing innovations seems endless. This project ultimately 
contends that technologies developed for the broadcast industry have followed a guiding 
principle of economic efficiency and centralization which have contributed to parallel 
developments in the structural component of the industry.  
This project echoes Douglas’ intertwined narratives approach in Inventing American 
Broadcasting, applying the four factors of economics, structure, policy and commercialism, and 
technology to a new narrative describing the path traveled by local television into the present 
day. Also similar to Douglas’ work, which draws upon press reports about radio broadcasting to 
provide another view on the new medium, this project incorporates multiple perspectives, 
juxtaposing academic work and official sources with information drawn from industry trade 
magazines such as Broadcasting and Television Magazine and organizational newsletters, such 
as the RTNDA Communicator from the Radio and Television News Directors Association. 
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Ideally, theory and analysis from an academic perspective combined with the industry’s 
perspective represented in these sources should provide a unique view of the changing structures, 
practices, and products of the industry.  
Chapter One offers a historical perspective on the relationships among ownership, 
organizational structure, and the practice of journalism. Beginning with the earliest “news” 
publications in the United States, the chapter addresses the flow of ownership structure, 
organizational practices, and journalistic convention through the newspaper, radio, and television 
industries. The chapter pays special attention to the larger social and economic trends which 
influenced changes in journalistic practice, and offers examples of structures and practices that 
emerged during the development of the broadcast industry. The chapter also introduces the 
exemplar station groups for this project, which will be used in a limited case-study approach. 
Each of the groups, Hearst-Argyle, Sinclair Broadcasting, and Cox Broadcasting, is notable for 
some structure or practice which illuminates larger trends in the television industry, and offers a 
concrete example of the causes and effects of such structures and practices.    
Chapter Two analyzes changes in regulatory policy and their impact upon industry 
structure, practice, and product. The chapter offers a comprehensive discussion of broadcast 
policy as it applies to tension between ownership and the public interest, and details the changing 
nature of such policy in the face of broad social and industrial change. Of particular importance 
is the changing interpretation of the public interest, which has been a pivotal part of broadcast 
policy since the earliest regulation of the industry in 1910. The chapter demonstrates the 
recursive influence that regulators and the industry have had on one another, and examines the 
shift away from the trustee model toward a marketplace model which began in 1979 and 
continues into the present day. Finally, the chapter details the contribution of broadcast policy to 
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the continued centralizing momentum present in the structural development of the television 
broadcast industry.   
Chapter Three analyzes the role of technology in both permitting and encouraging 
centralization of ownership and operation in the television industry. The chapter posits that 
technological innovation in television was constrained by two factors, guiding principles which 
pushed towards economic efficiency and a cultural need to fit the new medium into the existing 
media environment. The chapter demonstrates the interaction between this cultural positioning, 
the equipment developed for the new medium, and the changes in structure and practice 
permitted, inspired, or required by the new inventions and innovations. The chapter continues 
work begun in Chapter One, detailing the impact of new technology on the practices and 
products of television news. Finally, the chapter examines the specific technical choices made by 
the exemplar groups and their impact on the practices and products of their stations.    
Chapter Four examines the specific economic conditions of the industry that encouraged 
or permitted certain structural innovations. Economic efficiency in service of the free market 
concept is demonstrated as the primary driving force of the industry, exemplified by sharing of 
resources, centralizing of operation, and economies of scale in program creation. The chapter 
incorporates discussions of station valuation and the economics of station buying, selling, and 
trafficking as factors in the centralizing momentum. This chapter also profiles specific structural 
choices and their effects on station operation and organization, including LMAs, duopolies, and 
multi-channel operation, again touching upon the choices of the exemplar groups.   
The conclusion builds upon the preceding chapters to determine how changes in structure 
and practice have impacted the news product of local television stations, changing it over time 
from a burden broadcasters carried in the interest of the public into a cash generating 
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powerhouse that defines the identity of many local television stations. It illustrates the changing 
profitability of news, addresses the change in local television market structure from oligopolistic 
competition to monopolistic competition, and examines the relationship between the changing 
nature of news and issues of structure. Finally, the conclusion analyzes specific models of news 
efficiency and their influence on the product of news itself, with a particular emphasis on 
Sinclair Broadcasting’s News Central model of local news. 
Overall, this project describes the emergent reality of local television under deregulation 
and describes the many steps taken by the industry along the way. This reality is constrained in 
significant ways by the structures which have developed in response to the dual goals of cutting 
costs and increasing revenues, and the practices which have evolved under those structures. In 
the best case scenario, this project provides perspective for critics and consumers alike to use in 
examining the medium, allowing for a vision of content as molded by issues of economics and 
structure. At a minimum, this project adds valuable industry perspective to academic 
understandings of broadcast history, which is itself a useful undertaking. In either scenario, the 
project offers a view of broadcasting as seen through a different lens, and in doing so contributes 
to greater understanding of the ever-changing face of local television.    
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1.0  A BRIEF HISTORY OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND JOURNALISTIC 
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 
The free press is the mother of all our liberties and of our progress under liberty.   
 
An editor is someone who separates the wheat from the chaff and then prints the 
chaff. 
 
Attempting to define the role of the press in the United States is at best an effort beset on all 
sides by contradictions. The two quotes above, attributed to Adlai E. Stevenson Jr., illustrate this 
slippery nature.10 The press walks the line between servant of the public interest, with 
responsibilities and protections afforded by the Constitution, and free enterprise, charged with 
the goal of endlessly increasing profits in service to its owners and shareholders. These divergent 
demands upon our press have resulted in a cavalcade of debate, regulation, and deregulation 
which has affected the way that media businesses operate, cooperate, and conglomerate.  
“All the news that’s fit to print,” declared the masthead of the 1896 New York Times, 
carefully avoiding any issue of what “news” or “fit” might entail. In practice, the determination 
of newsworthiness has always been conditioned by two important factors: social conditions and 
business concerns. Since the earliest days of U.S. newspapers, these two influences have molded 
the practice of journalism and the resulting news product; often embracing the chaff over the 
wheat in deference to the bottom line. Economic concerns, in particular, have had a 
                                                 
10 The second quote is also often attributed to Elbert Hubbard. 
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transformative influence on journalistic practice in many ways, as the form and substance of 
news content has been changed in order to draw in more readers and to cut costs as dramatically 
as possible, often resulting in new organizational arrangements created with the express purpose 
of incorporating various economies of scale. 
This chapter will present a brief history of journalism practice as related to the social 
conditions and business environs that influenced its development. Throughout this discussion, 
special attention will be paid to changing organizational structures within and across media 
industries, demonstrating their momentum in a common direction. This drift towards 
centralization was a key factor in the development of media institutions, and contributed greatly 
to changes in journalism and the resulting product in newspapers, radio news broadcasts, and 
television news broadcasts.  
The chapter is broken into sections dealing with print news from its humble beginnings in 
1690 to 1936, radio broadcasting between 1920 and 1952, and television broadcasting between 
1945 and 1980. The first section will address the development of newspaper publishing in the 
United States, detailing the alterations in journalistic practice and organizational structure which 
occurred as society underwent dramatic changes in the 1800s, with a special focus on the 
commercialization of news and the changes in practice that resulted from it. The second section 
will describe the moment of change caused by the emergence of radio broadcasting in 1920, 
focusing especially upon the transfer of journalistic practice and organizational structure from 
the old medium to the new. The third section offers a similar analysis of the moment of change 
between radio broadcasting and television broadcasting between 1945 and the start of 
deregulation. Each section will describe the many ways that organizational structure and 
journalistic practice influence one another, as well as showing how each new medium builds 
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upon the foundations of those which preceded it. The chapter will conclude with a final section 
charting the organizational development and history of Hearst-Argyle Television, Cox 
Broadcasting, and Sinclair Broadcasting, the exemplar groups for this project. 
1.1 THE PREHISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF PRINT NEWS, 1690-1936 
The start of print news in the United States can be traced to Benjamin Harris’ publication of 
Publick Occurrences, Both Forreign and Domestick, in 1690 Boston. At the time, New England 
readers could get papers and books from the visiting trade ships, and religious tracts were the 
sole product of the local press. Harris formulated a new plan to capture the attention of the local 
audience: publish local news and happenings, and give ‘the truth’ about domestic matters, which 
he considered to be lacking in coverage imported from England. The inaugural issue offended 
the authorities, and the paper was banned; however, Harris’ plan survived and became the 
formula for the early press in the United States (Williams 2002, 3-4). 
By the time of the Revolutionary War, the party press era had begun, as newspapers and 
editors were persuaded by the various political parties to print their perspective about the 
direction that the new republic should take; in return, party leaders gave the publishers contracts 
to print government documents. These papers were funded by a combination of subscriptions, 
individual purchases, party subsidies, and an increasing dependence on advertising dollars. This 
combination of politicization and commercialization changed the press dramatically as new 
papers were created and existing newspapers were co-opted by the parties (1993, 50-51). The 
party press reached its height between 1824 and 1837 as Andrew Jackson, after losing the 
presidential election in 1824, employed the press to great effect in winning the election four 
 17 
years later.11 Jackson awarded government positions to around 50 journalists during his time in 
the White House (Risley 2002, 14-16).12  
Coexisting with the party press, which counted on political support and funding for its 
continued existence, was the commercial press, which garnered the majority of its subscriptions 
from business owners. The commercial press primarily included advertisements and bulletins of 
shipping news. The commercial press and the party press were similar in several respects: 
subscription was their main method of distribution; they were relatively expensive at six cents 
per copy; and they directed their appeal to the interests and needs of the elites (Schudson 1978, 
15-16).   
In 1833, a powerful new model of the press took shape in Benjamin Day’s print shop in 
New York City, and the transition away from the party press began. An outbreak of cholera had 
driven the affluent from the city, and to supplement his lagging printing business Day founded 
the Sun, selling the daily for a penny per issue and distributing it via newsboys rather than annual 
subscriptions (Williams 2002, 6-7). The development of Day’s penny press was the result of the 
confluence of a number of long-developing trends. John Nerone describes the moment as the 
completion of a shift from newspaper as an artisanal craft to newspaper publishing as an 
industry. He includes increased reliance on advertising, the trend towards job specialization 
                                                 
11 Jackson won the popular vote in 1824, but failed to gain the requisite number of electoral votes, resulting in his 
defeat. Convinced that he had lost in part because he did not have a newspaper in Washington supporting him, 
Jackson arranged for the introduction of the United States Telegraph in 1826. Paul Starr, The Creation of the Media: 
Political Origins of Modern Communications (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 93. 
12 Williams further claims that the party press played a major role in the development of the nation by involving 
ordinary people in the political process of their country. Julie Hedgepeth Williams, "The Purposes of Journalism," in 
American Journalism: History, Principles, Practices, ed. W. David Sloan and Lisa Mullikin Parcell (Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland & Company, Inc., 2002), 6. While it is certainly true that the party press enabled a wider dissemination 
of political thought, the party press was still directed at a certain group of people – those with the wealth to afford a 
subscription - and thus the involvement of “ordinary people” fails to ring true.  
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which gave rise to the reporter, and technological improvements as major components of this 
shift (Nerone 1987, 397). 
This new model both dramatically altered the future course of the business of newspaper 
publishing and created the basis for the modern day conception of news. Previous publications 
had focused on two principal topics designed to appeal to specific subscriber bases: politics and 
commerce. Abandoning both elite appeal and subsidy from the political parties, the penny press 
publishers desired broad circulation to support their advertising revenues, and thus needed 
content with wider appeal than the previous models. Such content included local politics, police 
and court news, and stories from the streets, which required the services of reporters to acquire. 
One of Day’s first decisions was to hire George Wisner away from another paper. Wisner, who 
had covered court news previously, attended the daily police court and wrote stories about the 
ordinary people who found themselves there (Williams 2002, 6-7). Michael Schudson writes that 
this new content reflected the multifaceted social life of the time, rather than the narrow elite 
focus of previous newspaper incarnations. Unlike previous news content, which was largely 
reprinted stories from other sources and editorials provided by the publisher, the penny press 
sought out new information to fill its pages each day, often printing entire transcripts of trials or 
political speeches. As a business model, the penny press had transformed newspapers from a 
product which sold a service to the elites into a vehicle to provide an audience-product to an 
advertiser-consumer (Schudson 1978, 22-25). 13  
The commercialization of the news that crystallized with the Sun in New York expanded 
across the country at a measured pace through newspaper startups. At the same time, newspaper 
                                                 
13 The penny press also marked the first steps towards a new journalistic convention, objectivity. The publishers 
attempted to reach their new audiences by differentiating themselves from the partisan press, focusing on reporting 
facts allegedly without any bias. For more information see: David T.Z. Mindich, Just the Facts: How "Objectivity" 
Came to Define American Journalism (New York: New York University Press, 1998).  
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publishers started to realize the benefits of forming networks or chains, although these structural 
arrangements would not be completely embraced until the end of the 1800s. These benefits 
included the ability to fund a new publication while it carved out a market, the ability to support 
struggling newspapers, sharing equipment between different papers that were near one another, 
and even joint operating agreements with competing papers to share equipment, facilities, and 
distribution (McPherson 2002, 118). One early example of joint agreement was cooperative 
newsgathering. New technologies such as the telegraph in 1844 offered faster methods of 
transmitting news, but they were always expensive; nonetheless, no editor wanted to get scooped 
by the competition, so they paid the price. Two years after Samuel Morse’s first telegraph line 
was run, another line was built to connect Albany and Buffalo in early 1846. By the time the line 
reached Buffalo, newspaper editors along the route had hired an agent to stay in Albany and feed 
information to every newspaper on the line. In 1849, six daily newspapers in New York City 
formed the Associated Press to share information, eventually including affiliates across the 
country; in the mid-1850s they leveraged their group power to secure favorable telegraph 
transmission rates (Schwarzlose 2002, 154-155). This example is interesting in two ways. First, 
from a journalistic standpoint, the location of a bureau in the state capital is a precursor to similar 
developments in the media which followed, and is consistent with the penny press’ focus on 
locations where news happened. Second, from an organizational standpoint, this is one of the 
early examples of group economics influencing news content, as the economies of scale made 
regional and national news less expensive to acquire.  
The shift to an industrialized model, of which these cooperatives were part, was one 
indication of an overall social change which occurred between 1820 and 1890 and entered the 
newspaper industry through the vehicle of the penny press. In part, the new model resulted from 
 20 
a transfer of the practices and ideals common to the newly industrialized factories to the business 
of the press, which included the adoption of new technologies, standardization of workflow and 
product, and specialization of worker tasks (Peterson 1981, 22), a set of practices notably similar 
to those Nerone describes in relation to the birth of the penny press. The half-century following  
the birth of the penny press would see technological advances in communications such as the 
telegraph (1844) and the transatlantic cable (1858-1866) permit faster newsgathering, and 
advances in typesetting, the electrically driven press (1837), the rotary press (1843), and 
photoengraving (1870s) would enable the production of more papers in less time. In addition, the 
desire for efficiency resulted in a standardization of style and content in papers nationwide, 
which was reinforced by the creation of professional associations for journalists, who were 
considered professional by virtue of conforming to these styles (Peterson 1981, 23-26).  
Another impact of industrialization on the newspaper industry was the institutional 
change during the second half of the century from ownership by individuals and partnerships to 
corporations, and eventually to industry leaders who were integrated vertically, horizontally, or 
as conglomerates (Smythe 1985, 3-4). These structures lent themselves to the increased 
specialization of the industrial model, and resulted in the creation of a managerial class and 
individual divisions for them to manage. In U.S. newspapers, these were generally news, 
production, distribution, advertising, and accounting (Baldasty 1992, 82). In addition, as the 
ideology of the factory took hold, the seeds of a centralizing movement designed to promote 
economies of scale were planted.  
Svennik Hoyer, a Norwegian press analyst, offers important insight into the 
industrialization and operation of the newspaper industry. Hoyer suggests that all newspaper 
industries progress through three different phases. In the first phase, which encompasses the 
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earlier part of the century and has already been described, newspapers are introduced into urban 
centers. The second phase of the U.S. newspaper industry occurred in the second half of the 19th 
century, characterized by rapid expansion and an increasing specialization of product to target 
niche audiences. The final phase of the industry is its inevitable concentration (Kaplan 1995).  
These latter two phases bear further scrutiny. The expansion of newspapers across the 
country that marked the second phase was in large part inspired by the economic model of 
commercial journalism which started in the penny press. The effort to attract a wide audience as 
newspapers expanded was tempered by the business concerns faced by any startup, and so even 
in the era of aggressive expansion after the end of the Civil War, efforts towards economic 
efficiency in reporting and production were an integral part of every newspaper’s plans. These 
efforts to reduce and control costs directly impacted both business operations and the content of 
the newspapers. Gerald Baldasty describes the situation: “the constant pursuit of profits created 
working conditions that often sacrificed accuracy and quality for economy, while encouraging 
fabrication and sensationalism.” In addition, newspapers offered a “cafeterialike approach to 
news” that often ignored important issues in favor of commercially beneficial ones. Finally, by 
the end of the century the commercial ideal embraced by the penny press had achieved complete 
dominance as an economic model, along with its particular vision of news. In practice, the 
bottom-line focused tactics of late 19th century newspapers resulted in low pay for reporters, 
driving those with experience out of the business; in addition, bonuses were paid for “sensational 
or exclusive stories,” which encouraged lying and exaggerating (Baldasty 1993, 99-101).  
The content of newspapers was further shaped by the publishers’ need to fill an 
increasing number of pages cheaply and expeditiously. This need ushered in the development of 
the “patent inside.” This product was a conceptual descendant of the commercial press which 
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existed before the penny press, and filled its pages mainly with stories and bulletins clipped from 
other newspapers. Newspaper unions, which were in effect the first newspaper syndicates, 
created half-finished newspapers filled with previously reported stories, and sold them to small 
newspaper operations nationwide. The key to the success of the patent insides was twofold: an 
economy of scale which benefited seller and buyer, and a news product specifically tailored with 
profit in mind, rendered uncompromisingly uncontroversial so as not to offend any potential 
reader. The patent inside provided newspapers started during this time of rapid expansion with 
an inexpensive source of content to use while building their subscriber base and newsgathering 
operations. In another attempt to fill in the blank spaces between advertisements as economically 
as possible, newspapers drew upon the beat system, which is still an important convention of 
journalism in the present day. The beat system drew already prepared materials from places 
where news was plentiful, such as hospitals or police stations (Baldasty 1993, 101-104). The 
usefulness of such a system had been shown in the early part of the century, and during the rapid 
expansion phase it became a vital part of the cost-reduced newsgathering of newspapers 
nationwide.  
The market specialization that Hoyer maintains accompanies the rapid expansion during 
any newspaper industry’s second phase was started by one of the Scripps newspapers, the 
Detroit Evening News. Under the ownership of James E. Scripps in 1873, the News introduced a 
new type of journalism to the market which appealed to the public and translated into economic 
expansion (Kaplan 1995). This new journalism was motivated by three business factors: 
increasing concentration and competition within markets, the rising costs of running a 
newspaper, and the fear of retaliation against its new papers as they entered into established 
markets. Scripps responded to these challenges by establishing very different newspapers from 
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those already in the market, by aggressive cost cutting, and by trying to stay small and obscure 
so as not to provoke the market leaders (Baldasty 1999, 5). These decisions would eventually 
lead to changes not only in journalistic practice, but in organizational structures as well, as an 
examination of challenges and solutions demonstrates.  
There was a dramatic increase in competition in the newspaper industry between 1880 
and World War I, as the number of daily papers tripled and publishers fought for every advertiser 
and every reader. Newspapers increased dramatically in page count as well, requiring more raw 
materials and more staff paychecks to fill the pages. In addition, many newspapers ran expensive 
contests to lure readers to their publication. As a result, existing publications were extremely 
aggressive towards new entrants, and attempted to block them by denying them AP access, by 
offering advertisers lower rates if they would avoid the new papers, or by the use of long term 
subscriptions or discounted subscriptions. Scripps’ solution was an elegant one: rather than meet 
these competitors head-on and try to take away their readership, his newspapers would instead 
look to reach an untapped market.  
Scripps commissioned research studies of the markets his newspapers hoped to enter, and 
used that information to found newspapers which appealed to currently unsupported readership. 
The resulting newspapers shared several characteristics: “working class content and advocacy; 
photographs, illustrations, cartoons and news features...; sports news; and politics.” His papers 
appealed to the working class by covering topics of interest to them and by specifically 
supporting labor unions both in the pages of the paper and with jobs in the organization. Scripps 
believed the working class was underserved democratically and was an as yet untapped source of 
advertising dollars (Baldasty 1999, 5-7). The effort to garner the attention of the working class in 
Detroit was echoed a decade later in New York City, as William Randolph Hearst’s purchase of 
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the New York Journal sparked conflict with Joseph Pulitzer’s New York World. The competing 
penny papers initially tried different paths to victory, with the World attempting to appeal to 
workers on the front page and intellectuals on the editorial page and the Journal embracing mass 
appeal with sensational stories on the front page, worker-friendly editorials, halftone color 
photographs, and the introduction of comic strips. One of those strips, the “Yellow Kid” by 
Richard Outcault, was printed in halftone color as well, and indirectly inspired the derisive 
moniker “Yellow Journalism” for the mass-appeal practices employed by the New York Journal 
(Tebbel 1969, 199-201).14 The two newspapers became even more competitive with the outbreak 
of the Spanish-American War, when “Pulitzer and Hearst concocted a series of news stories, 
editorials, pictures and headlines which constituted the most depressing display of unabashed 
jingoism in the history of American journalism.”15 Eventually Pulitzer ceded the mass appeal 
audience to Hearst and remade the New York World into what he called a “liberal, democratic 
organ” (Tebbel 1969, 202, 205). In point of fact, both Pulitzer and Hearst had embraced political 
coverage when it suited their bottom lines, so this was more of a positioning statement than any 
watershed moment.  
Having created a niche market, Scripps, like its industry predecessors, endeavored to 
meet the demands of that market in the most economically efficient manner. In addition to hiring 
untrained reporters and reducing the size of its newspapers to half that of a typical paper, Scripps 
experimented with new methods of newsgathering, forms of content, and organizational 
                                                 
14 There’s some argument about the direct influence of the cartoon on the name, which was first used three months 
after the start of the cartoon. It is attributed to Evin Wardman’s New York Press, and Wardman had been 
experimenting with other phrases, including “nude journalism” to describe Hearst’s mass-appeal tactics. The two 
events are close enough, though, that one could consider that the cartoon had an influence. W. Joseph Campbell, 
Yellow Journalism: Puncturing the Myths, Defining the Legacies (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001). 
15 Hearst was often accused of starting or escalating the conflict, based on his pre-war telegram to a staff artist in 
Cuba, which said “You furnish the pictures and I’ll furnish the war.” Hearst was also been charged with conspiring 
to blow up the Maine in Havana harbor. John William Tebbel, The Compact History of the American Newspaper 
(New York: Hawthorn Books, 1969), 202.  
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structures including the first newspaper chain. The Scripps-McCrae League of Newspapers was 
officially founded in 1895. It differed from previous multi-newspaper operations in several ways: 
it was the first to have one person oversee the operations of the entire group; it had a corporate 
structure that ensured its newspapers would be treated as a unit; and by virtue of this corporate 
structure, the newspapers in the group would be able to survive the deaths of their founders 
(McPherson 2002, 118).  
Even before the official creation of the chain, Scripps newspapers worked cooperatively 
to overcome the rising costs of publishing, sharing some short articles in 1880 and thereafter. In 
1902, Scripps formalized this sharing among the chain newspapers by creating the centralized 
Newspaper Enterprise Association. The NEA produced anything and everything that could be 
distributed to more than one paper, including cartoons, photographs, illustrations, and news 
features focusing on the major players in the news, a resource the competition lacked. Use of the 
NEA cut the per-column cost of content from $6.40 to 50 cents for the Scripps papers. To ensure 
this economy of scale, Scripps insisted that NEA material account for 25-35% of every issue’s 
non-advertising content; in many cases, the papers averaged 59%. Scripps also formed his own 
telegraph news service called the United Press Association to avoid the AP issue in markets he 
entered, which resulted in a coverage bias toward cities in which Scripps owned newspapers 
(Baldasty 1999, 8-10). This creation of a centralized source for content is a perfect preview of 
some of the economic and newsgathering models which developed in local television 
broadcasting during the latter part of the 20th century. 
The third challenge that new entrants faced during the expansion was the frequent 
retaliation of existing papers in the market against them. Scripps’ response was to keep his 
papers big enough to generate profits but small enough to appear unthreatening, again opting to 
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evade competition as they entered the market. By using NEA content and cutting costs as much 
as possible, these papers were able to maintain a low profile and avoid taking significant 
advertising away from the larger papers and drawing their notice. However, by trying to avoid 
retaliation, the Scripps papers, once established, were locked into the weakest position in the 
market, which left them excessively vulnerable to being eliminated altogether. To mitigate this 
risk, Scripps newspapers entered into “combinations” in several cases, coordinating “advertising 
rates, subscription rates, newspaper pricing, and bids on government printing” (Adams 2002, 
416).  
The first example of coordinated subscription pricing by a Scripps newspaper was in 
1895 with the Pulitzer-owned Post Dispatch in St. Louis. Based on the success of that 
experiment, Scripps worked towards a subscription rate arrangement in Detroit in 1902 as well 
(Adams 1996, 198; Adams 2002, 418-419). In another example of creative cooperation, five St. 
Louis papers, including Scripps’ St. Louis Chronicle, colluded in 1897 to wrest a government 
printing contract away from the market-leading Journal. Three of the papers submitted 
prearranged bids, ensuring that the Republic would present the lowest bid, while the two non-
bidding papers printed negative stories about the Journal. These derogatory reports planted the 
seed of doubt, and the five conspirators were successful in dealing a serious financial blow to the 
market leader. Scripps made another government printing related deal in San Francisco, 
withdrawing from competition in return for increased advertising from companies associated 
with one of the other papers. Another combination was born in 1897 Cincinnati, where Scripps-
McRae and Taft ran competing afternoon papers. The two companies agreed to arrange a trust in 
which each would gain from the other’s increasing profits, and thus would cease actively 
working against one another; they would still maintain complete separate editorial stances and 
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decision making. By virtue of owning several papers, Scripps was able to take successful 
combination strategies developed in one market and replicate them across the entire chain, and 
by 1900, all of the Scripps McRae dailies were involved in combinations (Adams 1996, 196; 
Adams 2002, 419-421).  
The third phase of the newspaper industry began around 1902, as publications failed or 
consolidated, often with the aid of external investment. Concentration was also abetted by 
drastically increased newspaper start-up costs, which effectively eliminated the likelihood of new 
entrants into a market. Advertisers also shifted monies towards the leaders of a market, 
recognizing that the economies of scale which would result from concentration would also result 
in lower advertising costs  (Kaplan 1995). Both Scripps-McRae and Hearst embraced the notion 
of consolidation during the first two decades of the 20th century. These companies, along with 
supermarket magnate Frank Munsey, acquired newspapers with an eye to cutting costs, merging 
them with existing newspapers, or simply buying them out to eliminate competition. Munsey 
was notable for buying the New York Globe in 1923 for the sole purpose of killing it and taking 
its Associated Press membership, having killed and consolidated papers during the preceding 
two decades at an impressive rate. This move towards centralization of ownership across the 
industry is demonstrated by an increasing number of newspaper chains. Between 1910 and 1920, 
the number of newspaper chains rose from 13 to 31. In addition, chain ownership of daily 
newspapers rose dramatically between 1910 and 1930, from 2.8% to 16% (McPherson 2002, 
118-119).  
The atmosphere of cost cutting and concentration which existed during the first two 
decades of the 20th century impacted the Scripps newspapers in a significant way. Editors who 
had been conditioned to rely upon the relatively low cost stories generated by the NEA failed to 
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generate much in the way of local coverage, which further weakened the Scripps papers’ 
positions in their markets as competition increased. This weakened position left the papers 
vulnerable to further slippage as radio broadcasting began to displace newspapers as the source 
for non-local content (Adams and Baldasty 2001, 526-528). Between 1928 and 1933, 50 daily 
newspapers and 1,000 weeklies ceased publication, as circulation and advertising were affected 
by the Depression and the increasing encroachment of radio broadcasting as an advertising 
vehicle (Adams 1997).  
Scripps responded to these market forces with a new cost-cutting tactic, the Joint 
Operating Agreement, a logical extension of its earlier combinations. The first JOA was formed 
between Scripps’ Albuquerque Tribune and the independent Albuquerque Journal in 1933 to 
combat the financial woes of the Depression. A new shared corporation was formed to handle 
business, advertising, circulation and printing for both papers, which kept separate editorial and 
news staffs. Each company received a predetermined portion of the net profits of the shared 
corporation (Adams 1996, 195-196). In 1936, the Scripps Herald-Post and Dorrance Roderick’s 
El Paso Times entered into a similar arrangement, printing both papers from the same equipment, 
and in the following years Scripps implemented JOAs in Nashville and Evansville (Adams 
1997). The JOA was the clear conceptual precursor to many of the organizational structures of 
present-day media industries.   
From this brief history of print news, it is clear to see the impact that changing business 
practices had on both the content and organizational structure of the newspaper publishing 
industry. The 1833 development of a journalism focused on creating an audience to sell to 
advertisers resulted in the creation of practices designed to reliably fill the pages of the 
newspaper with a new kind of news drawn from the social life of the market. The influence of 
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practices spawned by the industrial revolution contributed to a consistent institutional drift 
towards centralization, which expressed itself in early cooperatives and the eventual 
development of larger organizational structures including corporate ownership and newspaper 
chains. These structures were influential on newspaper content, as group owners instituted 
economies of scale resulting in standardization of content in many areas. Finally, this desire for 
cost savings via economies of scale resulted in the development of Joint Operating Agreements 
and the eventual dominance of chain ownership as companies purchased competing papers to 
downsize, merge, or eliminate. These same business models and practices would become vital 
parts of the burgeoning broadcasting industry as well, where the centralizing momentum started 
on the pages of the Sun would continue with broadcasts sent over the airwaves.   
1.2 NEWS ON THE AIR: RADIO BROADCASTING, 1920-1952 
The emergence of radio broadcasting simultaneously presented both threat and opportunity for 
newspaper publishers. As this duality sought a resolution, increasing numbers of radio stations 
fell under the control of newspaper publishers, and the practices and structures of the existing 
medium drastically influenced the development of the new. The years between 1920 and 1950 
were pivotal in the development of broadcast organizational structure, broadcast news practices, 
and broadcast programming. As this section demonstrates, it was during this time that the 
centralization of ownership and operation and the commercialization of news content which had 
begun with newspapers were transferred to the new medium.    
KDKA radio, generally considered to be the United States’ first commercial radio station, 
owes its groundbreaking existence in part to a September 1920 newspaper advertisement. A 
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Pittsburgh department store, Joseph Horne Company, advertised a radio program by amateur 
Frank Conrad in hopes of increasing its sales of radio sets. 16 Shortly thereafter, Westinghouse 
financed Conrad’s efforts in an effort to increase demand for its line of radio sets, officially 
establishing radio station KDKA with an on-air target date set to coincide with the presidential 
election on November 2 (Sterling and Kittross 1978, 59). The KDKA story is interesting in terms 
of both ownership and news. 
On the ownership front, KDKA was one of many early radio operations initiated in the 
hope of achieving some indirect benefit for the owner, as opposed to a desire for direct profits 
from the station. In KDKA’s case, Westinghouse had just released a new line of $125 radio 
receivers and wanted both to publicize its sets and offer entertainment to those who might 
purchase them (Brown 1998, 132). RCA and General Electric acquired stations for the same 
reason, and AT&T also entered the industry in an effort to secure a profitable position in the new 
medium for telephony (Sterling and Kittross 1978, 62, 66). In 1922, however, AT&T broke from 
this model of indirect benefits and began to sell airtime on WEAF in New York City, the first 
step toward the current commercial system of broadcasting in the United States (Croteau and 
Hoynes 2001, 51-52).  
 By May of 1922, there were 99 licensed radio stations. Individuals and businesses alike 
leapt at the opportunity to break into the new medium, leading to a unique distribution of station 
ownership. Newspaper owners were among the first to take action, seeing the new medium as a 
                                                 
16 Conrad, an engineer for Westinghouse, started his station in 1916. During the war, he continued to broadcast a 
station from his home as part of his job designing equipment for the navy. He relaunched his station, 8XK, between 
June and August 1919, and began playing music on October 17, 1919. The music drew an audience, leading to song 
requests and eventually leading to the newspaper advertisement. Christopher H. Sterling and John M. Kittross, Stay 
Tuned: A Concise History of American Broadcasting (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1978), 59. 
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way to augment their current offerings.17 Department stores, following the success of Joseph 
Horne Company, started their own stations to promote radio set sales. Colleges and universities 
started stations “either for instructional purposes or because radio technology was a hot topic in 
the curriculum.” Finally, churches, religious organizations, municipalities, and hobbyists 
rounded out the ownership spectrum (Douglas 1987, 32-33).18 As with the second phase of the 
newspaper industry, the early days of radio were market by rapid expansion, which led to this 
broad diversity of ownership.  
One of the first newspaper publishers to be interested in the new medium was James E. 
Scripps. In 1902, he helped to fund Thomas E. Clark’s radio experiments in Detroit; eighteen 
years later, his son William E. Scripps would turn to Clark for assistance in starting amateur 
station 8MK, which would eventually become WWJ Radio (Barnouw 1966, 4-5, 61-62). WWJ is 
another example of a station started for indirect benefits; in this case, the station was started 
primarily to promote and sell more subscriptions to Scripps’ Detroit News (Brown 1998, 132). 
As radio was developing during the 1920s, the relationship between radio stations and 
newspapers was often cooperative rather than competitive, as neither party saw radio news as a 
serious challenge to newspaper dominance. Newspapers were in a good position to use these 
stations for cross promotion, receiving on air advertisements in return for glowing reviews of 
radio broadcasts in the next day’s paper and a schedule of upcoming programs. In addition, the 
                                                 
17 Newspapers owned 12.6% of all radio stations in 1922. Christopher H. Sterling, Electronic Media: A Guide to 
Trends in Broadcasting and Newer Technologies, 1920-1983 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), 50.  
18 By January 1923, 72 educational institutions, 69 newspapers, 29 department stores, and 12 religious 
organizations, among others, held licenses Barnouw, A Tower in Babel, 4. 
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use of radio news bulletins acted as teasers to draw readers to the next issue of the newspaper 
(Barnouw 1966, 105, 132, 138).19  
 The early broadcasts of KDKA and 8MK are also interesting in terms of news. On 
August 31, 1920, 8MK radio broadcast election results gathered by the Scripps newspaper to a 
potential audience of 50 other radio operators and an estimated 500 listeners. Both 8MK and 
KDKA broadcast presidential election results on November 2nd of that year, in cooperation with 
the newsgathering operations of local newspapers the Detroit News and the Pittsburgh Post 
(Barnouw 1966, 63-64; McPherson 2002, 120). This latter moment of cooperation between the 
media represented the confluence of two kinds of radio news, broadcasts drawn from newspapers 
and special event broadcasts.     
Most often, radio news coverage in the 1920s consisted primarily of brief reports 
acquired from the daily newspaper to fill the time between phonograph records or other dead air, 
generally less than a minute long. The partnership between the stations and the newspapers for 
the election broadcasts is typical of this arrangement. The other occasion where news regularly 
found a home on the airwaves was during notable events. Since the early experiments with the 
medium, broadcasters had used important occasions to demonstrate their technology, and this 
continued as the medium grew. One of Lee De Forest’s first broadcasts was of a famous tenor at 
the Metropolitan Opera, and he later transmitted a review of the Wilson-Hughes election results 
in 1916, echoed by the efforts of 8MK and KDKA in 1920.20 Special event coverage continued 
                                                 
19 News programming was a part of radio broadcasting almost from its inception. Beginning sometime between 
1909 and 1912, news headlines were a part of “Doc” Herrold’s weekly programs from his College of Engineering in 
San Jose, CA. Harrold J. Power started an experimental station in 1915 which also carried news bulletins. In 1917, 
9XM in Madison began sending out weather forecasts in Morse code, replacing them with voice broadcasts 4 years 
later. Ibid., 34, 36, 61. 
20 Lee H. De Forest was America’s “most important early radio pioneer.” Between 1902 and 1906 De Forest 
acquired more than 30 patents for radio technologies, and would gather more than two hundred in his lifetime. 
George H. Douglas, The Early Days of Radio Broadcasting (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1987), 7-8. 
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through the first half of the 1920s, as 200,000 listeners experienced the Dempsey-Carpentier 
fight in 1921, with the number of listeners rising to 10 million for the announcement of Calvin 
Coolidge’s election in 1924; his inauguration was broadcast by 26 stations in 1925 (Brown 1998, 
132-133).     
Competition for airspace was often fierce among the diverse spread of radio operators, 
and eventually resulted in interference across the dial. This interference led to emergency 
legislation: the Federal Radio Act of 1927, which established the Federal Radio Commission as 
the regulatory body with jurisdiction over the medium.21 The Act, which will be described more 
fully in the next chapter, was the impetus for two important industry-wide changes, one in 
ownership and one in news. In enforcing the Act, the Commission pushed many low-power 
broadcasters off the air and allowed the remaining stations to increase transmitter power to 
overcome frequency competition. Additionally, the need for better broadcasting equipment 
created by the government’s more restrictive regulation of the industry resulted in the stations 
owned by hobbyists and small businesses being forced off the air or acquired by larger 
companies. Many of these larger companies which could afford to invest in radio also owned 
newspapers, and the number of newspaper-owned radio stations grew from approximately 5% of 
all stations in the mid-1920s to 13% by 1933 (Sterling and Kittross 1978, 104-105). This 
regulatory response to the interference problem marks the beginning of the centralization phase 
in radio broadcasting, as large businesses including newspapers began to expand their media 
holdings with new stations or the acquisition of poorly performing or lower powered stations 
forced to abandon their licenses.  
                                                 
21 Interference was the catalyst, but was not the only cause for the legislation.  
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The Federal Radio Act of 1927 also required local stations to provide several hours per 
day of public interest programming, which resulted in increased airtime for local news on many 
radio stations. The following year, the Smith-Hoover presidential race was widely covered and a 
desire for regular news programming began to spread; Lincoln, NE station KFAB started two 
news broadcasts daily that year, and two years later KMPC Beverly Hills, CA devoted three 15 
minute periods a day to radio news. These programs were made possible with the assistance of 
local newspapers, who still failed to see the new medium as a threat in news dissemination 
(Brown 1998, 133).  
Radio carried other big news events during the rest of the decade; in 1925 Chicago’s 
WGN broadcast the Scopes trial and in 1927 many stations relayed news about Charles 
Lindbergh’s flight. In 1930 regularly scheduled radio news began on the networks with “Lowell 
Thomas and the News” on NBC and H.V. Kaltenborn’s thrice weekly news reports on CBS 
(Larson 2002, 277; Sterling and Kittross 1978, 122). The following year, CBS blended news and 
drama in The March of Time, which reenacted the biggest news stories of the week for the 
listening audience and cross-promoted Time magazine. Erik Barnouw suggests that the success 
of this show may have been a pivotal factor in an increase of tension between newspapers and 
radio; even as advertising dollars were moving from newspapers to radio, the networks were still 
using the newspapers and wire services for their news content, not yet having their own 
newsgathering operations (Barnouw 1966, 277-278).   
Gary W. Larson writes that there were five important periods of “quickening” in 
broadcast journalism brought on by the conjunction of technology, content, and politics. These 
periods of quickening each had an influence in both the amount of news being broadcast and the 
organizational and ownership structures of radio broadcasting. The first begins in 1922 and 
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extends to 1938; the second covers the years between 1939 and the end of WWII in 1945; and 
the third is comprised of the years between 1945 and 1960. Larson’s periods of quickening serve 
as a useful organizational schema for examining the changing state of broadcast journalism. 22  
The first period begins with the Associated Press’ 1922 declaration that its service was 
not to be used by any broadcast outlets. Although other wire services at the time did not follow 
suit, the decision served as an impetus for many broadcasters to begin their own newsgathering 
efforts (Larson 2002, 277).23 Tension mounted between newspapers and radio stations for the 
next decade, and finally boiled over in 1932. Early that year the Associated Press again denied 
the NBC and CBS radio networks access to its facilities, and they responded by using their own 
newsgathering crews and carrying the 1932 political conventions live. In September of that year, 
radio listeners were treated to the broadcast of another news event, as William Beebe spoke 
though a microphone from a vehicle submerged 2,200 feet in the Atlantic Ocean. These live 
events contributed to a new emphasis on radio news that expressed itself in increased regular 
news programming as well; suddenly many newspapers started to believe that radio was a 
competitor, rather than a partner (Larson 2002, 136). 
It was in this environment that broadcast reformers made their move, as the Ventura Free 
Press anti-radio campaign, fronted by H. O. Davis, attempted to enlist newspapers in opposition 
to radio, fanning the flames of competition. This campaign would result in a number of 
organizational changes in radio broadcasting as commercial broadcasters worked against the 
reform movement, attempting to mollify the newspapers and deflect the reformers in three ways. 
                                                 
22 Larson’s other two moments of quickening are the later switch to FM (and the resulting audience segmentation) 
and the combination of deregulation and satellite delivery of programming to radio stations, neither of which is 
within the scope of this project.   
23 Newspaper owned stations in particular were generally unconcerned with this declaration, as they had 
newsgathering routines in place already. 
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First, commercial broadcasters claimed that radio was generating new advertising dollars, rather 
than taking them away from newspapers. Second, commercial broadcasters positioned 
themselves as members of “the press.” By doing so, they played upon newspapers’ own desires 
for free speech and operation unencumbered by excessive regulation, undercutting the reformers’ 
call for more government intervention in broadcasting. Finally, the networks encouraged 
newspaper investment in radio stations, citing statistics which showed increased profits for 
newspaper-owned stations with network affiliations and claiming that in many cases these profits 
could keep struggling newspapers afloat. Newspaper owners intensified their efforts to acquire 
interests in stations, and where 139 stations had newspaper investors in 1931, a 1932 estimate 
saw that number increase by 100 (McChesney 1993, 167-169).24    
While these efforts by the broadcasters made a difference, they were not a panacea, and 
the battle between radio stations and newspapers continued. Radio news again showed its value 
on February 15, 1933, bringing listeners breaking news of the assassination attempt on President 
Roosevelt’s life long before newspapers could get the story out to the public and again sparking 
conflict (Larson 2002, 136). The Associated Press announced further restrictions on broadcast 
use of its product, but that effort was diminished when the United Press and International News 
Service failed to do the same. In April 1933, the American News Publishers Association agreed 
to discontinue selling news to the radio networks, and the American Press Association ceased 
printing radio listings and schedules. CBS responded by starting its own newsgathering 
operation, the Columbia News Service, and NBC signed a contract with an alternate wire 
service. The ongoing battles culminated in negotiations at the Biltmore Hotel in New York in 
                                                 
24 As McChesney laments in his definitive work on the subject, the reformers would eventually be defeated by the 
machinations of commercial broadcasters, and the commercial system of broadcasting would be made law in the 
Federal Communications Act of 1934. The 1934 Act is more fully discussed in chapter two.  
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December 1933 (Brown 1998, 136-137). Two days of meetings among representatives from the 
wire services, the networks, and newspaper publishers resulted in the “Biltmore Agreement:” the 
networks could air two five-minute news broadcasts per day, one in the morning after 9:30 am 
and one in the evening after 9:00 pm; they could only use copy from the established wire 
services; no breaking news or updates could be broadcast; commercial sponsorship of the 
newscasts was not allowed; and finally, listeners must be encouraged to look to their local 
newspapers for the latest news (Larson 2002, 278).  
Larson claims that this agreement “[molded] the future of broadcast journalism for both 
radio and television” in several ways. First, the decision positioned the newspaper as a news 
medium, and radio as an entertainment medium. Second, independents (stations without a 
network affiliation) who made up about 75% of the market at that time rejected the agreement, 
opting instead to do their own newsgathering.25 It also led NBC and CBS to recast their news 
broadcasts as “commentary” to allow for sponsorship, which changed the style of delivery from 
simply reporting the news to interpreting it, inviting the anchors’ personalities to become part of 
the broadcast. As newspapers continued to buy radio stations and existing stations found ways 
around the issue, first the UP and INS and then finally the AP gave in and lifted their bans in 
1939 (Larson 2002, 278-279). The radio environment had changed dramatically from the 
beginning to the end of Larson’s first period of quickening. The 1927 Act had prompted the 
concentration of ownership in the industry, and the 1934 Act had established the commercial 
                                                 
25 Regional newsgathering networks sprung up to provide news to radio, including the Yankee Network of New 
England, The Radio News Service of America, and The American Broadcasting News Association. Many stations 
also had access to the Radio News Association, which provided news only to broadcasters. Robert J. Brown, 
Manipulating the Ether: The Power of Broadcast Radio in Thirties America (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & 
Company, Inc., 1998), 137. The United Press, the International News Service, and Transradio Press Service were 
also available to radio broadcasters in the mid 1930s. The Associated Press allowed newspaper-owned stations to 
use its product in 1939, and started a separate radio wire in 1941. Sterling and Kittross, Stay Tuned: A Concise 
History of American Broadcasting, 175.  
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nature of the medium. The Biltmore Agreement recast radio as an entertainment medium, and 
compelled broadcasters to switch to a commentary model of news which emphasized the 
personality of the commentator and by doing so deemphasized the substantive news content of 
the broadcasts, all in the name of sponsorship. The commodification of news which had allowed 
the profitable expansion of the newspaper industry was, by the close of Larson’s first period of 
quickening, an important factor in the new medium as well.   
If Larson’s first moment of quickening is characterized by the battle between newspaper 
and radio, the second period of quickening is characterized by a dramatic increase in the 
importance of radio news and the continued drift towards centralized ownership. Newspaper 
owners continued to be interested in acquiring radio stations as increased coverage of news 
events on radio was shown to have a direct correlation with increased sales of newspapers 
covering those same events, suggesting that perhaps the two media could exist in partnership. An 
American News Publishers Association meeting in 1940 focused on ways that newspaper owners 
could profit from radio, and of the 829 stations licensed that year after the meeting, newspaper 
owners accounted for full or partial ownership of 275. In addition, increased access to content 
made news programming more attractive, and the number of local stations carrying news grew 
from 325 in 1936 to 843 in 1941, with network coverage improving as well (Brown 1998, 138). 
Larson locates his second period of quickening in this time of increasing news, beginning 
with H.V. Kaltenborn’s 85 reports over 18 days on the Munich Crisis in 1938 and lasting until 
the end of WWII in 1945. A country generally acclimated to radio as an information source 
through coverage of big events and Roosevelt’s fireside chats naturally turned to radio for news 
about the situation in Europe. Each of the networks provided “roundup” programs, and the 
prominence of the anchors who hosted them grew with each report, enhancing the focus on 
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personality that had begun with the switch from headlines to commentary (Larson 2002, 279-
280). As wartime shortages of paper hindered publishers of newspapers and magazines, radio 
also benefited from increased advertising. In addition, the immediacy of radio, established over a 
decade and a half of scooping newspapers with reports of the biggest stories, was appealing to a 
nation greatly concerned with happenings overseas (Sterling and Kittross 1978, 239). During this 
period several broadcast radio news practices/conventions which would continue into television 
were cemented, including the importance of live coverage, the importance of immediacy in 
relating the news (as compared to newspapers), and the importance of broadcast personalities as 
an element of news coverage.26  
Increasing cross-ownership of newspapers and radio stations, while arguably good for the 
companies’ bottom lines, resulted in a moment of worry on the part of the federal regulators. By 
1940, newspaper companies owned over 30% of the radio stations on air, many of them in the 
same markets as the company’s papers, and almost 25% of FM construction permits. In 1941, a 
Federal Communications Commission27 concerned about diversity in media markets called for 
an investigation into cross-ownership and multiple-ownership, freezing newspaper applications 
for FM stations. Three years later, the Commission decided not to create an official rule 
regarding newspaper and radio cross ownership, and the stage was set for increased cross-media 
investment when the economic demands of WWII were no longer a hindrance (Sterling and 
Kittross 1978, 191-192, 238).   
                                                 
26 The acceptance of personality-driven news commentary resulted in an increase from six to twenty network 
commentators between 1933 and 1939, and made the individual who was delivering the news a vital component in 
news practice from then on. William A. Wood, Electronic Journalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1967), 11.  
27 The Federal Radio Commission was replaced by the Federal Communications Commission in the 
Communications Act of 1934. 
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The third moment of quickening that Larson discusses covers the postwar period until 
1960. Once again major changes in ownership structures and news practices were on hand for 
radio broadcasting, and for the emerging broadcast television service. The combination of a 
rebounding economy and new technical standards for AM radio caused a boom in AM and FM 
radio stations after the war, with the overall number of stations tripling between 1947 and 1952, 
including an increase of 453 local AM radio stations between 1945 and 1950. Ownership 
diversity didn’t increase at the same pace, however, and by 1949, 85% of FM stations were 
owned by AM licensees, often in the same town, and newspaper owners held the licenses of 
about 33% of FM stations. One of the reasons for this lack of diversity in new ownership was the 
considerable expense of starting a new station, which increased the risk for those without ready 
capital and prior experience in broadcasting; as Sterling and Kitross put it, “FM radio and 
television were being built on the profits of AM radio.”28 This lack of ownership diversity in turn 
led to a reduction in the number of FM stations after 1949. Because many AM/FM combos 
carried identical programming on both stations, the lack of original programming on the new FM 
stations failed to provide an incentive for consumers to purchase the new technology. As a result, 
advertisers were also reluctant to embrace FM broadcasting (Sterling and Kittross 1978, 249, 
253-255, 260). 
There were some companies other than newspaper owners who possessed the requisite 
capital and were willing to accept the risks of entering radio broadcasting at this time. One of the 
biggest non-newspaper names in early radio groups was “the Storer Stations,” owned by J. 
Harold Ryan and George Storer. The company began by owning filling stations, and expanded 
into radio, among other businesses. The Storer group made a practice of buying and selling 
                                                 
28 And, at the same time, on the profits of newspapers whose owners also held broadcast licenses. 
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stations, constantly trading up to better properties while racking up capital gains, which were 
taxed at a lower rate than operational profits. Another powerful station group in early radio was 
“the Richards stations,” started by an automobile dealer who purchased three radio stations  
located in Detroit, Cleveland, and Hollywood (Barnouw 1968, 220-221). These groups, along 
with others, would eventually force the FCC to revisit the issues of concentration both within and 
across media as the number of stations controlled by groups increased. In 1929, only 3.3% of 
stations were group owned; by 1939, that number had risen to 14.3% and would continue to rise 
(Sterling 1984, 57).    
Radio news changed as well during Larson’s third period, as some of the most important 
network radio news personalities moved to television, including Edward R. Murrow. The loss of 
its best talent to the new medium required radio news to change in order to remain competitive, 
and technology developed during WWII made such a change possible. Radio journalism used 
new high-quality audiotape to record the voices of newsmakers, and played them back to their 
listeners. At the network level, audiotape made it possible for the networks to provide newsfeeds 
to their affiliates for use in local broadcasts.29 New technology also made it easier to broadcast 
from remote locations with ease, giving radio the advantage over television when covering live 
events or breaking news (Larson 2002, 280-281). Nonetheless, as the next section will show, 
radio was soon to lose its place as the dominant broadcast source for news. 
The development of radio broadcasting was deeply influenced by the ownership 
structures and operational practices of the newspaper industry. The centralization of ownership 
                                                 
29 One of the earliest uses of audiotape for delayed playback is attributed to Bing Crosby, who had seen tape 
recorders during his USO tours in WWII. Tired of doing separate live broadcasts for the east and west coasts each 
evening, he arranged to record his early show and play the recording back later for the west coast. Since NBC had a 
“no recordings” policy in effect, Crosby moved his show to CBS. Allegedly, Crosby’s motivation to employ the new 
technology had a great deal to do with his desire to spend more time golfing. Sterling and Kittross, Stay Tuned: A 
Concise History of American Broadcasting, 251.  
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and operation which had begun in the earlier medium was quickly embraced in the new one as 
well. In addition, the commodified nature of news which began in the penny press also 
transferred into radio, spurred by regulation requiring broadcasters to fill a certain portion of 
their schedules with public service programs. Even as radio evolved, the newspaper industry 
continued to play a role through its ownership of broadcast stations, and the business structures 
and practices instituted by newspaper chains became part of the radio industry as well. Both of 
these media would have further impact on the emerging system of television broadcasting.  
1.3 NEWS IN THE TELEVISION AGE, 1945-1980 
Television is visual. Radio is aural. This stark polarity is true, but profoundly 
misleading. It gets in the way of a proper understanding of television’s past. It 
blinds us to the many things that hold these two media together – not least that 
radio’s history between the 1920s and the early 1950s established very many of 
the defining structures and practices of the television era (Hendy 2003, 4). 
 
The preceding two sections have established the historical basis for the development and growth 
of television broadcasting by tracing the development of both organizational structures and news 
practices from the early days of newspaper publishing through the era in which radio 
broadcasting achieved dominance. As the passage above indicates and this section will 
demonstrate, these organizational and operational elements which were fine tuned in radio 
broadcasting passed almost wholly unchanged into the new medium of television. 
In 1945, only six TV stations were on the air, in New York, Washington, Schenectady, 
Chicago, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles (Sterling and Kittross 1978, 255). As Kittross and 
Sterling observed, entering the broadcasting business in the years following WWII was 
undeniably an expensive proposition; however it was far more expensive to become a television 
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broadcaster than a radio broadcaster. The $15,000 which a broadcaster might spend to fully outfit 
a small radio station would buy only one camera chain,30 and to outfit an entire television station 
might cost upwards of a million dollars. As a result early growth was slow, with six new 
television stations signing on in 1946, and only four more reaching the airwaves the following 
year (Inglis 1990, 189). Because of the startup and operating expenses involved, ownership of 
early television stations was limited to two groups: television equipment manufacturers 
(Dumont, GE, and RCA) and owners of AM radio stations (Sterling and Kittross 1978, 259). 
In a 1947 speech, David Sarnoff encouraged NBC Radio affiliates to start television 
stations, and whether as a result or by coincidence, 35 stations were added the following year, 47 
were added in 1949, and another nine stations added in 1950 brought the total to 107 stations on 
the air (Inglis 1990, 193). The overall economic climate and operating philosophies that caused 
newspapers to form combinations and chains and made common and multiple ownership of radio 
and newspaper outlets a preferred model were at work in this new medium as well: in 1951, of 
those 107 stations, 49.5% were group-owned (Gelman 1965, 40). Many of these new group 
owners were cross-media owners, newspaper companies that either already owned AM stations 
or were breaking into broadcasting with television, and by 1952 newspaper companies had an 
interest in 45% of the television stations on the air, with a corresponding decline in radio station 
ownership from 30% in 1940 to 20% in 1952 (Sterling and Kittross 1978, 260).  
In part, it was the centralizing momentum of newspaper combinations, radio group 
ownership, and the economies of scale which they provided that led to similar patterns of 
organization in television, especially when the owners of these other media invested in the new 
                                                 
30 A camera chain refers to all of the equipment required to operate one studio camera, and is only a very small part 
of the expense involved in starting a television station. 
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one. When combined with the extravagant expenses demanded by the new medium, 
consolidation seemed an attractive solution.  
Television costs tended to encourage multiple-station ownership, whereby an 
owner could apply economies of scale to management even if it had only one 
station in a given region, since television owners often were larger corporations 
with nationwide interests, whereas radio was generally considered small business 
(Sterling and Kittross 1978, 260).  
 
Early concerns about conglomeration had been addressed in 1941, when the FCC instituted the 
duopoly rule, which prevented one AM licensee from operating two AM radio stations in the 
same market (Sterling and Kittross 1978, 191). This rule, however did not forbid an owner in one 
medium from owning an outlet in each of the others, and as FM radio and then television became 
popular, the increase in outlets led to less, rather than more, ownership diversity (Sterling and 
Kittross 1978, 260). Eventually the FCC would adopt rules to control some issues associated 
with ownership concentration, but the model of group ownership that existed at the start of the 
television broadcasting industry would expand and continue unabated into the present day. 
The first television station group was the DuMont Broadcasting Company, which owned 
three stations prior to starting its own network in 1949; both the station group and the network 
were disbanded 6 years later.31 Its first television station, WABD in New York, signed on May 
2, 1944; its second, WTTG in Washington began operation on January 1, 1947; and its third, 
WDTV in Pittsburgh, began on January 11, 1949. The second group was Paramount Pictures, 
and the third was NBC. At the start of 1948, only these three groups owned two or more 
television stations. When the FCC instituted a licensing freeze on September 29, 1948, there 
were 108 stations authorized to begin or continue broadcasting, all of which would be on the air 
                                                 
31 DuMont’s first two stations were sold together to the Metromedia Group in 1955. WDTV was sold to 
Westinghouse and renamed KDKA-TV. Herbert H. Howard, "The Contemporary Status of Television Group 
Ownership," Journalism Quarterly 53 (1976): 399. 
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four years later when the freeze was lifted. Just less than half of those stations were owned by the 
nineteen groups which held multiple licenses at the moment of the freeze; of those groups, four 
were networks (DuMont, NBC, ABC, and CBS) and 15 were independents (Howard 1976, 399-
340). 32   
The majority of the stations on the air when the freeze was lifted in 1952 were turning a 
profit, which made television licenses seem like a good investment. The resulting demand for 
new licenses created a competitive atmosphere, and FCC policy decisions made at the time 
favored applications from individual licensees, rather than multi-station groups. Because of this 
regulatory stance, only six groups held the maximum allowance of five television licenses prior 
to the FCC’s decision to increase the limit to seven in 1954 (Howard 1976, 400).  
During the 1950s, station groups increased their purchases of existing stations, avoiding 
the issue of dealing with competing applications that was required by the FCC when applying for 
a new license, a tactic which the radio groups had previously employed with much success. 
There were three categories of multiple-owners present in the 1950s, according to Howard: the 
networks, radio groups with interests in television, and new companies. These groups sought to 
improve their positions in several ways during the 1950s and 1960s, demonstrating a constant 
momentum towards centralization of operations and concentration of ownership. First and 
foremost, they worked to reach the ownership limit. Second, they sought to own the most 
valuable stations possible, and engaged in what Howard calls “trading up,” selling stations in 
smaller markets and buying ones in bigger markets. Third, following the examples of 
newspapers and radio groups before them, the largest station groups began to centralize some 
management and oversight functions for their stations at corporate headquarters. Some groups 
                                                 
32 Howard lists Storer Broadcasting Company as the most prominent of the independents, followed by General 
Teleradio, Crosley, Cox Enterprises, Scripps-Howard, and the Chicago Tribune.  Ibid.: 400. 
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also began to produce programs for syndication both within and beyond their stations and create 
news bureaus for their stations to share. By 1970, it was common for separately owned groups to 
cooperate in producing programs for syndication, and 13 station groups had Washington news 
bureaus for their stations (Howard 1976, 401).  
 
Table 1: Media Ownership33
Year Group-Owned 
(top-100 markets)
Cross-Ownership 
(top-100 markets)
Maximum owners 
(number of groups) 
1975 71% 22% 4 (7 station limit) 
1982 79% 33% 8  (7 station limit) 
1989 78.1% 24.7% 5  (12 station limit) 
1995 74.5% 22.5%  
1997 81.2% 27.2%  
 
Table 1 offers a snapshot of the centralizing momentum of the industry between 1975 and 
1997, providing percentages of television stations in the top 100 markets which were owned by 
station groups and of television stations in the top 100 markets whose owners also owned 
newspapers. It demonstrates an overall increase in ownership concentration during that time 
period, as well as an increase in cross-ownership, and offers limited evidence of a trend towards 
maximum ownership. In his 1997 analysis, Howard described the two year period surrounding 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as the most dramatic in terms of consolidation. Between 
                                                 
33 Sources include the following: 1975: Ibid.: 402-403. 1982: Herbert H. Howard, "An Update on TV Ownership 
Patterns," Journalism Quarterly  (1983): 397-399. 1989: Herbert H. Howard, "Group and Cross-Media Ownership 
of TV Stations: A 1989 Update," Journalism Quarterly  (1989): 788-791. 1995: Herbert H. Howard, "TV Station 
Group and Cross-Media Ownership: A 1995 Update," Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 72, no. 2 
(1995): 394, 399. 1997: Herbert H. Howard, "The 1996 Telecommunications Act and TV Station Ownership: 1 Year 
Later," Journal of Media Economics 11, no. 3 (1997): 26-28, 30..  Howard failed to detail maximum ownership 
during the last two studies, most likely because it had shifted to an audience-reach calculation, instead of a 
maximum number of stations. 
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1995 and 1997, 40 existing groups were absorbed through mergers and acquisitions, and 20 new 
groups entered the industry, resulting in a lower number of groups and a higher number of 
stations per owner. Howard also observed that the number of stations per group increased from 
4.3 to 5.5 between 1995 and 1997, the largest jump ever, and that the increase in group 
ownership of UHF stations during those two years also exceeded previous intervals (Howard 
1997, 26-28, 30).       
The trend towards centralization and consolidation in television station ownership has 
been quite pronounced outside the top 100 markets as well. Christopher H. Sterling provides 
yearly summaries of group ownership by percentage of the total number of commercial 
broadcast stations: 53.1% of stations were group owned in 1950, 40.1% in 1955, 48.9% in 1960, 
54.5% in 1965, 57.4% in 1975, 68.9% in 1980, and a whopping 73.3% in 1983 (1984, 60). As 
the preceding paragraphs have demonstrated, the dominant paradigm for television ownership 
has always been group ownership. As the new medium was built upon the knowledge developed 
in a century of newspaper and radio broadcast operations, the economies of scale offered by such 
a structural arrangement made it the logical choice. The extreme expense of operating a 
television station, when compared with radio and newspapers, only reinforced the need to run 
stations as efficiently as possible. Thus did the structural arrangements from the earlier media, 
including group ownership, cooperative efforts, and joint operating agreements move into 
television broadcasting.  
The same transfer process occurred in television news, which “grew from its audio 
predecessor and profited in many ways from what had been learned the hard way by the first of 
the electronic media” (Wood 1967, #13). William Wood suggests that television borrowed three 
kinds of news programming from radio: special events, regularly scheduled programs, and in-
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depth news programs and documentaries. The earliest television broadcasts were mainly of 
special events, echoing the early days of radio. These events included commemorations of the 
end of WWII, the 1945 Macy’s Thanksgiving Day Parade, a UN Security Council meeting in 
1946, President Truman’s address to Congress the following year, and the first television 
broadcast from the White House also in 1947 (Wood 1967, 14-15). Again following the path that 
radio had blazed, television networks broadcast the 1948 political conventions via airborne 
relays from coast to coast, and estimates claim viewership by more than 10 million people 
(Wood 1967, 15). 
The success of event programs proved that there was a potentially large audience for 
televised news. NBC had been experimenting with regular news since 1945, and in 1947 
contracted with Jerry Fairbanks Productions to provide newsreels for broadcasts, switching to 
Fox Movietone a year later. CBS signed a similar contract with Telenews, another newsreel 
provider. Outsourcing the picture portion of the news was most economically expedient as the 
networks experimented; later they would develop their own news-film departments (Barnouw 
1970, 41). By 1949 the networks offered several regularly scheduled and sponsored news 
programs, some of which had existed before, but on a sustaining basis.34 The installation of a 
network of cable and microwave connections enabled the entire country to see the network news 
programs in 1951, and some affiliates began to air local news programs adjacent to the network 
shows (Wood 1967, 16-17).  
The third type of news programming borrowed from radio was the in-depth news special 
or documentary. The success of the CBS radio documentary series Hear it Now, which featured 
                                                 
34 “A program which does not receive commercial sponsorship or advertising support is known as a sustaining 
program.” Suzanne Williams-Rautiolla, "Sustaining Program," in The Encyclopedia of Television, ed. Horace 
Newcomb (New York: Museum of Television & Radio, 1997).   
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Edward R. Murrow and Fred Friendly, led to the creation of See it Now in the early 1950s and to 
the defection of those prized personalities from radio to television (Wood 1967, 18). This 
documentary trend would live on in programs such as 60 Minutes, and would eventually receive 
additional airtime with the explosion of network news magazines in the early 1990s.      
By 1964, surveys showed that television had moved ahead of newspapers and radio 
broadcasting as the public’s main source for news (Wood 1967, 5). Four years later, WABC in 
New York revolutionized local television news. Before that time, local news on most television 
stations was a 15 minute block of a single anchor reciting the news of the day, occasionally 
complemented by a random piece of film. WABC, at the time a major cash source helping to 
support the ABC network as a whole, offered a new model for local news which contributed to 
the expansion of local news broadcasts. “Eyewitness News” on WABC featured field reporters 
who would cover stories firsthand, with a dramatic increase in the use of images other than the 
single anchor’s talking head during the newscast. In addition, the broadcast featured an anchor 
team, flashier set design, and exciting music. Eyewitness News netted WABC an additional 
500,000 viewers over the next two years and the station was number one in the market in 1972 
(Allen 1997, 12-13). This change emphasized both the live nature of television news, via the 
reporters and the increased use of field footage, and the personality driven element of television 
news, both practices begun in radio decades before.   
In 1971, television station consultants McHugh & Hoffman ran an advertisement in 
Broadcasting with the headline “It’s News.” The advertisement continued “local television news 
develops a warm, trusting and dependent relationship between the audience and the station that is 
essential to success, and it does it on a daily basis.” Through news consultants, the Eyewitness 
News model was disseminated to stations across the country (Baker and Dessart 1998, 128-129).  
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Although some stations had made money on news programming, prior to this time it was still 
thought of as primarily a public interest operation by broadcasters. During the 1970s that attitude 
changed, and station managers realized that they could received substantial profit from 
newscasts. As a result, local news operations expanded the coverage of their early evening 
programs and added morning, noon, and late night broadcasts as well (Kaniss 1991, 102).  
This financially driven expansion would further cement the nature of news as 
commodity, and in combination with relaxing regulation and changing ownership structures, 
would dramatically change the television broadcasting industry. The organizational structures, 
operational practices, and journalistic conventions developed in newspapers and refined in radio 
broadcasting would continue to play a major role in television broadcasting as the centralizing 
momentum impacted the new medium. The continuing story of broadcast television ownership 
and broadcast television news will be told throughout the rest of this project in various 
examinations of the way regulation, technology, and economics impacted and were impacted by 
the industry. But first, three more pieces of historical perspective.  
1.4 EXAMINING THE EXEMPLARS 
This brief history of the interactions among ownership, organizational structures, economic and 
social conditions, and the development of news practices has shown that structure matters; it 
undeniably influences the practices and content of station programming, most importantly of 
broadcast news. The remainder of this project builds upon this base, examining the other factors 
which have influenced both structure and practice. Part of this examination is a limited case-
study approach, looking closely at the structures and practices of three particular station groups 
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which represent larger trends in the industry. Before progressing further, it is useful to quickly 
examine the histories of these groups, which are exemplars for investigating the ways that 
structure, practice, policy, technology, and economics have interacted in local television 
broadcasting.   
1.4.1 Hearst-Argyle Television  
The first of these companies, Hearst-Argyle Television, has the distinction of being the oldest of 
the four. It is a descendant of the original Hearst publishing company, started by its namesake, 
William Randolph Hearst. Hearst is legendary in the media business, and his company serves as 
a perfect example of growth, integration, and concentration of ownership. In 1887, Hearst started 
his media operations as the proprietor of the San Francisco Chronicle. By 1913, Hearst owned 6 
newspapers, in Boston, San Francisco, New York, Los Angeles, Atlanta, and San Francisco. He 
spent the next two and a half decades buying, selling, and merging newspapers, ending up with 
seventeen in 1940. By 1960, the tally was down to 13 dailies and nine Sunday editions, but it 
was still enough to lead all newspaper companies in circulation with over four million daily 
(Tebbel 1969, 239, 242). In addition to the Hearst Corporation’s newspaper holdings, the 
company also owned a syndication company (King Features Syndicate) and a large array of 
magazines by the time it was ready to move into the broadcast arena (Hearst 2005). 
The Hearst Corporation entered broadcasting by acquiring WSOE (later WISN) radio in 
Milwaukee in 1928. By 1935, the company had added WTAE (Pittsburgh) and WBAL 
(Baltimore) to its holdings in radio broadcasting. In 1948, Hearst acquired WBAL-TV, the 19th 
television station in the country, to complement their radio station in the same market. The 
Hearst Corporation reprised this formula with its other radio holdings in the 1950s, launching 
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WTAE-TV and acquiring WISN-TV (Milwaukee). In the 1980s, the Hearst broadcast division 
added 3 more television stations: WDTN (Dayton), KMBC (Kansas City), and the nationally 
recognized WCBV (Boston). In addition, Hearst entered the cable television marketplace in 
1984, as a founding partner in the A&E and Lifetime networks. In 1991, Hearst increased its 
stake in cable television by acquiring a 20% ownership interest in ESPN (Hearst-Argyle 2005b) 
(Hearst 2005). 
1997 was a pivotal year for the Hearst broadcast division. Having added two more 
television stations previously during the decade, Hearst added another station in 1997, WPBF 
(West Palm Beach) and then merged with the 8-station Argyle Company to form Hearst-Argyle 
Television, a publicly traded company with Hearst Corporation as the majority shareholder. 
After the merger, the pace of station acquisition quickened. In 1998, Hearst-Argyle swapped 
television stations WDTN-TV and WNAC-TV for KSBW (Monterey-Salinas) and 
WPTZ/WNNE (Burlington/Plattsburgh), and announced deals to acquire the Pulitzer broadcast 
group’s nine television and five ratio stations, and the Kelly Broadcasting television stations in 
Sacramento, KCRA-TV and KQCA-TV (under a local marketing agreement). In 1999, those 
deals were completed (except for the LMA, which was completed the following year), bringing 
Hearst-Argyle to a total of 26 television and 7 radio stations (Hearst-Argyle 2005b) (Hearst 
2005).  
Also in 1999, Hearst-Argyle formed a partnership with Internet Broadcasting Systems, 
acquiring a 30% stake in that company. Internet Broadcasting Systems specializes in creating 
websites for television stations, and the two companies envisioned creating a network of 
websites for the Hearst-Argyle properties. Finally, in 2001, Hearst-Argyle, Emmis 
Communications, and Imes Communications arranged a three-way trade in which Hearst gave up 
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3 radio stations in Phoenix, exchanging them for WMUR-TV in Manchester (Hearst-Argyle 
2005b) (Hearst 2005). 
In 2006, Hearst-Argyle Television owns 25 television stations, and manages 3 others, in 
addition to managing 2 radio stations. It is the largest ABC affiliate group, the second-largest 
NBC affiliate group, and reaches 18% of U.S. households (Hearst-Argyle 2005a). Hearst-Argyle 
has long used economies of scale among its stations, in technical purchases, graphic design, and 
group organization. It will serve in this project as the station group which best represents the 
practices of television station groups as a whole. While Hearst-Argyle does not use the sorts of 
innovative models presented by the other two groups, the models it does use are employed by 
many other players in the industry.  
1.4.2 Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. 
In 1971, Julian Sinclair Smith entered television broadcasting with the first UHF television 
station in Baltimore, WBFF-TV. The success of this station led his four sons to imagine a station 
group made up of existing UHF stations, and in 1986 they formed the Sinclair Broadcast Group, 
buying out their parents’ share of the company in 1990. In 1991, the group acquired WPGH-TV 
in Pittsburgh, and introduced the first local marketing agreement, allowing the group to program 
an additional station in the same market as one it owned (Sinclair Broadcast Group 2005). The 
LMA was one of the first steps towards all-out centralization; a chink in the regulatory armor 
that permitted the de facto operation of two stations in the same market, at a time when owning 
two stations in the same market was still prohibited by the FCC. 
In 1994, Sinclair Broadcast Group acquired four more stations. In 1995, Sinclair went 
public, and immediately used the capitalization to purchase five more stations in four markets. In 
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1996, Sinclair became the largest non-network station owner in the U.S. by acquiring River City 
Broadcasting, bringing the group’s total holdings to 28 television stations in 21 markets, and 23 
radio stations in 7 markets. In 1998, Sinclair Broadcast Group acquired Heritage, Sullivan 
Broadcasting, and Max Media, doubling its size (Sinclair Broadcast Group 2005).  
On the basis of its success in television broadcasting, Sinclair Broadcast Group 
diversified in 1999, acquiring an 89% interest in an e-business company and 32% interest in a 
manufacturer of television transmitters and associated broadcast equipment, Acrodyne 
Communications, Inc. That same year, Sinclair Broadcast Group divested its radio stations to 
focus on television (Sinclair Broadcast Group 2005).  
Sinclair Broadcast Group believed that the idea of national advertising had run its course, 
and that future profit rested in attracting advertisers at the local level. Focused on this goal, in 
2002 the group launched a local news network, News Central, ostensibly to provide local 
markets that could not otherwise support news with the means to do so at the lowest cost 
possible (Sinclair Broadcast Group 2005). It is this news network, in addition to the overall 
philosophy and operations of the group, that makes Sinclair Broadcast group especially 
interesting in terms of this study, as it is a unique model of local television ownership and 
operation.  
1.4.3 Cox Television 
The third of these companies, Cox Television, is a subsidiary of Cox Enterprises, Inc., which has 
holdings in television, radio, cable, newspapers, and automobile auctions. James M. Cox, once a 
school teacher and at the time a newspaper reporter, borrowed money from family and friends in 
1898 and used it to purchase the Dayton Evening News. In 1934, after three terms as the 
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governor of Ohio and an unsuccessful bid to become the democratic presidential nominee, Cox 
entered broadcasting with the establishment of WHIO radio in Dayton.  Five years later, Cox 
acquired the Atlanta Journal newspaper and its radio station, WSB-AM. In 1948, Cox added a 
television station and another radio station to its broadcast holdings, WSB-TV and WSB-FM in 
Atlanta. 
The beginnings of WSB-TV are a superlative example of the way in which television 
broadcasting was built upon the foundations of radio and newspapers in circumstances of cross-
media ownership. The technology of the new medium was a challenge, but Cox had to look no 
further than its own radio operations to staff the new television station. With technical and 
management crews already familiar with broadcast technology, the company had an advantage in 
implementing its television operation. The Atlanta Journal wasn’t forgotten either; it began a “T-
day countdown” on its front page for the 29 days prior to the station’s debut. Cox also partnered 
with a local department store, Rich’s, giving a preview of the new television service via closed-
circuit on the third floor bridge of their downtown store. The Atlanta Journal followed those 
previews with reviews of the programming shown during them, hearkening back to similar 
practices for co-owned newspaper and radio stations. The Journal also benefited from heavy 
advertising for television receivers by local appliance stores. In this way, all of the Cox media 
holdings in Atlanta cooperated and benefited from the launch of WSB-TV (Carter 1997, 82-86). 
Cox Enterprises entered the cable business in 1962, purchasing systems in Pennsylvania, 
California, Oregon, and Washington, and two years later integrated the Cox newspapers when 
Cox Broadcasting went public. The cable business expanded dramatically in 1994 through 
partnerships with Sprint, TCI, and Comcast, and a year later Cox Cable merged with Times 
Mirror’s cable systems, giving Cox Communications, Inc. access to over 3 million homes via 
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cable. In 1996, Cox Radio went public, and acquired New City the following year, adding 12 FM 
and 6 AM stations to its holdings. Currently, Cox Radio owns, operates, or services 78 radio 
stations, and Cox Television owns 15 television stations, among them the NBC affiliates that 
form a cluster around the Pittsburgh television market. The company still has newspaper 
holdings as well, amounting to 17 daily papers and 25 non-daily (Cox 2005). Cox Broadcasting 
offers a unique model because of its regional clustering philosophy, which tends towards a 
higher degree of localism than many other group strategies.     
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2.0  BROADCAST OWNERSHIP, GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION, THE 
PURSUIT OF PROFIT, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
With commercial broadcasting, the person who pays for the broadcast of a 
program is the advertiser. It follows that the programs broadcast are those which 
maximize the profits to be derived from advertising. The market for broadcast 
programs is one from which the consumer is barred: what he would pay plays no 
part in the determination of programs. The result is that some sectors of the public 
feel that they are not being catered for. The FCC is uneasily aware that all is not 
well. And so it has exhorted the businessmen to act in the public interest and, 
incidentally, against their own. It seems clear that in this case the highest motive 
was not the strongest (Coase 1966, 446).  
 
The dual nature of broadcasting – part business, part servant of the public interest – has placed it 
in a unique position in regard to governmental intervention, as R.H. Coase so eloquently 
described. The broadcaster will, of course, attempt to make as much money as possible, that 
being the role of businessperson in a free market economy. The Federal Communications 
Commission, in attempting to oversee broadcasting through the lens of the (deliberately) ill-
defined “public interest,” is influenced by politics present and past, and is further limited in the 
policies it can set by the very commercial nature of the medium it is attempting to regulate 
(Coase 1966, 441-442).35  These influences on regulation and regulation’s influence on the 
structure and practices of the industry in turn are the focus of this chapter.    
                                                 
35 Coase, an academic economist, continues: “The task of charting a sensible future for the broadcasting industry is 
not one which can be left to the industry, which has its own interests to protect. It cannot be left to the Federal 
Communications Commission, which cannot conceive of any future which is not essentially a repetition of the past. 
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The previous chapter illustrated the many ways in which broad social trends and 
industry-specific changes affected media ownership and operation, resulting in a consistent 
centralizing momentum beginning in the newspaper industry and continuing in broadcasting. 
Chapter One also demonstrated the effect of these changes on the nature of news and journalistic 
practice, detailing the increasing commodification of news in the penny press and the eventual 
transfer of those conventions and perspectives into the broadcast media. In describing the 
historical trajectory of structure and practice in the media, Chapter One illustrated the effects of 
government regulation on broadcasting without delving deeply into the complex influences 
which created such regulation; such is the task of this chapter. Unlike in the newspaper industry 
which preceded it, extensive government regulation has been a key factor in the development of 
broadcasting, impacting virtually every area of the industry.  
The FCC’s decision to use the “public interest, convenience, and necessity” as a guide in 
determining and applying broadcast policy strongly impacted the structure and practices of the 
industry from the time of its initial articulation in the Radio Act of 1927. At first glance, the 
terminology seems to be a clear mandate that broadcasters should act in the public interest, 
subordinating their immediate economic interests as necessary to fulfill this obligation. In reality, 
however, the “public interest” language has always been a point of contention between regulators 
and broadcasters, and changing interpretations of the public interest language prompted by these 
contests have resulted in constantly changing boundaries of structure and practice. It is the 
ultimate goal of this chapter to demonstrate the influence of these regulations on broadcast 
ownership, organizational structures, and the programming product of the stations, and by doing 
                                                                                                                                                             
Who, therefore, is to perform this task? I suggest that it has to be assumed by academic economists.” R. H. Coase, 
"The Economics of Broadcasting and Government Policy," The American Economic Review 56, no. 1/2 (1966): 446. 
While his call to the academic community of economists was apparently unsuccessful, Coase’s perspective on the 
inability of the other two groups to adequately regulate the industry is compelling.  
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so further illuminate the causes and effects of the economically motivated centralizing 
momentum at the heart of the industry. In addition, the chapter will demonstrate the steady 
transformation of broadcast news from an initial emphasis on news as a public service to the 
current view of news as an extremely valuable source of profit for local television stations, a 
change which occurred in concert with and partially as a result of the centralizing momentum in 
ownership and organization. 
Broadcast regulation has often had a cascade effect, as even the earliest attempts to 
control the industry have significantly influenced later efforts towards the same goal, and thus it 
is important to begin at the beginning by examining the social and industrial conditions which 
led to the first regulation. This chapter examines the broadcast industry from the inception of 
wireless telegraphy in the United States to the present state of deregulation, organized into four 
periods which encompass differing regulatory environments. During each of the periods, 
decisions were made which impacted both industry structure and practice, and which constrained 
the possibilities of future decisions. The first period covers the decade following Marconi’s 
arrival in America in 1899, a time of unregulated competition to define the new medium which 
had a profound impact on the shape that the industry would take. The second period begins with 
the first official broadcast legislation in 1910 and extends to the chaotic airwaves of 1926. This 
period was a time of limited regulation, as parties with a stake in the new technology battled for 
influence and supremacy, and the industry shifted from Marconi’s model of point-to-point 
transmission to the current model of broadcasting. During this period military and corporate 
primacies were assured and existing regulation proved inappropriate to the new model of 
broadcasting, resulting in airwaves filled with almost constant interference. The third period 
stretches from the Radio Act of 1927 until 1978, and represents the time of greatest industry 
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regulation. Changing interpretations of the public interest conditioned the growth of the industry 
in important ways during this time span, and the new addition of television to the broadcasting 
industry created challenges aplenty for regulators. The centralizing momentum present in radio 
broadcasting shifted to the new medium during this period as regulators applied existing 
constraints to the new technology. Finally, the fourth period is comprised of the years since 
1979, which ushered in attempts to update the Communications Act of 1934 in response to new 
technologies and perspectives and dramatically changed the nature of broadcast regulation, 
eventually leading to almost complete deregulation of the industry. In each of these sections, the 
chapter will describe the regulatory environment, the evolving understanding of broadcasting in 
the public interest, the industry’s recursive influence on the regulatory process, and the effects of 
these factors on ownership and organizational structure, practice, and the program product of 
local television stations.  
 
2.1 WIRELESS TELEGRAPHY AND THE BATTLE FOR THE AIRWAVES: 1899-
1909 
“If there ever was a period when radio was truly free and unfettered, when it resembled the 
utopia suggested by the rhetoric of today’s free marketeers, it was during radio’s first decade” 
writes Thomas Streeter in his critique of U.S. communications policy, Selling the Air (1996, 63). 
The story of broadcast regulation in the United States begins during this time period, two 
decades before the technology fully emerged to take center stage in 1920. Streeter describes the 
time as one in which four different groups each espoused its own vision of what the medium 
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could be and fought for the right to mold wireless to its benefit. These four groups were the 
amateurs and hobbyists, the inventor-entrepreneurs, the military, and the corporations (Streeter 
1996, 63-64). 
Although this first period is devoid of official regulation, the demand for such regulation 
emerges through the competitive actions of these four groups during this period. By the end of 
the first decade of wireless telegraphy, the technology was a growing part of the newspaper 
industry, the military had seized the primary position of influence upon the industry, and the 
boundaries for the battles over structure which would occur shortly thereafter were set. Early 
indications of the centralizing momentum in the new industry can be seen in the efforts to 
establish order in the chaos of early wireless, generally by consolidating control of wireless 
transmitters in the hands of the military and the commercial interests. In addition, it is during this 
period that the basis for wireless as a commercial enterprise was established.  
Marconi’s invention of the wireless telegraph publicly debuted in America at the behest 
of the New York Herald, which contracted with Marconi to transmit results from the America’s 
Cup Yacht Races in October 1899 and by doing so initiated a new standard for speedy 
newsgathering by publishers (Douglas 1987, 8-9). Marconi’s vision of wireless telegraphy was 
of a commercial system which would supplement the existing wired infrastructure, and his 
company focused its efforts during this decade on spanning the Atlantic Ocean with its 
transmissions. The initial success of the new technology resulted in new inventor/entrepreneurs 
entering the field between 1899 and 1905, each attempting to refine and improve upon Marconi’s 
invention through their own vision of the industry. Two significant examples are Reginald 
Fessenden and Lee De Forest. Fessenden worked to create quick profits for his company by 
creating connections between major metropolitan areas and selling equipment to whoever would 
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buy. Fessenden was instrumental in helping to design an alternator which would become an 
important part of the later industry as his company competed with Marconi to transmit across the 
Atlantic Ocean. Lee De Forest traded on patriotism in his competition with Marconi, raising an 
issue which would become an important one in the following decade, and became a popular icon 
associated with the new technology that he helped to popularize (Douglas 1987, 66-67, 85-91, 
94-98).  
The U.S. navy was understandably interested in this new technology as a means to 
communicate among ships and shore stations from the moment it was first demonstrated, and 
began its own investigations in 1901 after failing to negotiate an acceptable contract with 
Marconi. The military’s concern with wireless grew in response to the Russo-Japanese War in 
1904, and suddenly “the issues of who had priority in the airwaves, how respective spheres could 
be delineated, and how commercial stations could be prevented from interfering with 
government stations became pressing” (Douglas 1987, 111, 114, 123).  
President Roosevelt created the Interdepartmental Board of Wireless Telegraphy in June 
of 1904 to address these issues. In a report submitted two months later, the Board made three 
recommendations. First, it called for the creation of a radio telegraph system covering both 
coasts and the Panama Canal. Second, while specifically stating its support for private enterprise, 
the Board recommended that commercial stations should not be built where they might interfere 
with those of the military, a first step towards the military’s eventual position of power in the 
new industry. The Board’s third recommendation was that the Department of Commerce and 
Labor be given the right to license all commercial radio telegraph stations. The latter two 
recommendations were rejected by Congress, but the board’s initial recommendation for a 
coastal network of wireless telegraph stations system did not fall under Congressional purview. 
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The navy saw the benefits of such a system, and spent much of the decade pitting wireless 
manufacturers against one another as it implemented its own coastal network of wireless stations 
(Douglas 1987, 124-126). The creation of this coastal system satisfied the navy’s strategic 
objectives, but failed to address another concern. The navy worried about the larger economic 
picture, in which the protection of U.S. business interests played a vital role. As the initial 
development of wireless was by a company under foreign ownership, the navy had reason to 
aggressively work to expand its influence upon and control over wireless (Streeter 1996, 68-69).  
Amateurs complicated the regulatory picture by strongly embracing wireless technology. 
Young men were encouraged by the social atmosphere to accept machinery in general, and 
specifically exhorted by media coverage to build their own wireless sets utilizing the newly 
discovered, cheap, and effective silicon crystals (Douglas 1987, 189, 196). In addition, the 
hobbyists embraced the unstructured nature of the airwaves, finding opportunities for 
communication, organization, and enjoyment in the same randomness of broadcasting that the 
other groups despised (Streeter 1996, 64). Amateur operators proliferated, causing further 
interference with existing “legitimate” stations and eventually leading to a battle for supremacy 
between the navy and the amateurs; by 1909, amateur broadcasters outnumbered commercial and 
navy stations by a ratio of 4 to1 (Douglas 1987, 207).  
Where the amateurs found enjoyment and the military sought security, the entrepreneurs 
and corporations were interested in profiting from the new medium. During this time period, the 
Marconi Company was the primary corporate player, as most of the established communications 
corporations had significant investments in wired communications technologies. Marconi’s 
corporate approach focused on providing a service to businesses and governments which 
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complemented, rather than threatened, the existing wired corporations (Streeter 1996, 71-73).36 
Marconi’s institutionally-focused approach contributed to the social definition of the new 
medium by marginalizing the hobbyists, a bias which would eventually become part of 
regulatory policy. The newly developing industry was also influenced by the many inventors and 
entrepreneurs who worked to advance wireless technology in hopes of profiting through sales of 
the products they created. Their contribution to the melee was a viewpoint that most highly 
prized unencumbered competition, the only foreseeable route to undercutting the dominance of 
the corporations (Streeter 1996, 66).     
The years between Marconi’s 1899 introduction of wireless telegraphy in the U.S. and 
1909 are significant to a discussion of broadcast regulation for three reasons. First, during this 
time period the bias towards commercial use of the new medium were sown by the efforts of the 
entrepreneurs and the Marconi Company. Second, the military’s efforts to build a coastal system 
of stations allowed it to take a dominant position in the debates over the new technology, which 
would be a pivotal factor during the next time period. Finally, the public battles between various 
inventors trying to popularize their new innovations and the amateurs’ enthusiastic embrace of 
the new medium resulted in an increasing number of signals being transmitted, a situation which 
would quickly become problematic. In the next decade, Marconi’s commercial interests, the 
navy’s military and political-economic interests, the entrepreneurs, and the amateur operators 
who considered themselves the owners of the airwaves continued to conflict, inspiring official 
legislation that would begin to define the nature of the broadcasting industry.  
                                                 
36 Marconi envisioned his technology as one which would fill in the gaps where wired technology had no access, 
such as communications among ships and shore stations. 
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2.2   REGULATING WIRELESS, THE EMERGENCE OF BROADCASTING, AND 
CHAOS ON THE AIR: 1910-1926 
At the start of this second time period, Marconi’s original model of wireless as point to point 
communication for governmental, military, or commercial purposes was the dominant 
perspective, and one that had attracted little regulatory control. By the end of this timeframe, the 
industry was dramatically altered from its humble beginnings, and the importance of this newly 
emergent version of wireless was recognized in governmental concerns over broadcasting in the 
“public interest.” The intervening years were a time of great change which dramatically 
influenced the regulatory environment of the industry in several ways. First, key concepts were 
established which would dramatically influence the Radio Act of 1927, providing the new 
industry with an identity somewhere between the unbridled commercialism of newspapers and 
the public interest circumscribed commercialism of a public utility. Second, during this time 
period, expanded use of the airwaves and changing industry practices would create a situation 
demanding the new legislation. Third, decisions were made favoring the corporate and 
commercial interests which contributed to continued centralization of ownership and operation 
and which instilled a clear pro-corporate bias to the industry. Finally, debate over broadcasting in 
the public interest indicated the growing importance of news broadcasting on the new medium, 
favoring its use as a sustaining program to entice the public to purchase receivers and as a way 
for stations to connect to their communities.  
The unrestricted nature of both the airwaves and the industry during the first decade of 
wireless had contributed greatly to advances in technology and to innovative uses of the new 
medium. At the beginning of this second time period, Congress was faced with regulatory issues: 
rampant interference in the spectrum and how to distribute access to it, and the increased safety 
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of ships at sea that wireless could provide.37 It addressed the latter first, in the Wireless Ship Act 
passed on June 24, 1910. The Act mandated that any ship carrying 50 or more persons and 
traveling more than 200 miles have a wireless radio and operator (Douglas 1987, 218-220). This 
earliest piece of legislation was perhaps the purest of all broadcast regulation efforts in terms of 
serving the public interest, being relatively unencumbered by the commercial concerns that 
would influence later legislation. It also represents the first moment of explicit connection 
between wireless telegraphy and the public good, a connection which would live on in regulation 
to follow.  
Congress’ actions only addressed one part of the problem, however. The plan to address 
safety concerns by requiring every ship to have a wireless radio stood to exacerbate the 
interference problem by adding new signals to the ether, a situation Congress was forced to 
address in the aftermath of the 1912 Titanic disaster. After colliding with an iceberg, the rapidly 
sinking Titanic radioed for help; although there were several ships in the vicinity, only one 
received the signal. It was common practice for ships to have only one wireless operator, who 
worked a 12 to 16 hour shift. While that operator slept, the wireless set was left unmonitored; 
such was the case on the California, only twenty miles away from the Titanic. In the hours 
immediately after the distress call, the airwaves were so jammed with inquires about the accident 
that official sources were unable to communicate, and a false message of hope was generated by 
the partial reception of two unrelated transmissions. The lack of shipboard radio vigilance and 
the uncontrolled interference demanded action (Douglas 1987, 226-229). 
                                                 
37 A 1909 collision between the Republic, which had a radio, and the Florida, which did not, added emphasis to 
radio’s use for safety at sea; a distress call saved the lives of 1200 people. Susan J. Douglas, Inventing American 
Broadcasting, 1899-1922, Johns Hopkins Studies in the History of Technology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1987), 219.  
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The Radio Act of 1912, Congress’ response to the Titanic, instituted immediate changes 
for wireless telegraphy and had pronounced implications for the burgeoning broadcast industry. 
It required the licensing of operators, gave distress calls priority, partitioned the spectrum giving 
amateurs the least beneficial portion, and established the authority of the Secretary of Commerce 
and Labor to regulate the industry. The implementation of these provisions illustrates several 
important ideas that the Act made part of the new industry: the airwaves were a form of 
communal property, the commercial and military institutions had priority in their use, a license to 
use the airwaves did not imply ownership of them, and the government was the arbiter of rights 
to the airwaves (Douglas 1987, 234, 236-237). The Radio Act also effectively diminished both 
the entrepreneurs’ and the amateurs’ further influence on the course of the industry, instead 
encouraging the cooperation of the government, the military, and the Marconi Company to lead 
the way (Streeter 1996, 79).  
Beyond simply serving as the regulatory guideline for broadcasting for the next decade 
and a half, the Radio Act of 1912 was important as a conceptual touchstone for later legislation. 
Most importantly, the Act legislatively established the nature of the airwaves for the first time. 
The situation in the United States was unique. Wireless in Europe was either state run or heavily 
regulated by the government, a possibility eliminated by a decade’s worth of virtually 
unrestricted wireless activity in the United States. During that decade Lee De Forest had 
successfully created a commercial wireless network to rival the navy’s, raising questions about 
the nature of broadcasting and the spectrum it used (Kruse 2002, 661, 703). In a military setting, 
the spectrum could be nationalized into government property. A commercial setting instead 
demanded a definition of the spectrum and of relevant property rights in order to ward off 
problems of interference. The Radio Act of 1912 offered such a definition, albeit in limited form. 
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The prioritizing of users established that the government could, indeed, make decisions about 
who would use the airwaves, defining them as a public property under government supervision. 
The choice of the Secretary of Commerce as the party responsible for such supervision is 
indicative as well of the government’s acknowledgement of the commercial potential of the 
industry. Just as the Wireless Ship Act foreshadowed the public interest component of broadcast 
legislation, this Act previewed the issues of property and scarcity which would later combine 
with a commitment to localism to form the basis for ownership regulations.    
During World War I, the military exercised its priority on the airwaves, purchasing many 
commercial stations and thereby increasing its hold over the industry. In addition, the navy made 
several improvements in wireless technology during this time. When peace returned, the navy 
attempted to gain permanent control over the wireless industry. Government ownership was 
quickly rejected (being anathema to a free market ideology), but the only apparent alternative 
was to permit the Marconi Company to take over the industry, allowing a foreign owned 
company access to the navy’s technological accomplishments of the preceding years. The navy 
rejected that path, and instead encouraged the formation of a domestic wireless company: the 
Radio Corporation of America (Douglas 1987, 278, 281-284). 
The creation of RCA in 1919 resulted from a timely conjunction of commercial and 
governmental need. Before the war, General Electric had developed an alternator that 
significantly increased the abilities of wireless broadcasting. Marconi’s attempts to arrange a 
contract with G.E. for the units were halted during the war, and at its conclusion G.E. was 
discouraged from selling to Marconi by both the Navy and the government. Instead, American 
Marconi agreed to disband and was reformed under General Electric’s ownership as RCA. The 
new corporation’s privileged position with the government and the military, by virtue of their 
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involvement in its creation, would allow it to exert heavy influence on radio and television 
broadcasting, as well as the regulations by which it was bound (Douglas 1987, 285-286, 288). 
This influence helped to propel the industry to the commercial and corporate environment which 
persists into the present day, and reinforced the power structure placing commercial and 
corporate interests ahead of those of amateurs, educators, and other non-commercial users.   
Wartime use of wireless technology resulted in a cadre of operators whose interest in the 
medium continued into the latter part of the decade, returning the amateurs to greater 
involvement in the industry, but still in a subordinate position. These operators took to the 
airwaves enthusiastically but randomly, and by 1922 the airwaves were jammed with the signals 
of 576 stations, illustrating the necessity for additional control. The basis for this control would 
come from the regulatory precedents of the 1910 and 1912 Acts, which had addressed both 
technical necessity and the public good (Streeter 1996, 91). Secretary of Commerce Herbert 
Hoover, who held the post from 1921 to 1928 and was responsible for overseeing the wireless 
industry during that time, had a unique conception of “the public” which would directly 
influence broadcast regulation. Hoover believed that the free enterprise system was paramount, 
and the public was one part of a triumvirate of balanced forces which made up that system, with 
capital and labor holding equal importance. He further perceived that the public required 
constant attention in order to preserve the balance among the three. This need combined with 
another emerging notion, the idea that consumerism might be the most effective way to keep the 
public fully immersed in the free enterprise system. “The public, in other words, was a body of 
potential consumers and the public interest lay in the cultivation of a consumer society” (Streeter 
1996, 42-46). Hoover’s belief in the free market and resultant desire for a consumer society to 
preserve the necessary balancing of interests would be reflected in the legislation to come.   
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Hoover hosted the first of four annual Radio Conferences in 1922, inviting broadcasters 
to share in the effort to find answers to the numerous challenges of the radio industry. In his 
address, Hoover claimed that the broadcasters were using a national asset, and as such the public 
interest was an inherent factor in the industry (Krattenmaker 1998, 7). Attendees at the first 
conference apparently concurred, resolving that radio was “a public utility” which should be 
regulated by the government “in the public interest” (Kahn 1963, 98).38 The battles of the 
preceding decades which resulted in the primacy of military, governmental, and corporate 
control no doubt contributed to this conceptual connection between radio and existing public 
utilities. In addition, this language clearly evidences the influence of the public interest concerns 
of the 1910 Wireless Ship Act and the property considerations present in the Radio Act of 1912.  
The “public interest” language used at the First National Radio Conference initially 
appeared in an Illinois railroad regulation, and was intended to protect farmers and others 
shipping their goods by rail (a “public utility”) from “monopolistic abuses.” The regulation also 
benefited the railroads; while it did negatively affect their revenues in some markets, it also 
blocked the entry of competitors in others, guaranteeing overall profitability (Kanazawa and Noll 
1994, 24). The question of what exactly constituted a public utility was a long standing one. At 
the time of the radio conferences, public utilities were considered to be “natural monopolies” due 
to the high cost of capital investment. There was also a sense that, as monopolies, they needed to 
be regulated for the economic protection of the consumer (Nowotny 1989, 13). Generally, two 
criteria had to be met before a business would be made subject to direct governmental regulation. 
First, the service had to be a necessity. Second, either an “extortionate price or a harmfully 
                                                 
38 However, because only 22 broadcasters attended this conference, it would be unfair to say this was necessarily a 
dominant view among broadcasters. Kenneth Creech, Electronic Media Law and Regulation, Third ed. (Boston: 
Focal Press, 2000), 51. 
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inferior standard of service” had to be involved. In practice, businesses defined as public utilities 
also tended to have two other things in common: large numbers of the public had to deal with the 
firm, and the supplier held a position of power relative to the consumer (Dugger 1989, 29-30). 
Participants at the First National Radio Conference held that radio broadcasting displayed these 
four characteristics. The new medium was clearly going to be a necessity, and the potential for 
substandard programming was a concern. In addition, radio broadcasters would interact with 
large publics, and by virtue of the broadcasting model, would have an inherently stronger 
position than their consumers because of the reach of their messages. These factors contributed 
to an interpretation of broadcasting as a public utility, which by definition required regulation in 
the public interest.      
The public interest theory contends that regulation “exists as a way for government to 
protect consumers from the potential abuses inherent in natural monopolies… while at the same 
time taking advantage of their monopoly economies of scale and integration” (Barkovich 1989, 
41). While broadcasting was clearly different from many other public utilities by virtue of not 
having direct economic interaction with its listeners, the public interest notion certainly applied 
to an even greater extent by virtue of the potential influence of the messages carried over the 
airwaves to large listening publics. In any case, whether broadcasting lived up the definition of a 
true public utility or not, the spirit behind the regulation of public utilities would also underpin 
the government’s regulatory stance towards broadcasting.   
At the Third National Radio Conference in 1924, Hoover again expressed his belief that 
radio was a public utility which must act in the public interest. Later that year, Hoover responded 
to demands that he limit the number of stations in a given area by stating that such a limit should 
be determined by the service needs of the market, a standard used in regulating public utilities. 
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The specific language Hoover used in describing this standard was “public convenience and 
necessity.” At the Fourth National Radio Conference in 1925, Hoover expanded upon this theme, 
again defining the ether as public property and specifying that it must be used for public benefit, 
that “public good must overbalance private desire.” The conference as a whole had backpedaled 
from equating radio with a public utility, however, asserting that although the principle of public 
benefit was sound, it did not require the new medium to be subject to the myriad of regulatory 
restrictions placed on public utilities (Kahn 1963, 99).39 Ultimately, the National Radio 
Conferences helped to position broadcasting as a commercial industry which should operate in 
the public interest in a fashion similar to a public utility, and such provisions became part of 
regulation during the next time period. 
As Hoover and the broadcasters debated the merits and responsibilities of the new 
medium, amateur operators and commercial stations fought for position in the increasingly 
cluttered airwaves. The Radio Act of 1912 was intended to regulate a very different kind of radio 
industry, and its provisions were ill suited to address the growing pains of commercial broadcast 
radio, Hoover’s efforts notwithstanding. The earlier legislation preserved the spectrum from 
private ownership but failed to recognize an economic truth of wireless: the spectrum itself was a 
scarce commodity. A 1921 decision by the D.C. Supreme Court in Hoover v. Intercity Radio 
Company “in effect declared that anyone had the right to ask for and obtain a license from the 
Secretary of Commerce.” Having discovered this power, the number of applicants increased 
dramatically. Hoover, nonetheless, frequently defied the decision and continued to discourage 
applicants and deny licenses in an effort to maintain some control over the industry (Minasian 
1969, 395-396).  
                                                 
39 Over 400 broadcasters attended this conference, which may in part account for the change in perspective. Ibid.  
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In 1925, scarcity was again an issue when Zenith Corporation was granted a license for 
WJAZ radio. WJAZ was required to share a frequency with other stations, at the time a common 
practice intended to reduce interference. Dissatisfied with the 2 hours per week that WJAZ was 
allotted, Zenith applied for a shift in frequency, was denied, and proceeded to make the switch 
anyway. The parties appeared before the Illinois Federal District Court in 1926, which in United 
States vs. Zenith Corporation ruled that the Commerce Department had no authority to create 
regulations for radio broadcasting because its powers were limited solely to enforcing the 
mandates set forth in the previous Radio Act (Creech 2000, 52-53), reinforcing the decision in 
Intercity Radio Company. The airwaves exploded into anarchy as a result of the new ruling. 
During the six months after the decision, 200 new stations signed on and the existing stations 
migrated to new frequencies and power allocations as they saw fit, turning the airwaves into a 
cacophony of interfering broadcasts (Krattenmaker 1998, 9). The ironic practical result of the 
decisions in Intercity and Zenith was the exacerbation of the scarcity problem which would 
eventually lead to the sort of increased regulation that much of the industry was trying to avoid.  
At the close of this time period, several important decisions had already been made about 
the new industry. The historical treatment of public utilities, required to serve in the public 
interest, had been made a part of the conceptual framework of broadcasting. This served two 
purposes. First, it gave a degree of governmental control over the new industry which would not 
have been justified otherwise. Second, it positioned the industry as a commercial enterprise, a 
legacy of the corporate influence which had been present in the industry’s beginnings and 
dominant in its later stages. The decision to treat the spectrum as a public property was also 
decided by this time, and the government was securely positioned as the decision maker in its 
allocation. The battle between the four groups involved at the start of the industry had been 
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resolved in favor of the military and the corporations. Finally, it had become clear that the 
spectrum was a scarce resource, increasing the stakes involved in those decisions and reinforcing 
the need for concern about the public interest. On these pillars – public interest, commercialism, 
and the spectrum as scarce public resource – would be built the legislation that would oversee the 
next 50 years of radio and television broadcasting.     
2.3 REGULATING BROADCASTING IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: 1927-1978 
The third time period begins with the Radio Act of 1927 and extends to a point just before the 
advent of broadcast deregulation. This timeframe encompasses the development of radio 
broadcasting into a fully commercial industry and the development and growth of television 
broadcasting as well. It is also the period when the regulatory restrictions on broadcasting were 
most pronounced. Because it is such a large expanse of time, this section is divided into three 
sub-periods, each of which is significant in its own way. During the first, 1927-1939, regulation 
was introduced which would fundamentally define the medium for almost 70 years, the initial 
interpretation of the “public interest” was made, and concerns over the structure of the industry 
and diversity of ownership began to emerge. Also, the expectation of broadcasters to act as 
public trustees was enhanced with the specific adoption of the Fairness Doctrine. During the 
second sub-period, 1940-1959, the corporate bias of the industry was challenged by regulators 
concerned that broadcasters were not fully living up to their public interest commitments, and 
additional restraints on ownership were initiated. Several reports released during this time period 
addressed issues at the intersection of ownership, public interest, and the public service 
obligations of broadcasters. The final sub-period, 1960-1978 is simultaneously a time of great 
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regulatory concern over public interest in the industry and great concern over the commercial 
aspects of the industry, illustrating the continued tension between these two industry mandates. 
The time period as a whole demonstrates the continuing trend towards centralization of 
ownership in support of broadcasters’ profits. This centralization occurred as a result of changing 
interpretations of the public interest and its relationship to the commercial nature of the industry, 
and increased as the time period advanced. The time period further shows an increasing 
emphasis on public service activities by broadcasters as a condition of license renewals, and 
specific expectations that these activities should be both local and frequent, requirements which 
were particularly well suited for local news broadcasts to fulfill. Finally, the actions of the FCC 
during this time period emphasize its hopes that the industry would act as a public trustee, even 
as the industry itself failed to fully embrace that role. Just as the previous time period began with 
one model of broadcasting and ended with a radically different industry, this time period offers 
similar industry change resulting from the increasing centralization of ownership and the 
emerging view of news as both license renewal guarantor and profit producer.   
2.3.1 Decisive Regulation and Emerging Technology: 1927-1939 
During the first sub-period, regulation appropriate to the new form of broadcasting was passed in 
the Radio Act of 1927, drawing upon both previous legislation and Hoover’s National Radio 
Conferences. Between 1927 and 1934 reformers and corporations waged a pivotal battle to 
define the new medium, and while the commercial system of broadcasting was affirmed in the 
Communications Act of 1934, regulatory policy was specific in its expectation that commercial 
broadcasters act as public servants in return for their commercial opportunity. These commercial 
interests were further advanced by technical decisions which worked against the amateurs. 
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Important changes to the “public interest” interpretation which impacted structure, practice, and 
product were made during this time period as well, expanding that standard to include issues of 
localism and fairness. The years between 1934 and 1939 were significant in regulators’ growing 
concern about both multiple- and cross-ownership, inspired by broad social trends including 
Roosevelt’s New Deal. It was also during this last part of the sub-period that the new technology 
of television was making its way through the regulatory labyrinth towards an acceptable 
technical standard. In addition to creating the regulatory environment which would define 
television broadcasting, this time period is important for its strong embrace of the public interest 
responsibilities of broadcasters.   
The Radio Act of 1927 was Congress’ response to the regulatory vacuum created by 
Zenith. The new law established the five-person Federal Radio Commission, and was intended as 
a temporary measure;40 its impact would be anything but temporary. Incorporating Hoover’s 
comments from the Fourth National Radio Conference, the new law formalized the “public 
interest, convenience, and necessity” language drawn from public utility regulation as the 
standard for issuing broadcast licenses (Creech 2000, 53). The Act also continued the practice of 
issuing broadcast licenses free of charge (Krattenmaker 1998, 10). This decision reinforced 
Hoover’s belief that the public interest was only one part of the free enterprise model, balanced 
with profit concerns. It also perpetuated the corporate bias that had been part of the industry 
since its early days by allowing corporate commercial interests the benefit of cost-free access to 
the airwaves. 
                                                 
40 The Act had a life span of a single year, which Congress renewed for each of the next 6 years. If Congress had 
failed to renew the Act, it would have resulted in the Secretary of Commerce again taking control of radio 
regulation. Erwin G. Krasnow, Lawrence D. Longley, and Herbert A. Terry, The Politics of Broadcast Regulation 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 14. 
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Raymond Williams observes that broadcasting in the United States is unique in part 
because its regulatory structure solidified only after the manufacturers of equipment had gained a 
great deal of power, and had in effect created “the public” to be served. This resulted in a 
constant and uneasy effort to integrate the idea of a non-market public interest into an inherently 
market-driven institution (1974, 29). This uneasiness is expressed in the deliberate decision to 
leave the parameters of the public interest standard undefined. Where the 1912 Act specifically 
restricted the Department of Commerce’s authority to enforcing existing regulation, the 1927 Act 
allowed regulatory flexibility in the form of this connotative uncertainty (Krasnow, et al. 1982, 
17). At the First National Radio Conference, Hoover had blazed the trail for this particular form 
of regulation by invoking the public utility discussion and focusing on three factors which neatly 
align with the three primary themes of this chapter: who would broadcast (ownership), under 
what circumstances (in the public interest), and with what kind of programming (broadcasters’ 
obligations). This third factor was unique to the new medium, and the legislation was 
deliberately written to allow the commission to change its expectations for broadcasters along 
with the changing interpretation of the public interest (Krattenmaker 1998, 13).  
In an effort to further address the massive interference which had compelled the passage 
of the Radio Act of 1927, the FRC reassigned 94% of broadcast stations on the basis of 
“technical equipment, adequate finances, experienced personnel, and the ability to operate 
without interruption” in November 1928 (Krattenmaker 1998, 15-16). The reassignment worked 
directly to the benefit of the commercial interests in broadcasting, as they were the ones with the 
best equipment, the most money, the most experience, and the most potential for uninterrupted 
operation. Disguised as a simple exercise of technical necessity, the move resulted in many 
smaller stations losing their licenses or being assigned to less desirable frequencies (Streeter 
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1996, 99-100). The FRC then turned its attention to programming issues, with an ever-present 
concern about its actions being viewed as censorship. Its early decisions revolved around 
providing useful programming to the majority of the public41 (Krattenmaker 1998, 17-18). 
Both the reassignments and the public interest programming decisions reflect a concern 
with the functioning of broadcasting as a system, rather than the privileges of individual owners, 
which dovetails nicely with Hoover’s overarching concern with supporting free enterprise. This 
system focus expressed itself in much of the decision making and legislation which followed, 
and had a strong influence on the choice of a commercial mode for the new medium. Hoover saw 
advertising as an essential component of radio broadcasting, because “it served the needs of the 
system, and thus the public interest” (Streeter 1996, 101). Another example of this system focus 
can be found in the 1928 renewal of the Radio Act. As a result of the yearly renewal process, 
Congress was able to expand or contract the FRC’s authority and autonomy with each renewal, 
and in 1928 it added a geographical constraint through the “Davis Amendment.” The new 
requirement called for a balanced distribution of stations across five geographic regions, setting a 
precedent for localism that influenced much of the legislation that followed (Krasnow, et al. 
1982, 14), particularly the Communications Act of 1934.42 The localism principle established by 
                                                 
41 The FRC quickly castigated the stations that were only playing phonograph records as not serving their publics 
properly. They also rejected stations affiliated with certain groups such as the socialists and the Chicago Federation 
of Labor, claiming that the scarcity of spectrum meant that every station had to serve all listeners. In other decisions, 
the FRC denied renewal to Rev. Bob Shuler, a station owner accused of using his station for personal attacks on 
others; and to John R. Brinkley, “the goat gland doctor,” whose practice of diagnosing illnesses from letters sent by 
listeners and prescribing his own brand of medications to cure them resulted in the simultaneous loss of his medical 
license and his radio license. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Telecommunications Law and Policy, Second ed. (Durham: 
Carolina Academic Press, 1998), 16-18..  
42 The five regions were defined in the 1927 Act, which specified that only one commissioner could come from each 
zone. “Zone One encompassed New England and the upper tip of the Middle Atlantic states, including the District 
of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. The second zone included the upper Middle Atlantic states west to 
Michigan and Kentucky. The third zone encompassed the South, and the fourth and fifth zones the Great Plains and 
the West, respectively.” John R. Bittner, Broadcast Law and Regulation (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
1982), 14-15.  
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the Amendment would be a major factor in succeeding decisions about both ownership and the 
responsibilities of broadcasters to provide public service to their communities.  
In 1929, the FRC added an important new public interest obligation for broadcast 
licensees. The Fairness Doctrine demanded that broadcasters provide programming dealing with 
important social issues, and that they do so with fair regard for all sides of the issue. In a 
statement denying the renewal of a broadcaster’s license on the grounds of unfair editorializing, 
the FRC specified that the “public interest requires ample play for the free and fair competition 
of opposing views” in any discussion of public questions (Brainard 2004, 28). The FRC’s 
decision in this case is a strong statement of its expectations for broadcasting in the public 
interest, even before the advent of regular news programming.  
The period between 1927 and 1934 is one that has been painstaking covered by media 
historian Robert McChesney.43 During this period, battles between the reform movement and the 
corporate broadcasters were intense, with the future of the medium at stake. Although the 
reformers put up a valiant effort to turn broadcasting away from a commercially dominated 
system and into one which would be expressly focused on education and public service, they 
were ultimately undermined and defeated by commercial broadcasters. The Communications Act 
of 1934 officially codified broadcasting in the United States as an advertising-based commercial 
system. 
The 1934 Act itself was a response to a missive from President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
who proposed the creation of a new agency, the Federal Communications Commission. The FCC 
                                                                                                                                                             
Each state within a zone “was entitled to facilities on the basis of the ratio which its population bore to the 
population of the zone.” The FCC set up a unit quota system on the basis of power and hours of operation. The 
Amendment was later repealed. Herman S. Hettinger and William A. Porter, "Radio Regulation: A Case Study in 
Basic Policy Conflicts," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 221 (1942): 125-126. 
43 See Robert Waterman McChesney, Telecommunications, Mass Media, and Democracy: The Battle for the Control 
of U.S. Broadcasting, 1928-1935 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
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would have all of the powers of the FRC it would replace, but would be an independent agency, 
rather than a part of the Department of Commerce (Bittner 1982, 20).44 The Communications 
Act of 1934 continued unchanged most of the policies from the 1927 Act, and again deliberately 
failed to define the “public interest, convenience and necessity” that it reasserted as a regulatory 
standard. The Act did set out specific requirements for the FCC in regards to service and 
technology which amounted to a favorable view on competition in the communications industry, 
continuing Hoover’s work of a decade earlier. In doing so, the Act juxtaposed notions of 
competition with notions of the public interest, a duo of ideals which would be referenced 
repeatedly as regulators restricted or empowered broadcasters (Corn-Revere and Carveth 2004, 
52-53). Competition itself as a benefit to the public interest was further reinforced in one of the 
new provisions of the 1934 Act. The 1927 Act authorized license renewals whenever the 
Commission felt it was in the public interest to do so, with little further qualification. This 
language changed in the 1934 Act, adding the requirement that the same considerations would 
now be given to renewals as were given to new license applications, which allowed for 
comparative hearings between applicants at both initial application and renewal application 
(Geller 1975, 472-473).  
Another item which passed almost wholly from the 1927 Act to the 1934 Act was the 
FCC’s “local service objective.” Initially expressed in the 1928 Davis Amendment, it was 
reaffirmed in modified form in the 1934 Act, calling for “equality of radio broadcasting service” 
among each of the states and the District of Colombia, rather than the previous five broad 
geographic regions (Noll, et al. 1973, 99). The localism provision was initially based upon the 
                                                 
44 “The change to a separate independent agency also resolved the dilemma that had plagued regulation under the 
FRC, in that an agency of ‘Commerce’ had been charged with administering issues which were inherently part of the 
free speech-free press clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution.” Bittner, Broadcast Law and Regulation, 
20.  
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technological arrangement of stations, the locations of which had to be carefully calculated to 
avoid interference. Its use was much the same in this Act, but redirected from equity among 
regions to equity among the states. The localism principle which began as a technological 
question would eventually become one of the key factors used by regulators to decide whether or 
not a station was acting in the public interest.   
The Communications Act of 1934 embraced and strengthened the key regulatory themes 
which predated it. The obligation of licensees to act in the “public interest, convenience and 
necessity” in order to receive a license was affirmed, and the broadcasters who failed to do so 
now found their license in jeopardy from competing applicants. The specific public interest 
obligation placed upon broadcasters to provide fair coverage of important issues was perpetuated 
and the principle of localism which would eventually be a component of this public interest 
obligation was itself reinforced. Finally, that Act continued to acknowledge the fundamental 
truth of spectrum scarcity throughout all of these expectations, limiting ownership to those 
licensees willing to give back to the public for the privilege of using the airwaves.   
The culmination of these principles led the newly formed FCC to envision the 
broadcasters as “public trustees,” and its job as regulator to make sure that the broadcasters lived 
up to that designation. A public trustee is generally recognized as one who “has a special duty to 
subordinate one’s own interest to those of a wider public good,” and a broadcaster is acting as a 
public trustee “when it sacrifices its financial welfare to the interests of the viewing and listening 
public” (Krattenmaker 1998, 147). The principle of broadcasters as public trustees would 
influence a great deal of legislation to follow, and would eventually become a pivotal point of 
contention between regulators and broadcasters.   
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After 1935, the New Deal mindset was evidenced in broadcast regulators, who found 
themselves newly concerned with issues of the business of broadcasting in general and 
monopoly in particular. The growth of the industry combined with the emerging technologies of 
television and FM spurred the FCC into a series of hearings addressing those technologies, 
allocation, monopoly, and both multiple- and cross-ownership of broadcast outlets (Hettinger 
and Porter 1942, 127). Congress was also concerned about the issue of cross-ownership between 
newspapers and radio stations. A House Bill to amend the Communications Act of 1934 was 
introduced in early 1937 with the goal of completely eliminating newspaper interests in 
broadcasting.45 Otha D. Wearin, the author of the bill, described the rationale for this separation: 
In the past we have been vitally concerned over the freedom of the press, and in 
the future the problem of freedom of the individual to do his own thinking without 
the interference of monopolistic control of the agencies upon which he bases his 
conclusions in that thinking will unquestionably be equally vital. It would be an 
unfortunate thing for the American people, or for any section of them, to be 
handicapped through having the agencies of dissemination of public opinion in 
the control of a single individual or organization. It should be the duty of the 
Federal government to guarantee the average individual safety from the danger of 
monopolistic control of public opinion (Wearin and Kirchhofer 1938, 301). 
 
Wearin suggested that the initial response to this argument would be that curtailing newspaper 
ownership of broadcast stations is a violation of free speech. He rebutted this argument, citing 
the fact that newspaper owners would still have their own medium in which to exercise that 
right. He ended his argument with the statement “Of all the monopolies the world has ever 
known none could be as bad as a monopoly of public opinion in the hands of any existing agency 
of news dissemination” (Wearin and Kirchhofer 1938, 301-304). While the bill never became 
law, and cross-ownership was never banned, the concern about monopoly ownership of the 
                                                 
45 HR-3892, introduced on January 28, 1937. 
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media and its potential influence on the public service expectations of broadcasters under the 
“trustee” model would influence FCC regulations regarding ownership for some time.   
Although Wearin was concerned about newspapers, an even bigger challenge for those 
who would ban cross-ownership was in the experimental stage, and the FCC was paying close 
attention. According to Garth Jowett’s history of the initial presentation of television, 
government regulators faced three important television-related tasks in the 1930s: deciding what 
bandwidths and frequencies television should use, adopting standards for licensing the stations, 
and regulating the service provided to the public. Until these technical and programming issues 
were resolved, regulators were unwilling to allow the new medium to advance (1994, 126). With 
respect to the latter two tasks, it was only logical that the FCC should extend the rules for radio 
broadcasting virtually unchanged into television, and the Commission did just that. Technical 
standards for television, however, were another matter entirely, and the regulators held back on 
allowing the new medium to emerge until they were happy with its technical provisions. This 
exercise of restraint was a clear effort to avoid the uncertainties that plagued the early days of 
unregulated radio.    
The development of television technical standards occurred over the course of a decade. 
In 1930, Vladimir Zworykin was placed in charge of a new research group which combined the 
best and brightest from RCA, General Electric, and Westinghouse at RCA’s facilities in Camden, 
New Jersey. Beginning with a rudimentary set of equipment which could render a mere 60 scan 
lines of resolution, by 1939 the group had developed technology offering 441 scan lines. RCA 
celebrated its technology with a demonstration at the New York World’s Fair, and proposed its 
model of television to the FCC for consideration as the industry standard (Head, et al. 1994, 52-
53). However, defining television standards was not to be so easily achieved. Both Philco and 
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DuMont rejected one of the basic technologies that RCA had embraced, and the FCC was 
unwilling to move ahead without an industry in technological accord. The FCC again followed 
precedent set in radio, giving RCA preferential treatment by allowing it to broadcast on a limited 
basis in 1940 even though standards had not yet been defined, setting off a chorus of monopoly-
related criticism (Jowett 1994, 127-128).46
The caveat to RCA’s permission to broadcast was that it must inform the public that the 
broadcasts were experimental and that sets purchased during this time might be incompatible 
with future standards, which did little to stimulate receiver sales. Eventually the industry agreed 
to work together, and the National Television System Committee of the Radio Manufacturers 
Association recommended a set of television broadcast standards to the FCC. The NTSC 
standard was accepted on May 3, 1941 and the FCC set July 1, 1941 as the beginning date for 
commercial television, with 10 stations licensed to broadcast. However, the burgeoning industry 
came to a screeching halt on May 12, 1942, when the War Production Board halted further 
expansion during wartime (Jowett 1994, 128).  
The new medium was categorized in FCC Annual Reports of the time as a subset of 
Radio Broadcasting, a clear sign of the Commission’s perspective on the new technology: 
pictures delivered by radio. This positioning also made television broadcasters subject to the 
same rules as radio broadcasters, including operating in the public interest, adhering to the 
Commission’s specific requirement to provide public interest programming on their stations, and 
the regulators’ growing concern about diversity of ownership. Although it would be several years 
                                                 
46 Just as RCA had been awarded a leadership position in radio by virtue of its ownership, it was once again given a 
leadership place in television. However, in this case RCA was no longer simply an equipment manufacturer, it was 
also the owner of the NBC broadcast network, through its parent company General Electric. This made the stakes 
somewhat higher.  
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before television would fully develop, the expectation was clear that television broadcasters, too, 
would be considered public trustees.  
The first sub-period of this timeframe is a vibrant example of regulation for the benefit of 
commercial and corporate interests, but with a strong concern over the obligations of 
broadcasters as public trustees, which created a constant and often contentious tug of war 
between the ideals of service and free market economics. These obligations were most clearly 
expressed in the adoption of the Fairness Doctrine and the localism principles of the Davis 
Amendment and Communications Act of 1934. This sub-period is also highly significant in the 
early indications of the Commission’s growing concern with multiple- and cross-ownership, 
which would constrain industry structure until deregulation. Finally, the sub-period is significant 
in its conceptual transfer of regulation for radio broadcasting unchanged into television 
broadcasting.  
2.3.2 Localism, Ownership, Service, and the Public Interest: 1940-1959  
The second sub-period is marked by an increased level of FCC concern over broadcast 
ownership and broadcasters’ efforts to provide service to their communities. The former concern 
was expressed in restrictive regulation on multiple- and cross-ownership of media properties 
including the duopoly rule, the AVCO rule, further embrace of the localism principle, the 
application of antitrust statutes to the broadcast industry, and anti-trafficking efforts. The Report 
on Chain Broadcasting and the Barrow Report were pivotal publications informing these 
structural limitations. However, just as regulation constraining public utilities in the past also 
protected their profitability, the new regulations established certain permissible levels of 
multiple- and cross-ownership, which contributed to the overall centralization of the industry and 
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illustrated the uneasy tension between commercial and public interest concerns on the part of the 
regulators. Part of this tension was introduced by the expense involved in entering television 
broadcasting which limited the new medium to those with the resources to meet the initial 
investment and ensuing potential for loss in the early days of television. 
The latter FCC concern was expressed in its continuing commitment to the Fairness 
Doctrine and in the release of the “Blue Book,” which included a new level of expectations for  
broadcasters to live up to their promises of activity in the public interest. In addition, a new FCC 
vision of the industry further incorporated localness within the “public interest” definition, 
adding a service dimension to the existing technical and structural provisions. This placed further 
obligations upon broadcasters to focus on their communities and helped to position local news as 
a key component in the broadcasters’ public interest efforts.   
During the first half of the 1940s, the FCC was comprised largely of commissioners with 
prior experience in public utilities. Apparently drawing upon this background, the FCC instituted 
decisions which impacted the economics of broadcasting both in 1941 and in 1944; prior to this 
point, direct economic regulation had generally been avoided (Kahn 1963, 102). In a television-
specific restriction, the FCC in 1941 limited the total number of stations that could be owned by 
one entity to three. That same year the FCC published the Report on Chain Broadcasting, the 
culmination of a three-year investigation into efforts by NBC and CBS to stifle radio broadcast 
competition. The Report recommended that the networks’ practice of placing their affiliates 
under restrictive contracts be discontinued, and also recommended that no single owner be 
allowed to possess more than one network, and the FCC pursued these recommendations. In 
1943, the inevitable lawsuit was resolved by the Supreme Court in the FCC’s favor, and NBC 
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was forced to divest itself of its second network, which became ABC (Streeter 1996, 169-170). 47 
The Report was also concerned with the emerging conglomerate and corporate nature of 
broadcasting, which “accentuated non-responsibility of broadcast licensees” on two counts: that 
broadcasting was a “sideline” to the main business, and that the nature of corporate ownership 
made it subject to rapid change ("Conflicts of Interest" 1969, 891).48 It was the Commission’s 
stance that neither of these factors made for adequate public service to a broadcaster’s 
community.  
Perhaps inspired by the research which produced the Report on Chain Broadcasting, or 
perhaps out of a general desire to reduce the power of the broadcast networks, a further 
restriction on ownership was adopted on November 23, 1943. The new regulation specified that 
no single entity could own two stations in the same primary service area, unless it could be 
proved that “public interest, convenience and necessity [would] be served through such multiple 
ownership situation” (FCC 1943, IV(6)). As a result, the networks were forced to sell radio 
stations engaged in duopolies in several markets. This duopoly rule also effectively prohibited 
cross-ownership of broadcast outlets within a market.  
The legal decision that forced the split of NBC’s Red and Blue Networks also 
incorporated the antitrust laws into the concept of the “public interest.”49  In the Report on Chain 
Broadcasting, the FCC had previously written that the Sherman Act should apply to 
broadcasting: “This Commission, although not charged with the duty of enforcing that law 
                                                 
47 This decision addressed the two arguments advanced by an unrelated radio network, the Mutual Broadcasting 
System, which objected to the exclusionary affiliate contracts and NBC’s ownership of two networks. Mutual 
operated in a very different fashion than the traditional networks, a “semi-co-operative” which owned no stations 
and instead was a grouping of affiliates who shared programming among themselves. Hettinger and Porter, "Radio 
Regulation: A Case Study in Basic Policy Conflicts," 128-129. 
48 Charging the broadcasting industry with being overly corporate was a clear indication of the unique anti-corporate 
bias present among the Commissioners at the time. As this chapter shows, corporate intervention in broadcasting 
was both permitted and encouraged by the government in most cases.  
49 National Broadcasting Company v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).  
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should administer its regulatory powers with respect to broadcasting in the light of the purposes 
which the Sherman Act was designed to achieve.” The court decision in the NBC case propelled 
Congress to reinforce the authority of the FCC to act in cases of potential antitrust excesses, 
specifying that even if the broadcaster was violating an antitrust statute, the FCC still had 
jurisdiction to revoke their license (Gilbert 1950, 1347).  
In 1944, the FCC made took two additional actions impacting ownership. The first 
resulted indirectly from the hearings subsequent to the 1941 Report on Chain Broadcasting. 
While declining to adopt any specific rule, the Commission stated that “it does not intend in 
granting licenses in the public interest to permit concentration of control in the hands of the few 
to the exclusion of the many who may be equally well qualified to render such public service as 
is required of a licensee” (FCC 1944, I(12)). Additionally, the Commission relaxed its television 
ownership restrictions, allowing a single entity to own up to five television stations. Although 
these may seem like contradictory decisions, the commissioners must not have considered five-
station ownership to be concentration of a worrisome sort, since that limit was already allowed in 
radio; this was just one more example of the Commission equating the two media in regulatory 
terms. The statement against concentration remained a powerful one, and clearly reflected the 
Commission’s belief in the trustee model of broadcasting.  
Beyond its interest in ownership, the FCC was also highly concerned with the 
broadcasters’ commitment to the public interest during this time period. In March 1945, FCC 
Chairman Paul A. Porter addressed broadcasters for the first time, informing them that the 
existing practice of virtually automatic license renewal was over. In the future, he declared, 
renewals would only be granted to broadcasters whose actions matched the promises made at the 
previous time of application (Meyer 1962a, 197). On March 7th of the following year the FCC 
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released a report resulting from this statement, Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast 
Licensees, commonly known as the “Blue Book” for its chromatic binding. The Blue Book was a 
compilation of the previous year’s investigations into promises and performance, and it noted 
that many broadcasters were failing to live up to their commitments. The report detailed four 
specific instances where the FCC felt the broadcasters were endangering the public interest 
(Meyer 1962a, 199-200).  
The FCC’s first concern was the airing of sustaining programs, of which news was a 
major component. Sustaining programs, the Commission held, were the “balance wheel” by 
which the public service nature of the station could offset programming decisions made for 
commercial gain.50 The second contentious issue was a lack of local live programming, 
hearkening back to the FCC’s emphasis on localism. The FCC provided statistics which showed 
that many stations lacked the staff to fully serve their local community, and instead spent most of 
their on-air time clearing network programs. One particular noteworthy statistic was the average 
ratio of 4 salespersons to 3 writers at local stations. The third issue the FCC chose to spotlight 
was a failure to address issues of local importance. Although the FCC declined to specify rules 
for local coverage, they declared that “adequate” airtime must be given and that the amount of 
time devoted would be a factor in license renewal. Finally, the FCC expressed its displeasure 
with the state of advertising. While specifically giving its support to advertising as the basis for 
broadcasting, the Commission complained about the way in which it was being carried out, 
noting everything from the number of commercials in a given time period to the lack of 
                                                 
50 The FCC enumerated five functions of sustaining programs: (1) to give the station or network a means to achieve 
a balanced interpretation of public needs; (2) to provide programs that wouldn’t receive sponsorship; (3) to provide 
programs for minority tastes; (4) to provide programs devoted to the needs of non-profit organizations; and (5) to 
provide for experimentation with new forms of programming. Richard J. Meyer, "The Blue Book," Journal of 
Broadcasting 6, no. 3 (1962): 201. 
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transition between program content and advertising content. The FCC called for the industry to 
self-regulate, but reiterated that a failure to improve upon these four issues would be looked upon 
negatively at license renewal time (Meyer 1962a, 201-204). Although the Blue Book was a 
report, not legislation or official regulation, it gave broadcasters, future regulators, and future 
legislators valuable information regarding the parameters of the elusive “public interest” in 
broadcasting, and again offered broadcasters a reason to make local news a regular part of their 
broadcast schedule.  
A small initial response to the Blue Book snowballed, and by the following month 
broadcasters were loudly critical of the FCC’s report, claiming everything from subtle censorship 
to outright federal takeover of the airwaves (Meyer 1962b, 295-296). Ultimately, the Blue Book 
resulted in at least two positive changes by the industry: the radio documentary was created 
shortly after the report as a response to the questions of localism, and the NAB issued a stronger 
code for radio self-regulation in 1948. Beyond that, however, the dire consequences predicted for 
license renewals in the Blue Book never materialized, and it was quickly categorized by the 
industry “as a dead letter” (Meyer 1962b, 308-310). It is illustrative, however, of a growing 
concern that the balance of the industry might be actively tipping away from service and towards 
profit, a concern which would continue until deregulation imposed a marketplace model on 
service issues as well.    
The FCC also extended its public interest concerns to station transfers in 1945, adopting 
another form of economic regulation that would be known as the “AVCO Rule.” That year, 
Powel Crosley Jr. sold his radio businesses, which included AM and FM licenses, to the Aviation 
Corporation for $22 million. The FCC was split 4-3 in its approval of the transfer, and 
subsequently created a new policy regarding station transfers (Miller 2003, 24-25). The new 
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policy instituted a competitive system, requiring public notice of the intent to transfer a station so 
that other interested parties could also apply to purchase the station. A hearing would be held to 
determine which party would best serve the public interest, and thus receive the license 
transfer.51 The commission rescinded the rule four years later, believing that it did more harm 
than good ("Station Transfers" 1957, 153). However, this early effort to restrict station 
trafficking would inspire later regulation to accomplish the same goal.  
Interference issues again plagued the broadcasting industry in 1948, requiring the FCC to 
cease granting licenses and “freeze” the expansion of the industry. A 1945 plan which 
geographically arranged television stations required a minimum 150 mile separation between 
stations using a given channel assignment. Due to “tropospheric bending of radio waves,” this 
separation was inadequate, and the Commission estimated anew that separation of 220 miles 
would be necessary. This lowered the number of potential stations at a time of increasing 
demand for licenses, and endangered the theory of localism that was part of the Commission’s 
interpretation of serving the public interest. To address this, in 1949 the FCC began hearings on 
expanding into a new range of the spectrum for additional Ultra-High Frequency television 
stations (FCC 1950, IV(2)). 
The influences which resulted in the Blue Book could again be felt in 1949 when the FCC 
restated its commitment to the Fairness Doctrine. The Commission observed that in a 
democracy, the public interest demanded that citizens be exposed to all sides of controversial 
issues, and thus broadcasters were required both to make sure that controversial issues were 
addressed on their stations, and that all sides were represented (Krattenmaker and Jr. 1985, 153). 
                                                 
51 The objectives were to “ (1)[secure] the best qualified persons as broadcast licensees, (2) [prevent] undue 
concentration of radio facilities, and (3) [encourage] open competition among qualified persons desiring to operate 
radio facilities.” "Station Transfers - a Problem in Regulation," Journal of Broadcasting 1, no. 2 (1957): 153. 
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This recommitment to the principles of the Doctrine reinforced the FCC’s overall position that 
the broadcasters were required to act affirmatively in interests of their local publics.    
In its 1950 Annual Report, the FCC neatly summarized its regulatory position. First, the 
Commission no longer considered that broadcasting might be a public utility, and thus was 
largely unconcerned with the day to day operation of broadcast stations. Instead, it claimed 
responsibility over allocating spectrum in accordance with the laws created by Congress and 
over the licensing of broadcast stations. In the latter category, the report again specifies that 
“because radio channels are limited and are a part of the public domain, it is important that they 
be entrusted to licensees who have a high sense of public responsibility,” and will act in the 
public interest (FCC 1950, IV(1)). Two years later, the FCC acceded to the broadcasters’ request 
to drop the comparative renewal policy that had been added in the 1934 Act. The Commission 
specified that although renewals would not be treated the same as new applications, they would 
still be closely examined for proof of operation in the public interest (Geller 1975, 473-475).   
By this time, the 1934 debut of the “local service objective” had been incorporated into a 
new FCC vision of the industry that positioned locally-owned television stations in as many 
communities as possible, providing valuable public interest programming on local issues. Three 
policies were the result of this vision: the reservation of VHF channels in small markets which 
did not yet have stations, the development of UHF broadcasting to increase the number of 
channels available, and a growing concern over the ownership of television stations (Noll, et al. 
1973, 100). During the licensing freeze, the FCC had considered the relative merits of a regional 
system and a local system. The regional system would create fewer stations at higher power, 
which would offer consumers reception of up to 7 VHF stations in most markets. The local 
system would reduce stations’ power, but thereby allow more communities to have their own 
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station. The Commission decided that localism was the better route to public service (Noll, et al. 
1973, 101). The second of these policies led to the 1952 Sixth Report and Order. This mandate 
lifted the licensing freeze and assigned 70 new UHF channels to complement the existing 12 
VHF channels, permitting the increased localism that the FCC desired. In addition, the Order 
created a new class of television stations called “non-commercial educational” and assigned 
exclusive channels for them in 242 communities, 80 VHF and 162 UHF (18th report 1952 V(1)).  
But with more local stations came increased concerns about ownership, leading to the 
adoption of regulations to limit common ownership of broadcast facilities on November 7, 1953. 
Single entities were now limited to seven each of AM and FM radio stations, and the five 
television station limit was maintained. The following year, the rule was amended to allow for up 
to seven television stations per owner, but only five could be VHF and none of the stations could 
share market coverage. While making this legislation, the FCC admitted that group owners were 
an important part of the industry, and thus reached for a balanced approach of limited multiple-
ownership. This decision encouraged groups to expand to become maximum owners and at the 
same time restricted them to a set number (Howard 1976, 400). Several groups were in a good 
position to take advantage of the new rulings, and the networks and large station groups such as 
Capital Cities, Cox, Metromedia, Gaylord, and Taft were able to lead the industry during this 
period (Czech-Beckerman 1991, 23-24; Sherman 1995, 170). 
In a 1954 article, Harvey J. Levin expressed his own concern about ownership across 
media. At the time, 19% of AM stations, 33% of FM stations, and 37% of television stations 
were newspaper-affiliated, and the movie industry owned 20 television stations and seemed 
likely to acquire more. Levin offered a trinity of concerns resulting from cross-ownership. First, 
he worried that fewer independent owners would lead to less diversity of viewpoints in 
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programming, especially in news coverage. Second, Levin considered the possibility that the 
partisan proclivities present in newspapers would pass into the news broadcasts of their co-
owned broadcast outlets, and that diversity in non-news programming would be reduced by the 
connection between movie studios and their co-owned stations. The first two concerns led to the 
third: a reduced diversity of viewpoints did not adequately fulfill the needs of the democratic 
process. After additional analysis, Levin concluded that the FCC’s existing restrictions on cross-
ownership made sense, and in fact should be extended to restrain cross-ownership by movie 
studios as well (1954, 62-63, 79). 
By 1956, the issue of station transfers again became an important part of concerns about 
ownership and the public interest. A Broadcasting-Telecasting article tallied 1,085 requests for 
station transfers by the end of June, with over $100 million in stations traded by the end of the 
year. The public interest conflict arose around the uncertainty of criteria for deciding to permit or 
deny transfers. On the one hand, competition was a fundamental part of the industry, and 
increasing the value of a station in order to sell it would arguably entail serving the public more 
effectively than other stations in the market. On the other hand, a license application won by one 
entity with seemingly excellent public service potential could be immediately transferred to 
another entity with far less potential. At the time, transfers were held to a lower standard of 
investigation than were license applications ("Station Transfers" 1957, 146-153). This issue 
would resurface in the 1958 Carroll Doctrine, a discussion of which follows.  
Echoing the 1941 Report on Chain Broadcasting which investigated networks and 
competition in the radio industry, the FCC instigated a similar report on network television in 
1955. During the preparation of the report, Roscoe L. Barrow issued a 1957 memorandum highly 
critical of concentration of control, predicting an industry future in which the localism principle 
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was abandoned. In that memorandum, Barrow reiterated the three principles that formed the 
foundation of broadcast regulation: the public interest, the “local institution concept,” and the 
need for diversity of ownership, and offered statistics proving that both localism and diversity 
were on the decline ("Multiple Ownership and Television" 1957).52 The following year, the 
Barrow Report was released. Unlike the 1941 Report that expressed its concern with 
concentration of power in network hands and forced NBC to divest its second network and its 
duopolies, Barrow’s effort failed to address the structural factors which empowered the 
television networks and instead maintained that a competitive environment did in fact exist. The 
Barrow Report inspired no further action on the part of the FCC (Streeter 1996, 170-171).53  
In 1958, a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals offered a decision in Carroll Broadcasting 
Company v. FCC & West Georgia Broadcasting Company which addressed both economics and 
the public interest. At issue was Carroll Broadcasting’s protest that by granting a new license to a 
competing radio station 12 miles from Carroll’s existing station, Carroll would lose the ability to 
adequately serve the public because of the loss of income to the new station. In a move resonant 
with public utility regulation, the court decided that the FCC must consider issues of economic 
injury to existing stations when deciding whether or not to grant a new broadcast license (Kahn 
1963, 103).54  This allowed existing stations to challenge the license applications of new stations 
                                                 
52 Assistant Attorney General Victor R. Hansen authored an article in 1957 discussing the topic of network power as 
well, pertaining to the interaction between networks and multiple-owners of televisions stations. Hansen claimed 
that the networks unfairly privileged group owners. One example he offered was of station groups who were able to 
obtain preference in network affiliations and in feature film purchases over single station owners (Hansen 1957, 
581-582). Multiple owners often received better compensation deals from the networks in return for clearing their 
programs than independently owned stations did (Celler 1957, 565). 
53 The report did recommend that ownership regulations be expanded to forbid a single entity from having more than 
three VHF stations in the top 25 markets. Group owners unsurprisingly took offense, arguing that group ownership 
permitted the financing of local programming on stations that could otherwise not afford it, and that lessons learned 
from running one station could be applied to all the stations in the group. "Multiple Owners Hit Barrow Logic," 
Broadcasting, 24 March 1958.   
54 This decision was a radical reversal from a decision only a year earlier by the FCC in the Southeastern 
Enterprises case. In that ruling, the FCC denied that it had the authority to consider the economic impact of new 
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on economic grounds; if they could make a legitimate case, the issue would be brought to a 
hearing before the Commission. Ultimately, the “Carroll Doctrine” resulted in delays and added 
expenses, as the Commission never denied a license application because of it, although it stayed 
on the books for thirty years (Corn-Revere and Carveth 2004, 56). The Carroll Doctrine 
demonstrated the divided perspective of the FCC as it sought to balance the competing factors of 
profitability and the public interest. The argument in Carroll linking the two elements 
foreshadowed both future arguments by broadcasters and future regulatory decisions.  
In 1959, Levin again looked at the issue of cross-ownership in the media. He identified 
two benefits that could be gained by diversifying ownership. The first benefit involved avoiding 
three specific abuses of power. The first abuse of power was the larger company stifling the 
growth of the electronic media to protect previous investments in their other media holdings. 
Levin offers Paramount Pictures’ policies restricting its stars and films from appearing in 
broadcast media as an example. The second abuse of power was the use of a joint operation for 
bargaining purposes, which would undercut competition in the market. His example was a court 
case where the Kansas City Star was found guilty of violating the Sherman Act by barring 
advertisers who failed to purchase advertising space in its newspaper from advertising on its AM 
and FM stations. Levin’s third concern, previously expressed in his 1954 study mentioned 
earlier, was the potential for partisan content to move from a company’s newspaper to its 
broadcast outlets (Levin 1959, 1108-1112). 
The second benefit to diverse ownership Levin identified was an increased diversity of 
opinion and outlook. Cross-ownership would result in more media outlets carrying the same 
                                                                                                                                                             
stations entering a specific market, because “Congress intended broadcasting to be a field of free competition and 
gave the regulatory agency no power to mitigate its effects.” "Economic Injury in FCC Licensing: The Public 
Interest Ignored," The Yale Law Journal 67, no. 1 (1957): 137-138. 
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perspective; while seeming to be multiple voices in agreement, in fact they would be just one 
voice. Diversity of ownership would also allow for more possibilities to avoid unconscious bias 
in one direction or another, because there would be more owners and thus more chances for 
difference among them. After examining several potential arguments for economic disadvantage 
arising from separate ownership and finding none of them valid, Levin reiterated his call for 
stronger regulation in an effort to diminish cross-media ownership (Levin 1959, 1112-1121).  
The span of years which makes up this second sub-period was home to extensive action 
by the FCC to influence the economics of the broadcasting industry through restrictions on 
ownership. In addition, the FCC repeatedly made efforts to ensure that broadcasters were living 
up to their public interest responsibilities, including repeated application of the Fairness 
Doctrine. The tension between commercial interests and the public interest was constant 
throughout this period, and regulators charted a swerving course which at times favored each of 
these contradictory desires. As a result, even as the FCC expressed concern with ownership it 
permitted centralization as limitations were either relaxed or lightly enforced. The FCC’s efforts 
through the Blue Book to enhance the local service aspect of television broadcasting were well-
intentioned, but ultimately failed to stand up to industry complaint, demonstrating the recursive 
nature of the relationship between broadcasters and regulators. Although the trustee model was 
still at the heart of a great deal of regulation, the lack of enforcement of that model was an 
indication of the growing focus on the commercial side of the industry by broadcasters and 
regulators alike.    
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2.3.3 The Last Bastion of Restrictive Regulation: 1960-1978 
The last sub-period in this section includes the most stringent efforts by the FCC to restrict 
structural changes which were potentially adverse to the public interest, such as station 
trafficking and multiple- and cross- ownership, as well as a newly increased concern with 
conglomerate ownership. During this time the FCC also worked to enhance structural 
arrangements which would benefit the public interest, reaffirming its commitment to localism by 
protecting the new UHF stations which were integral to the local model of broadcasting. The 
FCC also made specific efforts during this time to connect assessment of the stations’ public 
interest efforts to their license renewals. The “public interest” standard was also further refined 
during this time period, but generally in ways that protected broadcasters from competition or 
permitted them to decide what that standard might mean in their particular community, a major 
change from earlier interpretations. Exceptions to that trend included the FCC’s continued 
support of the Fairness Doctrine and its first-time declaration of specific guidelines for 
broadcasters’ efforts in the public interest. This latter exception was of vital importance, as it 
directly equated news broadcasting with public service at a time when such broadcasts were 
being recognized for their profitability by those in the industry.  
On July 19, 1960, former FCC Commissioner Charles King derided the “public interest, 
convenience or necessity” language as invalid for lack of definability. In a 1961 response, 
Commissioner Frederick W. Ford offered an analysis of the language. Historically, the “public 
interest” was used as a scope-defining term in laws which transferred regulatory powers from 
legislators to agencies. It was employed for this purpose in the Radio Act of 1927, and the public 
interest criteria by which to judge station owners was “represented by service to the listener,” as 
stated during the Fourth Radio Conference. This was significant because it specified that private 
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interests were not the defining trait of the industry, but instead the industry was answerable to the 
public good. Ford summarized the public interest as defined through legislation as providing 
technically acceptable signals carrying socially useful content. Then, referring to the FCC’s 1960 
Report and Statement of Policy, Ford suggested that the burden of public interest was now where 
it belonged, in the hands of the broadcaster: “the public interest is what the licensee says it is; 
provided – and this is the key – provided that his judgment is the result of a reasonable and bona 
fide effort to ascertain the program interests and needs of the area he is licensed to serve” (Ford 
1961, 205-209, 214-216). Ford’s comments were right in line with the FCC’s vision of localism, 
even as he displaced some of the FCC’s responsibilities for oversight into the broadcasters’ 
hands. 
Another key component of the localism vision was the proliferation of UHF television, a 
commitment the FCC reaffirmed with the UHF television impact policy instituted in 1960. A 
conceptual descendent of the Carroll Doctrine, this policy shared the goal of protecting existing 
stations from competition, in this case UHF stations from VHF applications in the markets they 
served. The FCC believed that the technical superiority of the VHF stations offered them an 
undue advantage, and it applied this protective policy numerous times (Corn-Revere and Carveth 
2004, 56-57).55  
In 1962, the FCC enhanced its protection of the public interest against station trafficking 
with the passage of the “3-year rule,” which mandated a hearing before approval could be given 
for the transfer of any station sold within three years of its purchase. In its rationale the FCC 
                                                 
55 Both the Carroll Doctrine and the UHF television impact policy were abandoned in 1988 due to the changed 
media marketplace in which new stations frequently drew new advertising dollars rather than stealing them from 
competing stations. Robert Corn-Revere and Rod Carveth, "Economics and Media Regulation," in Media 
Economics: Theory and Practice, ed. Alison Alexander, et al. (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004), 
56-57. 
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characterized short-term ownership as detrimental to community service, which benefited from 
longer tenures of involvement by owners in the communities they served ("FCC's 3-Year Rule" 
1962). Further concerns about ownership led to a notice of proposed rule-making limiting 
multiple-ownership in June 1965. This was the first such legislation since 1954, and the FCC 
immediately put its provisions into effect on an interim basis. The new rules limited group 
ownership to a total of three television stations in the top-50 markets, only two of which could be 
VHF, but did not impact owners who exceeded that limit at the time of the notice. In effect, this 
gave the 19 station groups who possessed more than two VHF stations at the time a privileged 
ownership position.56 The FCC hoped to increase the diversity of ownership in the top-50 
markets through this action, dismayed at statistics which showed that in the 8 years previous, 26 
new top-50 VHF stations were added, with a corresponding increase of only 3 separate owners 
and a decrease from 55 to 45 in the number of single-station owners of top-50 VHF stations 
("Ban on Bigness" 1965, 50). In 1968, the Commission abandoned this proposed legislation and 
rescinded the interim rules on a 4-3 vote, but specified that applicants would need a “compelling 
public-interest showing” in order to acquire more than the abandoned limit. The decision not to 
pursue the legislation resulted in part from increased diversity of ownership among top-50 UHF 
stations during the intervening years ("Brakes Eased" 1968).       
A 1968 application for the transfer of WFMT-FM to WGN Continental Broadcasting 
inspired the FCC to again modify its ownership rules in the public interest. At the time, WGN 
Continental owned WGN-AM and WGN-TV in Chicago, and was itself owned by the publisher 
of the Chicago Tribune and the Chicago American. The FCC balked at adding another station to 
                                                 
56 The 19 groups and their top-50 market station count: RKO, Storer (5 VHF, 1 UHF);  ABC, CBS, NBC, Cox, Taft, 
Westinghouse (5 VHF); Newhouse (4 VHF, 1 UHF); Capital Cities, Crosley, Metromedia (4 VHF);  Triangle (3 
VHF, 1 UHF); Corinthian, Chris-Craft, Hearst, Scripps-Howard, Time-Life, WKY (3 VHF). "FCC Issues Its Ban on 
Bigness," Broadcasting, 28 June 1965, 50-51.    
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WGN’s lineup in the Chicago market, but felt that it could not in good faith apply a new standard 
only to this sale; clearly it was time to change the rules ("New Way" 1968, 23). The “one to a 
market” rule was introduced in 1968 and modified in 1971. It prohibited the ownership of more 
than one broadcast outlet in the same market, but again was not retroactive, so owners were not 
forced to sell if they exceeded the limit at the time of the rule’s adoption (Sherman 1995, 171). 
The FCC revisited conglomeration at the end of the 1960s, a topic it had addressed in the 
1941 Report on Chain Broadcasting, giving notice in February 1969 that it was concerned about 
conglomerate ownership influencing the objectivity of news programming. As early as 1965, 
journalists had observed that television broadcasts were happy to report on instances of 
lawbreaking by unions or individuals, but unlikely to report on corporate misdeeds. The FCC 
shared this worry in its consideration of the merger between ABC and ITT, and was specifically 
concerned that the commercial activities of ITT might influence news reporting, news 
commentary, or public affairs programming on the network and the network’s owned stations. 
Nevertheless, the majority of the commissioners approved the merger, believing that ABC would 
be more competitive with the other networks with the addition of ITT’s resources, and thus better 
able to serve the public interest ("Conflicts of Interest" 1969, 881, 888-889). 
In his dissent, Commissioner Robert T. Bartley cut to the heart of the issue. He claimed 
that the merger risked having the “broadcast operations becoming a public relations tool of, and 
image builder for the corporate conglomerate, [paying] little attention to the local needs of the 
public which the broadcast operations are charged with serving.” He was further concerned that 
these influences might be difficult to detect because of the multiplicity of divisions within the 
conglomerate, and such concern would lead to a new study of conglomerates in the following 
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decade ("Conflicts of Interest" 1969, 889). Ultimately, the merger was abandoned by ITT and 
ABC despite having won FCC approval. 
In 1969 the FCC made a decision which sent shockwaves through the broadcasting 
industry. Boston television station WHDH faced a renewal hearing before the FCC in January of 
that year, and the Commissioners voted 3 to 1 to deny the station continued operation. Instead, 
they reassigned the license to a competing applicant, Boston Broadcasting, Inc. One of the main 
reasons for this decision was the Commission’s desire to promote ownership diversity among the 
media, because the previous license holder, the Boston Herald-Traveler Corporation, also owned 
newspapers and an AM/FM combination in Boston ("$3 Billion" 1969). That same year, the 
FCC’s commitment to diversity of opinion was upheld in a case challenging the constitutionality 
of the Fairness Doctrine. Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. FCC involved a demand for equal 
time on Pennsylvania radio station WGCB to answer a personal attack made by Reverend Billy 
James Hargis. The FCC considered the situation a violation of the Fairness Doctrine, and ruled in 
favor of complainant Fred J. Cook (Krattenmaker 1998, 151). On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court 
upheld the FCC’s ruling. The court stated that the rights of the viewers and listeners, not those of 
the broadcasters, were paramount, and because broadcasters had access to a publicly owned 
channel which ordinary citizens did not, the Fairness Doctrine requiring such access was indeed 
constitutional (Sterling and Kittross 1978, 427).    
At the start of the 1970s, and after a great deal of regulatory concern over ownership in 
the previous decade, the “rule of sevens” instituted in 1953 was the law for multiple ownership, 
permitting each owner to possess seven AM, seven FM, and seven television stations, only five 
of which could be VHF. The 1943 duopoly rule further prevented a single entity from owning 
two of the same type of station in a single market. Finally, the one-to-a-market rule instituted in 
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1968 and amended in 1971 prohibited cross-ownership of broadcast stations within a market 
(Levin 1970, 792). 
The theories behind these restrictions on group ownership are well summarized by 
Harvey Levin. The FCC considered that groups have advantages over single station owners in 
three areas: gaining network affiliations, bargaining for better economic arrangements with the 
networks, and bargaining for better economic terms with film companies and national 
advertisers. These advantages resulted in increased group ownership in leading markets and in 
the industry in general, subverting the FCC’s desired locally-focused system (Levin 1970, 793). 
In addition, the 1970 FCC membership was specifically concerned with consolidation of power 
in two areas of broadcasting: the networks, who were responsible for 95% of prime time 
programming, and multi-media owners who, by virtue of holdings in multiple channels of 
communication, could potentially wield impressive political and economic influence ("Major 
Moves" 1970).  
In 1970, the Commission again balanced ownership and public interest issues as it 
revisited and reinstated the comparative renewal process. The FCC specified that a station which 
managed just enough public service during a license period to receive a renewal when there was 
not a competing applicant would find itself in dire straits if a viable competitor entered the 
picture. The Commission informed the broadcasters that they were in control of their own 
destiny, echoing sentiments similar to those expressed during the 1960s: strong public service 
would preserve the license against challengers; weak public service put the renewal in jeopardy 
with or without a competitor’s involvement. In a follow-up to the policy statement, the FCC 
offered broadcasters some guidelines for appropriate public service, with the caveat that they 
were not definitive. These proposed guidelines included: local programming for 10-15% of the 
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day, including 10-15% of primetime (defined as 6pm to 11pm); news for 8-10% of the network 
affiliate’s program day including 8-10% in primetime for VHF stations, and 5% of the day and 
of primetime for UHF stations; and public affairs programming accounting for 3-5% of the 
broadcast day including 3% in primetime. The high end of the percentages applied to stations 
with revenues above $5 million, with the low end applying to stations below $1 million; 
unprofitable stations were excluded (Geller 1975, 483-486). That same year, Commissioner 
Kenneth A. Cox made a point of informing broadcasters that the airing of 30 and 60 second 
public service announcements was inadequate service to the public, regardless of the 
broadcasters’ public relations campaign to the contrary. Cox specified that these short messages 
amounted to minimal service, and that consideration of news and public-affairs programming 
would likely be a vital part of license renewal proceedings in the future ("FCC's Cox Plays a 
Familiar Record" 1970).57
Also in 1970, the FCC undertook to study conglomerate ownership of broadcast stations 
after the results of a pilot study of six groups resulted in serious questions about that structure. 58 
The FCC developed questionnaires for a larger study which addressed several issues relating to 
the relationship between conglomerates and their broadcast subsidiaries: did conglomerates 
require their suppliers to buy advertising on their owned stations, were there safeguards in place 
                                                 
57 In 1964, the television broadcasting industry embraced a public relations campaign designed to show its 
commitment to public service. That year, the industry announced the results of the first-ever attempt at numerically 
measuring on-air public service announcements. Broadcast Advertisers Reports found that all local television 
stations combined carried 3.6 million public service announcements per year, for an average of 6,350 per local 
station. The ratio of paid spots to PSAs was roughly 5 to 1. Broadcasters estimated each PSA was valued at $100 "A 
Census of TV Public Service," Broadcasting, 6 April 1964.. Broadcasters continue to trumpet the value of “donated” 
time to the present day.   
58 The six groups were chosen as a representative sample. Avco, Chris-Craft, and Fuqua were chosen for their 
substantial and diverse non-broadcast interests. Cox and E.W. Scripps were chosen for their interests in cable 
television and newspapers. Finally, Travelers Insurance Company represented companies with non-diverse interests 
other than broadcasting. "A Different Tack on Conglomerates?" Broadcasting, 2 February 1970. The study covered 
1966-1969 activities, during which time both Avco and E.W. Scripps apparently engaged in practices the FC found 
questionable. "What Triggered Conglomerate Probe," Broadcasting, 17 August 1970.  
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to prevent editorial influence by the conglomerate on news coverage, and did the conglomerate 
financially support the broadcast subsidiary. On the last matter, the pilot study revealed that 
subsidiary broadcast stations were profitable and in fact contributed more to the conglomerate 
than other subsidiaries ("FCC Seeks More" 1971). During the five years that followed, the FCC 
investigated 37 conglomerates, but ultimately decided that where ownership was concerned, 
conglomerates were no different than any other corporate owners and required no specific 
restrictions ("Conglomerate Study" 1975). 
The guidelines to measure the “public interest” actions of broadcast stations were revised 
in 1976, taking the form of a percentage calculation for all commercial TV stations (except for 
independent UHF stations) called the 5-5-10 rule in 59 FCC 2d 491. The new rule required the 
stations to fill 5% of their schedule with informational programming, 5% with local 
programming, and with 10% total non-entertainment programming (Wollert and Wirth 1982, 
159-160). A longintudinal study covering 1973-1978 showed that stations were exceeding these 
requirements, providing 14.5% of their schedule with news and public affairs programs, 9.5% of 
their schedules with local programs, and 24.2% of their schedules with non-entertainment 
programs (Wollert and Wirth 1982, 159).     
This final sub-period completes the era including the heaviest regulation of the 
broadcasting industry. The entire period between 1927 and 1978 was replete with examples of 
the centralizing momentum of the industry and an emphasis on local public interest 
programming that encouraged the proliferation of local news, first as sustaining programming 
and later as a source of profitable public service. The ever-changing definition of the “public 
interest” provided both restriction and opportunity for broadcasters in the form of changing 
regulation on structure and practice, particularly in the last sub-period when the FCC looked to 
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the broadcasters for input on how they could best serve their communities. The concern shown 
by regulators for the commercial needs of the broadcasters in the third sub-period was a sign of 
things to come, as the subsequent time period would emphasize the marketplace model in place 
of the existing public trustee model. Early warnings of this change were present in an April 1975 
speech to the National Cable Television Association by President Ford, in which he expressed 
concern with industry “overregulation.” Following that speech, Ford planned meetings with the 
FCC, FTC, and others to “request suggestions for de-regulation” of various industries ("De-
regulation" 1975). By 1979, Media Decisions happily trumpeted, “They’re changing the rules of 
the game!” The article claimed that with the impending deregulation broadcasters could expect, 
among other things, an end to most provisions of the Fairness Doctrine and “the end of the public 
trustee concept of broadcasting” ("They're Changing" 1979, 59-60). 
 
2.4 1979-PRESENT: DEREGULATION, TELECOMMUNICATION, AND 
CONSOLIDATION 
In this context [the communications industry] what does deregulation mean? It 
means an expansion of business privilege – and a reduction of obligations to the 
public…. Deregulation – even more than regulation – is a licence (sic) for 
oligopolists to ride rough-shod over the mass….  
 
If these ground rules had been operative in the 1940s and 1950s, NBC would not 
have been forced to sell the network which became ABC, local radio and TV 
stations would have been dominated in program terms by the networks, the 
innovation of color TV would have been deferred from the 1950s to the 1980s, 
and ITT would have bought up ABC (Smythe 1985, 13-14). 
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The final time period this chapter examines is the era of deregulation which extends into the 
present day. This era is characterized by the vision of free-market economics as the force which 
constrains broadcasters, on the principle that those who provide the best service in the “public 
interest” will most interest the public, and thus will garner greater profits. In many media activist 
circles, deregulation is considered to be a switch from using government regulation to ensure the 
broadcasters are giving the public what they need to run their democracy to instead giving the 
public what they allegedly “want.” As a result of this new vision of “the public interest, 
convenience, and necessity,” the era of deregulation is characterized by an almost complete 
relaxation of expectations for public service on the part of broadcasters and of restrictions on 
ownership. These relaxations have led in turn to an accelerated trend of industry centralization of 
ownership and operation and a concurrent shift away from programming which serves the public 
and towards programming which sells audiences to advertisers, including a shift of perspective in 
news content towards that end. 
There were three important moments of deregulation between 1979 and 1996, according 
to Lori Brainard’s Television: The Limits of Deregulation. A first unsuccessful attempt was made 
in 1979, a substantially more effective attempt in the 1980s, and the complete undoing of most 
regulatory restrictions was accomplished in 1996 and thereafter (Brainard 2004, 53-54). Each of 
these moments requires further address. The first serious effort to deregulate the broadcast 
industry began with Representative Lionel Van Deerlin’s call for Congress to completely rewrite 
the 1934 Communications Act in 1976. After three years of research, Van Deerlin offered up the 
Communications Act of 1979. In the belief that the expansion of cable television would both 
foster competition and resolve the scarcity problem, the bill attempted to replace what Van 
Deerlin considered to be governmental restrictions on speech (direct involvement with program 
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content) with economic intervention designed to promote programming diversity. The bill 
federalized regulation of cable, limited multiple ownership of broadcast television stations to 
seven, and by making license terms indefinite after 10 years invoked a property system for the 
airwaves which regulators had avoided since the beginning of the industry. It also required 
broadcasters to pay a spectrum fee and cable providers to pay broadcasters for retransmission 
consent. Ultimately, widespread objections painted the bill as relaxing regulation too much and it 
was quietly done away with (Brainard 2004, 55-60). 
Brainard’s second important moment of deregulation began when Ronald Reagan took 
the oath of office as President. Reagan’s presidency was marked by a deep faith in the free 
market, a desire to reduce bureaucracy wherever possible, and a strategy of appointing 
individuals who shared these beliefs to key positions. One of the agencies Reagan targeted was 
the FCC, and in 1981 he appointed Mark Fowler as chairman of the Commission. Fowler’s 
personal and philosophical loyalty to the President who appointed him immediately put him at 
odds with Congress. Congress envisioned the FCC as regulators, and Fowler was determined to 
be a deregulator (Devins 1993, 149-150). Fowler’s first step was to re-imagine television 
broadcasters not as public trustees, but rather as marketplace participants. In that vision, 
broadcasters would be forced by the market to give the public what it wanted. Fowler made 
alterations in a number of areas relevant to television broadcasting during his tenure, including 
governmental filing requirements, duration of licenses, program content, advertising, station 
trading, multiple-ownership, and the issue of the Fairness Doctrine (Brainard 2004, 61-62).   
In the first area, Fowler’s FCC eliminated the broadcast financial reporting requirement 
and reduced the paperwork necessary for license renewals to a postcard, among other changes. 
The Commission estimated that by doing so, it reduced 33.5 million hours of broadcasters’ 
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paperwork to about six million hours ("The Bittersweet Chairmanship" 1985, 39). The FCC also 
extended television station license terms in 1981 from three years to five, further reducing 
administrative overhead for both broadcasters and Commissioners. In 1985, the Commission 
dropped the public service guidelines for amounts of non-entertainment programming, and that 
same year eliminated restrictions on the amount of advertising time allowed in programming 
(Sterling 1997). In 1986, broadcasters argued that the FCC’s rules regarding children’s television 
infringed upon their first amendment rights. The FCC agreed, and repealed the rules over the 
protests of public interest groups (Brainard 2004, 70). Also, the FCC facilitated easier station 
trading with the repeal of the 3-year rule regarding station sales in 1982, allowing companies to 
once again apply for transfer of ownership after owning a property for less than 3 years without 
facing a mandatory hearing. The FCC also eliminated its anti-trafficking policy which had 
looked upon frequent station trading with displeasure ("A Not-So-Rosy Evaluation" 1989).  
Perhaps the most dramatic and potentially damaging developments, however, were in the 
areas of fairness and ownership. In May of 1984, the FCC announced its intent to reassess the 
Fairness Doctrine, a move which quickly irritated Congress. The following year the FCC 
released the Fairness Report, which stopped short of demanding a repeal of the doctrine. It did, 
however, criticize the Fairness Doctrine as both unnecessary and detrimental. The Report 
contended that since scarcity was no longer an issue, the “public trustee” responsibilities of 
broadcasters no longer applied. Further, it claimed that the Fairness Doctrine actually restricted 
the discussion of important issues for fear of stirring up controversy. When the D.C. Circuit 
Court declined to rule on the 1986 Meredith case and remanded it to the FCC to determine the 
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constitutionality of the Doctrine, the FCC happily informed Congress of its new mandate.59 In 
June of 1987, Congress passed legislation to codify the Fairness Doctrine, but was unable to get 
the measure past Reagan, who trumpeted first amendment protection in his disdain for the 
Doctrine. One of the first important acts of Reagan’s pick to succeed Fowler, Chairman Dennis 
Patrick, was to abolish the Fairness Doctrine on August 4, 1987 (Devins 1993, 155, 159-161).  
Also in 1984, the FCC announced that the television ownership cap was soon to be 
eliminated. The cap had begun in 1941 with the rule of threes, increased with the rule of sevens, 
and during a six year transitional period lasting until 1990 would permit maximum ownership of 
12 television stations; after that, all restrictions would end. Congress failed to agree, and passed 
legislation blocking the FCC. Ultimately, a new law was passed assessing ownership as a 
percentage of the total national television audience, setting the cap at 25% with a concurrent 
maximum of 12 television stations. UHF stations were discounted, considered to reach only half 
of the available audience in a market (Benjamin 2004, 446).60 Minority ownership was also 
specifically encouraged: groups could own up to 14 stations if at least two were 51% minority 
controlled, and the percentage cap would be raised to 30% as long as the extra 5% was made up 
of minority controlled stations (Brainard 2004, 69). 
The third moment of deregulation, according to Brainard, began with President Clinton’s 
signing of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. FCC Chairman Reed Hundt saw the role of the 
FCC as “[guaranteeing] that necessary public benefits from communications are distributed 
                                                 
59 The Commission was crafty. When Meredith Corporation challenged a 1984 FCC finding that it had violated the 
Fairness Doctrine, it invoked the Fairness Report and asked the FCC to repeal the Doctrine as unconstitutional. The 
FCC claimed Meredith had no standing to protest. The D.C. Circuit court then gave the FCC what it wanted in the 
first place, the mandate to decide on the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine. Neal Devins, "Congress, the FCC, 
and the Search for the Public Trustee," Law and Contemporary Problems 56, no. 4 (1993): 158. 
60 This was not the first time that the percentage model was considered by the FCC. In 1964, an FCC staffer offered 
a proposal which would permit owners to possess broadcast stations and newspapers which reached 25% of the total 
U.S. population. "Cutbacks in Group Ownership?" Broadcasting, 21 September 1964, 42. 
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fairly and easily.” The preferred method was to let free market competition produce that result, 
but when that failed the FCC was ready to employ “proactive social policies structured to be 
sustainable in a competitive environment” (Aufderheide 1999, 81). In practice, the proactive 
social policies have generally failed to materialize, and free market competition has been the 
defining form of industry control since the signing of the Act.    
The Telecommunications Act had several provisions of note for television broadcasters. 
First, license terms were extended to eight years. Second, broadcasters were given additional 
spectrum to develop high-definition television and other services free of charge as long as their 
use was in the “public interest.” Using the new spectrum for pay services entailed a fee paid to 
the FCC. Third, the Act did away with the maximum number of stations policy, replacing it with 
a newly raised 35% cap on access to the national audience. Fourth, it instituted a ratings system 
for television programming. Finally, it specifically applied the public interest standard to new 
digital technologies (Brainard 2004, 80-81). Three years later, the FCC again relaxed ownership 
restrictions, introducing new duopoly rules for television ownership, one of which allowed a 
single owner to possess two television stations in the same market as long as one was not in the 
top four by audience share and there were “eight independent TV ‘voices’ after the merger” 
(Ozanich and Wirth 2004, 79). By January 2002, 95 combos were operating including 75 were 
duopolies, and the FCC was ready to relax the rules even more. In January 2002, LIN Television 
and Media General received government approval to acquire duopolies in markets “too small to 
pass regulators’ general test for station combos,” the first such approval given to markets where 
less than eight independent voices would remain (McConnell 2002). Duopolies were particularly 
beneficial to station groups for economic reasons, but also in terms of ownership levels, because 
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two stations reaching the same audience in a market do not increase the percentage of ownership 
considered by the ownership percentage cap (McConnell, et al. 2001).  
At the turn of the century, debate was fierce over the possibility of again raising the 
ownership cap to 45% of the national audience; only this time, the broadcasters were battling 
among themselves as well. The networks lobbied Congress and the FCC to raise the limit, while 
the National Association of Broadcasters preferred maintaining the 35% limit. Many affiliates 
felt that the networks would be too powerful if they were permitted to own more stations 
(Albiniak 1999). Fox Television forced a decision on the issue two years later.  
In 2002, a D.C. Circuit Court instructed the FCC to revisit the national television station 
ownership rule as a result of Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, claiming that it could find no 
connection between the rule and the public interest. The FCC took that opportunity to revisit all 
of its ownership regulations, and in June 2003, issued new rules which loosened ownership 
restrictions across the television broadcasting industry. The new rules permitted some cross-
ownership among media; continued to ban mergers among the top four networks; increased the 
maximum number of television stations per owner per market, allowing 2 in markets with 17 or 
fewer stations and 3 in markets with 18 or more stations;61 and raised the maximum percentage 
of the nation’s audience that a single group’s owned stations could reach from 35% to 45%. 
During the hearings before the ruling, this last provision generated more than 750,000 comments 
advising the FCC not to proceed. When it made the ruling anyway, Congress rescinded the 
increase, codified the cap at 35%, later raised it to 39% to appease Fox and CBS which were 
                                                 
61 In spring 2003, the FCC approved broadcast ownership rules to allow new TV duopolies in over 70 markets, 
including medium and small markets, where they had previously been disallowed. Triopolies, or ownership of three 
television stations, would be allowed in six of the largest markets. Cross-ownership of local television stations with 
local newspapers would be greatly relaxed, and the number of markets in which cross-ownership was allowed would 
increase from 46 to 60. Mark K. Miller, "On Hold: Rankings Change Little as Regulatory Uncertainty Keeps Station 
Trading in Neutral," Broadcasting & Cable, 19 April 2004. 
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both above 37% ownership, and removed the FCC’s power to raise it again (Benjamin 2004, 
440, 447-448).  
And so goes the era of deregulation. The combination of free-market ideology and a 
corporate-privilege bias have created an industry characterized by concentration of control and 
ownership in the hands of a steadily shrinking number of groups. The three major themes of this 
chapter – the public interest, broadcasters’ public service responsibilities, and restrictions of 
ownership – have been generally subordinated to the rule of the market. Even the public interest 
obligations the broadcasters initially accepted in return for free digital broadcast spectrum 
allocations are largely ignored as group owners examine datacasting and multi-channel operation 
schemes to increase their profit margins, rather than providing the high-definition service that 
Congress intended; we’ll address these topics in the next two chapters.    
So why does all of this matter? What’s the connection between ownership, regulation, 
and the public interest? Isn’t the market an adequate vehicle for regulating the industry? These 
questions are well addressed in a 2004 study by Michael Yan and Philip M. Napoli. These 
researchers collected a random sample of programming from 285 television stations, and used 
the results to examine the connection between commercial status, ownership, and local public 
affairs programming. Excluding news from consideration as public affairs, the authors found that 
only 41% of the commercial stations aired any local public affairs programs during the two week 
sample, while 11% of the commercial stations aired neither local nor national public affairs 
programs.62 Using regression analysis, the study further examined the impact of station 
ownership by one of the “big four” networks on the quantity of local public affairs programming. 
                                                 
62 Of the public television stations included in the survey, roughly 90% aired local public affairs programming 
during this timeframe (47 of 52). Michael Yan and Philip. M. Napoli, "Market Structure, Station Ownership, and 
Local Public Affairs Programming on Local Broadcast Television," in Telecommunications Policy Research 
Conference (Arlington, VA: 2004), 11. 
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The study concluded: (1) there is a small positive effect of local ownership on the quantity of 
local programming; (2) ownership by one of the big four negatively affected the amount of local 
programming carried; and (3) that the expected local service benefits afforded by duopolies’ 
economies of scale have not translated into expanded local public affairs coverage (Yan and 
Napoli 2004, 11, 14-16). 
The importance of these factors in determining the current state of local broadcasting 
cannot be ignored. Regulatory decisions regarding ownership have been instrumental in molding 
the current structure of the local television broadcasting industry, on an ever-loosening trajectory 
of restriction. These ownership decisions, in turn, have consistently been influenced by the 
changing FCC definitions of the “public interest” and the changing expectations for 
broadcasters’ public service efforts which resulted, leading to both an increase in the quantity of 
news and a potential decrease in its quality as the service aspect is subordinated to the profit 
aspect. Ultimately, the relationship between the commercial nature of the broadcast industry and 
the public interest expectations placed upon those participating in it seems to boil down to a 
question asked in the 1920s: what should broadcasters have to remit to the public in exchange for 
using the public property of the electromagnetic spectrum for their own financial gain? The 
answer then was for broadcasters to take up the mantle of public trustee and exchange public 
service, especially through news and public interest programming, for the right to profit. Imagine 
that position as one extreme of a pendulum. Throughout the first century of broadcasting, that 
pendulum moved through its arc as regulators reinterpreted what the public interest meant, as 
broadcasters pushed their public service commitment to its most economically effective and 
limited boundary, and as the FCC expanded and contracted ownership regulations to satisfy its 
changing perspective. Now, near the other extreme of the pendulum’s arc, the question can be 
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asked again: what must the broadcasters offer to the public for their use of the spectrum? Given 
the shift of the industry from social regulation to economic regulation, the answer to that 
question seems to have been left in the hands of the broadcasters. As Coase observed, the FCC 
has once again “exhorted the businessmen to act in the public interest and, incidentally, against 
their own” (Coase 1966, 446). As Yan and Napoli show, as yet they have mostly failed to do so.  
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3.0  THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN THE CENTRALIZATION AND 
CONSOLIDATION OF LOCAL TELEVISION BROADCASTING 
“It is no longer possible for studies simply to regard the technology of television as a 
given, whose institutional implications are self-evident and whose applications do not 
require independent investigation” (Corner 1999, 16). 
 
As Chapter One demonstrated, the development of the television industry has been marked by a 
constant trend towards centralization, as broadcast ownership and organizational structures have 
condensed from a relatively large number of small owners operating stations independently into 
a small number of relatively large owners operating interconnected stations. Chapter Two 
analyzed one of the main contributing factors to the centralizing motion: changing governmental 
regulation of the industry which attempted and often failed to balance the public interest with the 
free market commercial system of broadcasting. This chapter examines another determining 
factor in the centralization of ownership and operation, the technologies upon which the industry 
rests. As Corner observes, too often the importance of technology is underestimated, considered 
simply a tool rather than a vital component. Many of the organizational structures that exist in 
the industry today are possible only because of the development of technologies to serve them; 
the technologies are not always a cause, but are most certainly a prerequisite. The overall 
purpose of this chapter is to describe the historical trajectory of technological invention and 
innovation in television broadcasting and to chart the consequent/concurrent changes in the 
structures and practices of the industry.  
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As a preface to a more detailed discussion, the chapter first addresses the nature of 
technology and technological innovation, and several models of causality and social interaction 
that are vital to any discussion of technology in an effort to establish the conceptual foundation 
for the chapter, a theory of economic “guiding principles” embodied by television technologies. 
Second, the chapter examines television broadcasting technology during the early days of the 
industry, providing a basis to understand later technological development and illustrating the 
manner in which the new medium was forced to fit into the cultural understanding of radio 
broadcasting, especially in the transfer of news practices from radio to television broadcasting. 
Third, the chapter describes three sets of “centralizing technologies” which dramatically 
influenced the development of television broadcasting between 1941 and 1988. Finally, the 
chapter examines television technology from 1988 to the present day and shows how 
technological development and “convergence” have made possible many of the shifts in 
ownership structure which were finally allowed by changing regulation of television 
broadcasting and catalyzed by the impending shift to digital television. Throughout these 
sections, the chapter contends that technologies designed under the guiding principle of 
economic efficiency have dramatically changed both structure and practice, especially in the area 
of television news. The chapter concludes by examining the three exemplar station groups for 
specific examples of how technological choices have contributed to the centralization of 
operations within and among their stations. 
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3.1 TECHNOLOGY, THE BROADCAST FACTORY, AND ECONOMIC GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES 
Prior to a discussion of technological development, it is helpful to define technology in the 
context of this project. It is a word bound together with ideas and ideals that far exceed the 
simple idea of “machine,” which is often considered its synonym. Dallas Smythe offers a 
definition couched in perfect prose: 
‘Technology’ is a myth composed of: capital, science and machines welded together by 
an ideology and distributed by propaganda which molds public opinion to accept the 
myth. It is not autonomous and it is endogenous. (Smythe 1985, 15) 
 
Part of that myth is the ongoing drive of capital to wring maximum efficiency from every part in 
the production chain. Frederick Taylor applied this concept of maximum efficiency to labor and 
called the result “scientific management,” a philosophy which includes a set of practices to 
exhort the worker to achieve his or her full potential as part of the production process (Redmond 
and Trager 1998, 41). Technology, as Smythe describes it, has become a word encompassing all 
of these ideals, but most especially the idea that technology embodied increased productivity, 
and thus increased profits. The beginnings of this connotation can be found on the factory floor 
at the start of the industrial revolution.    
Karl Marx, in his 1867 work Capital, Volume I, discusses the role of machines in newly 
industrialized factories, and the economic factors that attended this change. Ernest Mandel 
observes that when talking about machines, Marx proceeds in three simultaneous directions: 
machines as the main weapon to subordinate labor to capital, machines as the main weapon for 
increasing the production of surplus-value, and machines as the main weapon for reproducing the 
industrial ‘reserve army of labour;’ (1978, 35) for both Mandel and Marx, technology / 
machinery is synonymous with weapons used by capitalists in their war with workers. Mandel 
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offers another insight, which is particularly relevant to this chapter:  “Inasmuch as production 
becomes mechanized, it becomes reorganized around machinery. The work rhythm and work 
content of living labour are subordinated to the mechanical needs of machinery itself” (1978, 
34). All of the discussions of television technology are illustrative of this insight, as the industry 
revamps not only work routines but organizational structures as technological innovation makes 
these new forms possible. 
Using Mandel’s observations as a guide, consider Marx’s views. First, machines are used 
to subordinate labor to capital. Marx views the relationship between capital (owners) and labor 
(workers) as a battle for dominance and control. In an environment where the owner is reliant 
upon the workers’ skills, such as the learned ability to use a certain tool, the worker has a degree 
of power. When a machine can replace that skill, the power in the worker-owner relationship 
rests solidly with the owner of the machine (Marx 1867, 494-495).  
Second, machines increase the production of surplus-value.63 As technology improves, 
surplus value increases, because tasks take less time. “The machine, therefore, is a mechanism 
that, after being set in motion, performs with its tools the same operations as the worker formerly 
did with similar tools,” Marx writes. It is not, however, a one-to-one ratio: “The number of tools 
that a machine can bring into play simultaneously is from the outset independent of the organic 
limitations that confine the tools of the handicraftsman.” Where a man could operate only a 
                                                 
63 Marx distinguishes between two different circular economic models, one in which Commodities are exchanged 
for Money which is then used to buy Commodities for use (C-M-C), and another in which Money is used to 
purchase Commodities which are then sold for Money (M-C-M). In the first model, the money moves from person 
to person; in the second, the money comes back to the initial buyer. In the first model, consumption of the use 
product is the goal; in the second, the goal is exchange-value. In the process of M-C-M, the goal is to sell the 
product for more than it cost to acquire, and the difference between the cost paid and the higher price received is 
surplus-value (Marx 1867, 248-51). Part of that cost is the daily wages of the worker; once the worker has produced 
enough to cover those wages, the remaining hours in the day are dedicated entirely to the production of surplus 
value for the owner. Taylor recognized the benefit of surplus value in his theory of scientific management, and 
included incentive pay for those who exceeded their expected quota of work. James Redmond and Robert Trager, 
Balancing on the Wire: The Art of Managing Media Organizations (Boulder: Coursewise Publishing, 1998), 42. 
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single-spindle spinning wheel, some of the earliest spinning machines used twelve spindles 
(Marx 1867, 495). Here again, power shifts away from the worker and towards the owner of the 
machines. 
Third, and briefly, machines produce a “reserve army of labour.” Because one machine 
can replace several workers, the addition of machines to the factory allows a reduction in staff 
size. When workers are unemployed, they are available to be thrust into the work force whenever 
capital demands it; they are the soldiers of the reserve army of labour. 
Finally, as production becomes mechanized, the workers still involved in the production 
must reorganize themselves in new ways. This is a key element in any discussion of 
concentration: new technology brings with it new work patterns. Examples offered by Marx 
include an increase in women and children in the factories as machines were developed to handle 
manual tasks and the workers’ role became supervisory (1867, 519); the extension of the 
working day to include additional shifts to make better use of the fixed costs of buildings and 
machinery (1867, 527-529); and the historical state of labor being specialized with a given tool 
that might benefit the worker outside the factory, to becoming specialized in the use of a given 
machine which the worker cannot hope to afford (1867, 547).   
Modern examples of Marx’s ideas are illustrated in the forthcoming pages, which 
examine the ways that technology has influenced the television broadcasting industry. Although 
the local television station and the industrial revolution era factory seem to have little in common 
at first glance, Marx’s observations are as true on the studio floor as they were on the factory 
floor. The new television machines are technologies in Smythe’s sense of the word, embodying a 
constant drive for more efficiency throughout the production process. This new efficiency allows 
for operational practices that replace human actions with machine actions, placing power firmly 
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in the hands of the owners and redirecting former employees into the potential labor pool, while 
steadily increasing surplus value and profit for the owner.  
3.1.1 Social Constructivism and Economic Determinism 
In order to understand the role of technology in the development of broadcasting, it is first 
necessary to examine how broadcast technology itself is developed. Marx’s writings adopt a 
circular perspective towards technological development: social needs call technology into being 
at the behest of the capitalist, and the new technology acts upon that society in pronounced ways 
both within and beyond the factory walls. Two important and related questions at the historical 
heart of technology studies follow this thinking: first, how do technological development and 
innovation occur, and second, in what ways do technology and society affect one another? 
Scholars generally take one of two approaches when addressing the relationship between 
technology and society. The first approach is that employed by noted scholars Harold Innis and 
Marshall McLuhan, who suggested that technologies “develop according to an inner logic” or 
“as a reflex of scientific discovery” and are “impervious to human influence” (Disco and van der 
Meulen 1998, 4). Aptly named technological determinism, this model has been shown to be 
lacking by later studies of communications technology, particularly those of Raymond Williams 
and Brian Winston, who instead promote the notion of social constructivism or cultural 
determinism.  
In the introduction to the 1992 reprint of Williams’ Television: Technology and Cultural 
Form, Lynn Spigel describes Williams’ research as a “thoroughgoing critique of the 
relationships among television’s technological invention, its innovation as a media institution 
and textual form, and its connection to social relationships and experiences in modern western 
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culture” (1992, x). Spigel quotes one of Williams’ later works, The Year 2000, succinctly 
summarizing his perspective: “The moment of any new technology… is a moment of choice” 
(1992, xv); as Spigel indicates, Williams feels that choice is what is lacking in technological 
determinism. He describes the innovation process as defined by technological determinists 
thusly: “New technologies are discovered, by an essentially internal process of research and 
development, which then sets the conditions for social change and progress” (1974, 7). Williams 
rejects this characterization, and offers his own hypothesis which he claims would “differ from 
technological determinism in that it would restore intention to the process of research and 
development. The process would be seen… as being looked for and developed with certain 
purposes and practices already in mind” (1974, 8).  
These purposes and practices, Williams proposes, are driven by social need. As an 
example, he offers the development of radio, which was initially propagated as a means of 
wireless telegraph transmission for a society that was demanding a more efficient information 
distribution system64 (1974, 11). However, not every social need is fulfilled with immediate 
technological development. Only when you have a “need which corresponds with the priorities 
of the real decision-making groups” can the necessary investment of resources commence (1974, 
13).  
Once intention is given its due as the driving force behind research and development, the 
argument takes shape: “Technologies are shaped by the actions, strategies, and interpretations of 
                                                 
64 Guglielmo Marconi combined current telegraph technology with Heinrich Hertz’ discovery of radio waves, called 
Hertzian waves at the time, to develop the wireless telegraph. Moving to England in 1896, he formed the Wireless 
Telegraph and Signal Company, Ltd., with an eye towards selling units to the British navy. An early notable use of 
the device for news purposes was a “minute-by-minute wireless account of the Kingstown Regatta” for the Dublin 
Daily Express. This market, in combination with the military applications, provided impetus for innovation and 
expansion of the technology. Barnouw, A Tower in Babel, 9-13. 
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human actors” (Disco and van der Meulen 1998, 4).65  The theory of social constructivism, as 
Williams proposes, “investigates how actors organize their perception of existing technologies 
and how they… develop appropriate technologies”(Disco and van der Meulen 1998, 6), restoring 
intention to the process of research and development. This departure from technological 
determinism still fails to suffice for authors Cornelis Disco and Barend van der Meulen, who 
instead offer a theory called societal constructivism as the correct frame through which to 
examine technological development.  
Societal constructivism differs from social constructivism by emphasizing how 
“perception and action are constrained and enabled by the situations in which actors find 
themselves or which they have produced as a result of earlier actions.” The focus is on what the 
authors call coordination, the idea that the actors who are developing new technologies are 
influenced by and are exerting influence upon other actors, pushing towards a collective goal 
(1998, 7). Although the complete theory is perhaps best suited to wider-ranging inquiries than 
those this chapter is concerned with, Disco and van der Meulen incorporate a useful structural 
emphasis in their theory, suggesting that as different companies or individuals develop new 
technologies their actions constrain the options of the other actors, both relying on and refining 
through their interaction a common direction for a given technology.  
These structural constraints are best expressed through authors Smit, Elzen, and 
Enserink’s application of this theory to an examination of military socio-technical networks. In 
                                                 
65 Disco and van der Meulen offer direction toward other critiques of technological determinism. Notable historical 
authors include Adam Smith, Marx, Engels, and Schumpeter. Contemporary authors include Braverman’s Labor 
and Monopoly Capitalism (1974), Noble’s Forces of Production (1984), Edwards’ Contested Terrain (1979), Dosi’s 
“Technological paradigms and technological trajectories” (1982), Nelson and Winter’s An Evolutionary Theory of 
Economic Change (1982), and Abernathy and Clark’s “Innovation: Mapping the Winds of Creative Destruction” 
(1985). They also mention Mumford’s Technics and Civilization (1963) and Ellul’s The Technological Society 
(1964). Cornelius Disco and Barend van der Meulen, eds., Getting New Technologies Together (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1998), 4. 
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their analysis, they discovered that military technological innovation is governed by “guiding 
principles,” even as the process is fundamentally decentralized through the use of non-military 
contractors. A guiding principle is “an analytic concept that observers or analysts may use to 
describe and analyze processes of military technological development.” They point out two 
important characteristics: first, that the guiding principle is shared by actors on different levels 
and in different organizations, and second that the guiding principles function as a “heuristic for 
making choices… and a touchstone for their evaluations” (1998, 79). Although their research is 
accomplished in a military context, the theory of guiding principles can be applied equally well 
to a set of commercial imperatives, such as the tendency towards centralization in the television 
ownership arena. 
These commercial imperatives are indeed central to the development of technology 
within a capitalist economic system. Because technical systems are economic enterprises, market 
competition forces technical change to occur so that the companies involved can continue and/or 
increase their profit-making. The economic needs of the system drive the changes in technology; 
innovation is made in service of the ultimate goal of profit, and this economic system is an 
inherently social construct (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999, 12-13), providing further bolster to 
the case against technological determinism.66  The economic system constricts both development 
process and resulting technology, as technology is most often the result of extensive and 
expensive research and design; the truth of this can be found in the myriad of patent, copyright, 
and intellectual property laws that protect investments in new technologies (Green 2001, 6). 
                                                 
66 MacKenzie and Wajcman reference Karl Marx’s Capital Vol. 1 ([1867] 1976, Harmondsworth: Penguin), pages 
173-176, in support of this claim. Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, "Introductory Essay and General Issues," 
in The Social Shaping of Technology, ed. Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman (Philadelphia: Open University 
Press, 1999), 13. 
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These arguments, taken together, form the foundation for this chapter. The theories of 
technological determinism espoused most popularly by Innis and McLuhan are insufficient to 
explain the path of innovation that has occurred in the equipment used at local television stations.  
Mike Wayne summarizes the reasons for rejecting this approach in Marxism and Media Studies: 
The common feature of technological determinism is that it levers technology, its 
development, implementation and effects out of the social relations in which they are 
embedded, thus a) marginalizing or removing the social relations from analysis, and b) 
ascribing powers and characteristics to technology which are the result of social relations 
between people, rather than properties intrinsic to things (2003, 40). 
 
Instead, following Williams and Disco, this chapter uses as a starting point the idea that 
technologies are created within a system of imperatives and guiding principles that determines 
the direction of technological research, based upon an interaction between societal need and the 
interest of powerful parties to fulfill those needs. In addition, because of these imperatives, 
technology is developed with certain “purposes and practices” in mind. This social interaction 
positions technology as both cause and effect of social change, because even as technologies are 
created towards a given result, it is still vital to consider the holistic social environment that both 
permitted and necessitated the achieving of that result (Slack 1984, 15-16).  
3.1.2 Discovering the Guiding Principles 
There are many avenues that can be explored to discover the purposes and practices guiding 
technological development, including statements of designers and adopters, news reports, 
corporate documents, and other similar sources. However, often the most fertile ground for 
examination is the technology itself. If technology is designed for a specific purpose, rather than 
being “discovered” during experimentation as the technological determinist would have it, it is 
reasonable to assume that these purposes, and the assumptions and desires behind them, are 
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somehow encoded within that finished technology. Bruno Latour addresses this concept in the 
article “The Sociology of a Door Closer.” Describing the many inherent requirements and needs 
incumbent upon the technologies of the door and the door closer, he illuminates the ideas 
embedded in individual technologies in an entertaining and eminently useful manner. 
Latour offers several definitions in service of understanding the interplay between human 
and non-human, and these definitions trace an intricate path towards a theory that can be applied 
to our analysis of television technology. First, Latour rejects trying to assign “a priori” 
distinctions between human and nonhuman skills, and instead speaks simply of scripts, “scenes 
or scenarios played by human or nonhuman actors.” The retrieval of the script from a given 
situation he calls description, which is part of the job of the technologist or sociologist – to figure 
out what is going on and report it in some fashion. Taking the scripts, now apparent because they 
have been described, and translating them “from one repertoire to a more durable one” Latour 
refers to as transcription, giving the example of taking the script of traffic control and 
transcribing it from action by a policeman to action by a traffic light (1988, 305-306). 
By establishing that certain purposes are encoded into a technology’s design, Latour 
neatly contradicts the seeming randomness at work in technological determinism. He also 
suggests that the actions of the nonhumans are intended as replacements for the actions of 
humans, the corollary of which is that the actions which impelled the development of the 
technology were addressing a real or imagined need of that society; otherwise, why would the 
script have existed in the first place to then be transcribed to a nonhuman actor? Latour next 
defines prescription as “whatever a scene presupposes about from its transcribed actors and 
authors (this is very much like “role expectation” in sociology, except that it may be inscribed or 
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encoded in a machine).”67 In short, technologies embody ideas about their uses, and their users 
(1988, 306-307). 
Additional support for the idea that technologies embody these ideas, practices, and 
principles is offered by Langdon Winner’s work on what he calls “technological politics,” which 
he posits as a “necessary complement” to theories of social determinism. The benefit of adding 
this position, he argues, is that it “suggests that we pay attention to the characteristics of 
technical objects and the meaning of those characteristics” (1980, 28), which is precisely what 
this chapter attempts to do in regard to television equipment. Winner offers two ways in which 
technical objects can contain political properties. The first comprises “instances in which the 
invention, design, or arrangement of a specific technical device or system becomes a way of 
settling an issue in a particular community.” The second includes cases of “inherently political 
technologies, man-made systems that appear to require, or to be strongly compatible with, 
particular kinds of political relationships” (1980, 29-30). Winner offers Robert Moses’ design of 
Long Island’s parkways to intentionally deny access to those who relied on public transportation 
– Moses designed the overpasses to be too low for a bus to pass underneath them - as an example 
of the former possibility (1980, 30-31). For the latter, Winner suggests that in order to function, 
systems of transportation such as the railroad demanded a new social form in order to operate – a 
“large-scale centralized, hierarchical organization administered by highly skilled managers” 
(1980, 35). In this case, the assumption about society is embodied in the technology, because the 
railroad simply could not operate as intended without the associated social support. These 
examples prove that assumptions about the users and uses of that technology can be drawn 
directly from the technology. 
                                                 
67 A term used to describe a group's or society's definition of the way a specific role ought to be played. Diana 
Kendall, Jane Lothian Murray, and Rick Linden, "Sociology in Our Times,"  (Thomson Nelson, 2004), IIB(1). 
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This notion that we can look to technology itself as embodying the guiding principles, 
beliefs, and ideas of the social system that called them into being is the second part of this 
chapter’s foundation. The final step is to unearth the core element which underlies the 
development of all of the technologies we will examine. There can be little question that 
technical innovation in the television industry, at least within the capitalist market system of the 
United States, has always been driven ultimately by the desire of both broadcasters and 
equipment manufacturers to increase their profit making potential, a key component of the free 
market ideology which supports the system.  
Brian Winston begins Technologies of Seeing by joining the chorus in opposition to 
technological determinism, instead using as inspiration for his analysis a passage from Fernand 
Brudel which likens the history of technology to alternating processes of acceleration and 
braking (1996, 1).  Winston writes “in the dance of history, society always leads technology,” 
and continues “[t]he state of the market, or better, of society is the crucial factor in enabling the 
development and diffusion of any communications technology or in hindering it” (1996, 3). 
The process of creation and dissemination of communication technologies follows a 
consistent path. First, existing scientific knowledge (which is socially conditioned) is used to 
create a prototype device in the real world – a step that Winston calls “ideation.” The accelerator 
which transforms the prototype into an invention is a “supervening social necessity,” defined as 
an external social force or combination of forces which gives direction for using the prototype. 
Winston suggests that this process explains simultaneous invention, because different scientists 
are working in response to shared societal needs. Finally, even though the invention exists now 
in the real world, its dissemination is controlled by the brake of “suppression of radical 
potential,” which prohibits it from being widely used until it can be properly ‘fit’ into society. 
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Winston offers as an example of this last step the fact that television as a technology was ready 
two decades before it became widely available to the public, because it didn’t yet ‘fit’ into the 
plans of the companies still reaping profits from radio (1996, 4-9). The same brake was applied 
to the rollout of color television later in the century, and has affected the transition to digital 
television and HDTV as well. 
Winston’s description of the process of innovation is the element which completes the 
base theory for this chapter’s analysis. In summary: this chapter will examine the development of 
television broadcasting technology from the perspective of social / societal constructivism, 
incorporating the notion of guiding principles; it will look to technologies themselves for 
evidence of these principles; and finally, it will remain cognizant of the manufacturers’ and 
broadcasters’ overarching social catalyst – the drive for profit – and its influence on the 
development and dissemination of these technologies.  
3.2 TELEVISION BROADCASTING: RADIO WITH PICTURES 
In broadcasting, both in sound radio and later in television, the major investment was in 
the means of distribution, and was devoted to production only so far as to make the 
distribution technically possible and then attractive (Williams 1974, 19). 
 
Williams’ quote offers two helpful ideas. First, he points to the connection between 
technological development in radio and television. This section will demonstrate how the latter 
medium was heavily influenced by the former in both form and content. Second, Williams 
precisely describes the earliest guiding principles for broadcast television production equipment: 
the initial equipment was simple, intended only to get programming on the air to entice the 
public to buy television receivers. Over time, however, those principles changed, as the simple 
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stuff gave way to new technologies that did the job at higher quality and lower cost, and which in 
turn gave way to innovations that permitted and provoked industry-wide transformations. The 
battle to get television broadcasting on the air is illustrative of the economic determinism at the 
heart of the industry.    
In his comprehensive history of the technological development of television, Albert 
Abramson details the changing technological state of television in the early 20th century.68 By 
1929, the technology was ready to “emerge from the laboratory and take its place in the 
entertainment industry;” however, the economic depression which began at the end of that year 
“was to have a profound effect on the fledgling television industry,” and the expected emergence 
failed to occur (1987, 146). Abramson’s quotes illustrate two facts which are highly relevant to 
this chapter. First, the technology is positioned primarily as an entertainment medium from the 
outset, following the example of radio broadcasting before it. Second, the fact that equipment 
manufacturers were reluctant to release the new product in an era of challenges to new market 
growth demonstrates a failure to fulfill Williams’ prerequisite interest by a ‘real decision making 
group,’ and so Winston’s brakes were applied to the new technology because it didn’t yet ‘fit’ 
into the plans of those companies. This pause in rollout allowed room for further technological 
development in production, transmission, and reception equipment, further delaying the 
industry’s debut; finally, a decade later, an improved set of technologies was again ready to be 
delivered to the public.  
                                                 
68 This chapter relies heavily on Abramson’s work because it is the single superlative work on television technology. 
His two-volume set is culled from industry trades, patent filings, and other inspired sources; the same sources that 
this chapter would turn to as primary materials as well if Abramson had not done it so ably already. This chapter 
attempts to categorize and create an alternate narrative using a small portion of his research.  
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Television standards were the holdup at the end of the 1930s, as Edwin Armstrong and 
RCA battled over FM radio69 to the distraction of the FCC, and the major names in television 
manufacturing – Philco, Dumont, Zenith and RCA – argued over which of their proposed 
technologies should become the standard.70 Finally, the official go-ahead was given to the 
industry in early 1941, using a standard of 525 scan lines and FM audio; however, questions of 
what to do with the VHF spectrum and the potential for color television remained unaddressed. 
The rollout was delayed again as the United States joined in World War II (Barnouw 1968, 127-
128).  
Most electronics manufacturers, including those involved in radio and television, retooled 
their assembly lines during the first half of the 1940s to produce materials for the war effort. As 
WWII ended, the need to again retool the lines offered perfect opportunity to convert some of 
them to manufacture equipment for television broadcasting. This provided the new television 
industry with its prerequisite supervening social necessity, making profit by selling television 
receivers, and now that the manufacturers were fully on board and the policy decisions were in 
place, the new medium was finally a reality for the public at large (Winston 1998, 117-118). 
                                                 
69 In yet another example of Winston’s “brakes,” FM radio was tested successfully in 1933 by Armstrong, who 
“believed that his friend David Sarnoff, head of RCA, would use the new technology to revolutionize the radio 
industry.” Instead, Sarnoff delayed, suggesting the new technology be tested for television, protecting RCA’s AM 
station investment and television patents. Corn-Revere and Carveth, "Economics and Media Regulation." 
70 Philco television wanted a standard format at 605 scan lines delivered at 24 frames per second, DuMont wanted to 
use a format of 625 lines at 15 FPS, and Zenith was of the opinion that television simply wasn’t ready for the public. 
During this same period, RCA demonstrated a 30 FPS system for the FCC and indicated it was beginning research 
into color television as well. Albert Abramson, The History of Television, 1880 to 1941 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 
1987), 257. 
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3.2.1 Fitting In: From Radio to Television 
As Williams observed, in the earliest days of the television industry production equipment took a 
necessary back seat to equipment for television broadcasting and reception.71 Nonetheless, the 
choices that were made about the medium at the outset are reflected in even these early versions 
of television equipment. Winston states that one of the challenges of establishing the new 
medium was that it needed to “fit into a media system already accommodating live events of all 
kinds, print, films, and radio” (Winston 1998, 117). The need to find a place in this larger system 
is embodied in the early technologies. The guiding principles driving technological development 
during these early days were twofold, and hearken back to Williams’ observation: first, get 
programming on the air as cheaply as possible, and second, help the new medium fit into the 
social expectations created by radio broadcasting. The decision to emulate the programs and 
practices of radio broadcasting reduced the economic risks associated with the new medium by 
providing the audience with familiar types of programming. This content decision constrained 
technological development in television, and the resulting technologies in turn reinforced 
existing practices. This process is especially clear in the production and practices of television 
news, where the earliest decisions of radio news are still evident in present day television 
broadcasts.     
The earliest technologies for transmitting images varied widely in application, from 
sending still photographs to video telephones.72 After WWI, the emergence of radio broadcasting 
                                                 
71 Only 10,000 sets had been sold by the time WWII began. Erik Barnouw, The Golden Web, vol. 2, A History of 
Broadcasting in the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 128. 
72 Edouard Belin received a French patent in 1903 for a mechanical scanning system which recorded on film; later, 
this would become an important piece of his plan to transmit still photographs by wire (Abramson 1987, 24). In 
1906, Dieckmann and Glage experimented using a cathode ray tube, a vital piece of television technology, as a 
tablet to transmit handwritten messages via wire (Abramson 1987, 26). Gustav H. Hoglund, in 1910, created a 
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led developers to envision wireless television as well,73 and by 1928 television equipment 
manufacturers were actively attempting to fit the new medium into the existing media 
environment that Winston described. In one example of this attempt to ‘fit,’ the Bell Telephone 
Laboratories demonstrated “outdoor television” to the press at a sporting event, using a camera 
that “was portable enough to be taken anywhere” (Abramson 1987, 121). The use of television as 
a medium for bringing distant events and entertainments to its viewers was an expectation 
fostered by the uses of radio broadcasting for the same purposes. KDKA radio, for instance, 
spent much of its early broadcast schedule offering live remote broadcasts from diverse locations 
such as churches, social clubs, and boxing matches (Barnouw 1966, 71). The ability to offer live 
coverage of events that take place outside the television studio is a fundamental quality of the 
medium today, and the expectation that it would be so is indicated by this prototype remote 
camera. Another event which demonstrates the connection between radio and television occurred 
on September 11, 1928, at WGY, the GE television station in Schenectady, NY. The station 
offered a television version of a radio staple, broadcasting live drama for the first time on the 
new medium. This broadcast utilized 3 cameras, one dedicated to each of the two actors and a 
third dedicated to close-ups. The director also had a rudimentary video switcher to fade from one 
camera to another (Abramson 1987, 125-126).  
Equipment for this sort of programming improved dramatically in 1936, when the 
London Television Service created a facility similar in concept to those used today. Multiple 
                                                                                                                                                             
version of wired television so that people speaking on the phone could also simultaneously see one another 
(Abramson 1987, 35), and Campbell Swinton published his television plan five years later, which also envisioned 
the technology as a two party conversation device (Abramson 1987, 43). 
73 The first wireless visual message, a handwritten note, was sent across the Atlantic Ocean in 1921 (Abramson 
1987, 51). In 1923, two different successful experiments in sending “television over radio” were accomplished by 
C.F. Jenkins (Abramson 1987, 60, 65). In 1924, V.K. Zworykin was also pursuing the goal of two-way television 
(Abramson 1987, 66). By January 1925, AT&T had the technology to send still pictures over telephone wires, and 
was turning its attention towards television (Abramson 1987, 73). 
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camera signals were fed to a “fading and monitoring mixer,” where sources could be previewed 
or switched to air. The mixer only allowed for slow transitions between sources, or 
superimpositions, no instant cuts were possible. Later that year, the live studio was further 
improved by a patent application which added a pedestal on wheels that permitted the camera to 
move vertically (Abramson 1987, 230-234). These improvements demonstrate the importance of 
fitting in to the cultural space occupied by radio broadcasting, as technological innovation in 
television progressed along the lines previously drawn by the earlier medium, whose schedule 
was primarily made up of in-studio and remote live programming. An alternative possibility for 
fitting into the existing environment was for television to follow the model of non-live model 
offered by film, a major component of the media environment at the time. Although there was 
limited experimentation with recording television signals on film,74 equipment manufacturers 
focused the majority of their efforts upon creating television broadcasting in the image of radio 
broadcasting.   
EMI demonstrated the first television remote truck at the 1937 Television Exhibition in 
London, again emphasizing both the live and remote qualities that were prized in radio 
broadcasting.  Conceptually, then and now, a remote truck is a television studio of varying 
complexity on wheels, and EMI’s vehicle included three cameras with 1,000 feet of cable, a 
device to fade between them, and an audio mixer capable of handling six microphones. Another 
truck provided transmission from the remote location back to the studio. This setup was used in 
                                                 
74 Early work on color television in 1930 by the Bell Telephone Laboratories used Kodacolor motion picture film to 
record the three different color channels used by television (red, green, and blue), which were then played back 
through a special lens to reintegrate the color information. At the time, Dr. Herbert Ives discussed the value of using 
television as a distribution method for information captured on film. Abramson, The History of Television, 1880 to 
1941, 158. 
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July 1937 to telecast Wimbledon, and NBC purchased its first remote unit in December of that 
same year (Abramson 1987, 237-238, 242). 
These developments all occurred before television broadcasting was fully revealed to the 
public, which may have contributed to the fact that they so closely followed the model of radio 
broadcasting. Nonetheless, the importance of both live programming and programming from 
outside the studio continues today, particularly but certainly not exclusively in the realm of 
television news, and that industry convention can be traced back to these early radio-inspired 
decisions about technologies and practices.   
3.3 TELEVISION BROADCASTING, 1941-1988: CENTRALIZING 
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF TELEVISION NEWS 
Technological innovation in the preceding decades combined with the business and 
programming practices developed in radio broadcasting had set the stage for television 
broadcasting to take its first halting steps in 1941. Over the next half-century, television would 
become the most popular source of news and entertainment in the United States. The trajectory 
of television broadcasting equipment development during this period greatly influenced the 
organizational structures, work processes, and ultimately the content of the medium. These 
technologies were defined by economic guiding principles determined by the desire of the 
companies involved in every stage of the process to achieve the ultimate business goal of 
constantly increasing profit margins.  
 Taken as a whole, television technologies changed during this period from their 
rudimentary beginnings into devices which are conceptually similar or identical to present day 
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television broadcasting equipment. Between 1941 and 1960, technological innovation was 
primarily limited to improving existing processes without any major industry-altering changes. 
The latter part of this time period, between 1961 and 1988, was far more transformative. Major 
changes in how broadcasters and manufacturers conceived of the industry both compelled and 
constrained new technologies, which in turn impacted the form and content of the medium, 
particularly where local news programming was concerned. These changes can be broadly 
grouped into three different categories of what I describe as “centralizing technologies:” 
electronic editing, reducing the size and complexity of field production equipment, and station 
automation. Each of these groups of technologies made possible new modes of production which 
allowed for cost savings through staff reductions and/or changes in business practices; these new 
possibilities also lent themselves to a centralizing momentum in station operation and ownership. 
As television broadcasting began in earnest after the end of WWII, television equipment 
manufacturers continued along the same path they had been traveling for two decades, albeit 
now with more experience behind them. The image orthicon became the industry standard in 
1946, a transportable camera featuring a four-lens turret and an electronic viewfinder. The 
camera could be used in the studio or in the field, offering new broadcasters some flexibility as 
they took their first steps while still affirming the cultural positioning of the medium as a 
successor to radio broadcasting’s focus on covering news outside the walls of the studio. 
Although television broadcasting followed the economic and conceptual path set by radio 
rather than cinema, this previous incarnation of visual reproduction technology was an important 
part of the television industry. An early application of film in the new medium was as storage, 
and in 1947 systems for archiving television broadcasts on film were developed in the U.S. and 
in England. The most interesting thing about these systems is not how they worked, but rather 
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why they were called into being. The impetus behind the British system was the realization that 
important events often happen at times when the majority of viewers aren’t available to watch 
them. As a result, both a film crew and a television crew were sent to important happenings, and 
film archiving of the television broadcast was developed as a means to eliminate this 
redundancy. The genesis of the DuMont Laboratories system in the U.S. was the knowledge that 
broadcast television would follow the network model established by radio broadcasting, 
requiring a recording technology that would allow the networks to produce a given program only 
once, and then rebroadcast a recorded version to the later time zones (Abramson 2003, 23-24). 
The problem of recording television broadcasts grew as the industry expanded and centers of 
production in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles became responsible for service in four 
different time zones. Kinescope film recording was adopted as the standard, but economics 
dictated the use of a 16mm format which lacked in quality when compared with the live 
television broadcast.  By 1948, NBC, CBS, and DuMont all had permanent recording facilities 
for their television networks (Abramson 2003, 26-28, 32), but few were satisfied with the quality 
or expense involved; once again, Williams’ and Winston’s conditions for changes in technology 
were fulfilled, and the moment was right for a new technology to enter the market.  
By 1950, the tremendous amounts of film necessary for network recording propelled 
Ampex to research a new technology to reduce recording costs: magnetic videotape. Several 
other companies, RCA included, joined in the search for a better option, and by 1954 videotape 
technology had progressed to the point where recorders were nearing broadcast quality at half the 
material cost of running a Kinescope. By 1956, Ampex had created a machine recorded without 
quality loss, and the networks immediately placed their orders; the Ampex recorder was first 
used for broadcast of “Doug Edwards and the News” by CBS on November 30, 1956, launching 
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what Abramson calls “the Ampex revolution.” Two months later, NBC was regularly using 
videotape recorded versions of programs for broadcast to the west coast (Abramson 2003, 48, 
53-54, 71-77). In 1958, RCA provided upgrades to the Ampex machines that allowed color 
recording, and “NBC Tape Central” was inaugurated in April of 1958 with 10 videotape 
recorders, 9 of them color.75 Work still continued toward recording television on film, however, 
as film was globally standardized, while video was not. Even so, the economic advantages held 
by videotape over film would quickly transform the television broadcasting industry (Abramson 
2003, 80, 82).76  
This transformation was accelerated with Ampex’s release of the first videotape editing 
system in 1958, modeled directly after previous audiotape splicing machines.77 On November 
20, CBS edited 8 hours of taped material to produce a 90 minute broadcast of “The Old Man” 
(Abramson 2003, 84-85). Two years later, Ampex engineers overcame a synchronization 
problem, allowing their new videotape recorders to be integrated into a control room setting as 
playback devices which could be mixed with live camera shots or other tape machines 
(Abramson 2003, 89), offering new possibilities for news and other live programming to quickly 
integrate material shot in the field. In 1961, Ampex would extend this discovery to create the 
                                                 
75 The motivation for broadcasters to adopt color television was small at this time; by 1959, less than 1% of homes 
had color televisions. NBC led the way among broadcasters in color television because its parent company, RCA 
was manufacturing the sets. Sterling and Kittross, Stay Tuned: A Concise History of American Broadcasting, 353-
354. While the development of new technology often inspires immediate investment on the part of broadcasters, in 
this case they were unwilling to commit funds when there was no audience available. A similar scenario would play 
out several decades later as broadcasters shied away from the costly new technologies of high definition television.  
76 These cost savings would eventually influence production in the film industry as well, with the creation of High 
Definition cameras. Directors George Lucas and Robert Rodriguez were the first to use High Definition Video in 
place of film for major theatrical releases including Star Wars Episode II (2002) and Once Upon a Time in Mexico 
(2003), respectively. Mike Snider, "The Digital Force Is with Big-Time Directors," USA Today, 5 August 2002. 
77 Audiotape editing involved a reel-to-reel setup with a set of playback heads and a small channel for the tape to 
wind through. When the editor decided on a location to make an edit, they would mark the tape with a grease pencil 
and then advance it into the channel, where they would physically cut it with a razor blade. Having excised the 
undesired part, the editor would use adhesive ‘splice tape’ to rejoin the audio tape. This is how the first videotape 
editing was accomplished as well.  
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first electronic videotape editor, revolutionizing videotape editing and eventually film editing as 
well. The new system allowed for seamless additions of scenes from other sources, whether 
camera or videotape, at any point in a given recording; thus, commercials could be added after a 
program was recorded, or additional “takes” of a given scene could be inserted to cover errors 
(Abramson 2003, 95). 
 The combination of these factors allowed the people in charge of network news to 
have a change of heart away from film as the primary format for newsgathering, instead adopting 
videotape. The new model was called “electronic journalism,” and although the technology was 
first adopted mainly for news, eventually videotape would become the backbone of television 
broadcasting. The switch at the network level propelled major change at the station level as well, 
providing opportunities for low cost recording and more efficient editing, both of which would 
greatly benefit the burgeoning local news operations at television stations nationwide. This new 
videotape technology was the prerequisite for two of the three technological developments which 
permitted and promoted the centralization of the industry: electronic editing for news and other 
programming, and reduced size and complexity of field cameras for newsgathering and 
production. Videotape also played a role in the widespread adoption of another centralizing 
technology, station automation.  
 There were many reasons for the switch to electronic journalism, including a 
desire to increase the speed with which programming for television made it from acquisition to 
air and a desire to reduce the direct cost of programming. Another motivation was to reduce the 
number of people involved in the process and simplify the workflow enough that it became 
possible to hire less skilled, and thus less costly, labor to handle the job. The trajectory which 
these three categories of centralizing technologies followed during this time period is highly 
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indicative of these forces at work, and illustrates the central argument of this chapter, that 
technological innovations in television follow the economically determined guiding principles of 
staff reduction and operational efficiency, and in doing so help make possible and desirable 
centralization in operation and ownership. 
3.3.1 Centralizing Technology #1: Electronic editing 
Ampex pioneered a revolutionary development in the television industry in 1964 with the release 
of the first full-color electronic editing system able to rival the quality of film production. 
Previously, editing involved the physical cutting of film, audiotape, or videotape with a razor and 
using splicing tape to link different pieces together; the new system required nothing more than a 
control panel and some videotape recorders (Abramson 2003, 100). Three years later, the 
Electronic Engineering Company improved on Ampex’s technology, creating a videotape timing 
system called “timecode,” which allowed unprecedented precision when starting and stopping 
videotape machines. Timecode again revolutionized video editing, making possible frame-
specific edits and allowing the operator to preview changes before executing them (Abramson 
2003, 119-120).78 Timecode also made possible a major innovation in electronic editing which 
hearkened back to the machines in Marx’s factory.  
In 1971, CBS and Memorex proudly presented the first version of the CMX editor, which 
would become the industry standard for electronic editing. The CMX-600 used “disc packs” as a 
                                                 
78 A “frame” in analog video is one complete picture, comprised of two interlaced “fields.” There are 30 frames per 
second. With the advent of timecode, an editor, who a decade previously could only chop at the tape with a razor 
blade, could now choose from 30 different edit points in each second of video.  
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storage device,79 and provided for automatic recording of videotaped material onto the packs and 
automatic recording of a finished project back to videotape; the system was conceptually 
identical to the nonlinear editing systems that are the editor’s tool of choice today. In between 
the recording sessions, an editor used a light pen to interact with two CRT monitors, setting edit 
points indexed by timecode that the system’s microcomputers would remember and later use to 
create the final program. The product came with a staggering price tag, however, requiring an 
investment of between $250,000 and $500,000.80  Ultimately, the CMX-600 turned out to be a 
dismal failure as an editing device; it cost too much to buy and maintain, it was limited to 
twenty-seven minutes of disc time, the transfer process was lengthy, and to master the final 
program required between three and six studio VTRs; the ideas behind it, however, cannot be 
dismissed so easily (Abramson 2003, 136-137, 144, 146).  
The concepts embodied in the CMX are excellent examples of how technologies acted to 
promote centralization in television broadcasting. The CMX editor accomplished two important 
tasks at the time of its invention, and also foreshadowed another major change in editing to 
come. First, the CMX editor automated parts of the editing process for the first time. A human 
editor no longer had to work in real time, waiting while the chosen section of tape was recorded 
from the playback machine to the record machine; the automated input and output divorced the 
editor from those parts of the process, shifting the time burden onto the machine. Second, where 
previously the human editor only controlled two machines, the CMX editor was capable of 
                                                 
79 In the March 1974 BM/E, industry leaders claimed “we believe the [video] disk is going to have an important 
place in broadcasting alongside video-tape, extending the use of recorded visuals into areas that tape is not so well 
equipped to handle.” "The Video Disc: Count on It," BM/E, Broadcast Management/Engineering, March 1974, 66. 
Their belief is founded on the fact that disk technology at the time was both less expensive and of higher quality 
than videotape. 
80 Strangely, Abramson quotes the unit cost for the CMX-600 differently in three different places. In his initial 
mention of it, pages 136-137, it costs $250,000. By the next mention on page 144, the cost for the device is 
$300,000. Finally, when discussing its use at CBS on page 146, he quotes its cost at $500,000. It is possible that the 
different references are for machines with different memory configurations.   
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controlling many more at the human editor’s request. Both of these seeming improvements 
follow the path that Marx described in Capital insofar as the machinery replaced workers. In 
addition, this first version of the CMX editing system foreshadowed today’s technology in 
another way beyond its similarity to nonlinear systems. This moment of integration of computer 
technology into the video production process is the first step along a long path of overlap 
between computer technology and video production technology which resulted in “convergence” 
being the most important industry buzzword throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
In 1972, Central Dynamics Ltd. announced an editor that used timecode and was 
designed to interface with a video production switcher called the PEC-102. It used an 
inexpensive computer to record edit decisions, and automated the final assembly of a program 
(Abramson 2003, 144), evidencing the same guiding principles as the CMX-600 of a year before. 
The second generation CMX editor was announced that same year, and released in 1974.The 
new CMX addressed the cost problems of the earlier model by replacing the disc packs with 
Sony U-Matic videotape machines and the light pen with a standard keyboard interface. It 
retained the ability to remember edit decisions and automate the final assembly, preserving the 
labor savings (Abramson 2003, 144, 156). Represented in these two editors are most of the major 
components of editing systems developed in the 15 years that followed: three or more machines, 
a video switcher, usually an audio switcher, and a keyboard/microcomputer combination to 
control all of the devices and record edit decisions for later automated assembly. What would 
have taken a whole studio crew to accomplish just a decade earlier could now be performed by 
just one person choosing edit points and acting as supervisor to the machines; the guiding 
principles of job concentration and consequent potential for reduction of staff is clear.  
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By 1974, “professionals involved with both film and tape [agreed] that editing a program 
on tape [was] now 50% and up cheaper – mainly in the cost of time – than editing the same 
program on film”("Tape and Film" 1974, 30). Although these editing devices were initially 
created for and adopted by network operations, an early example of the penetration of electronic 
journalism into local stations is WBBM-TV in Chicago, which boasted an entirely electronic 
news operation in October 1977 (Abramson 2003, 177). Although most television stations used 
fairly primitive (and less capital-intensive) machine-to-machine editing systems, electronic 
journalism in general was a thrust towards a cheaper and leaner method of television production 
than had been offered by film equipment. 
Having accomplished the goals of reducing production time and the overall cost of 
editing, edit systems released throughout the rest of this time period were variations on the same 
themes with some useful additions. The Videola, a new CMX editing system, announced at the 
1979 NAB conference allowed editors to record their edit decision list (EDL) to floppy disk for 
later use, archiving, or for use on a different system (Abramson 2003, 183).81 In 1984, 
LucasFilm and CMX marketed the EditDroid, an optical-disk based edit system for film editing 
which resulted in an EDL (Abramson 2003, 201, 203).82 A similar system, the Montage Picture 
Processor, controlled 17 video playback machines, was capable of holding five hours of 
materials, and resulted in an EDL (Abramson 2003, 203).  
At the 1985 NAB conference, the Ampex ACE editing system was unveiled, which used 
standard interfaces for four machines (Abramson 2003, 207). Two years later, the ACE 200 
                                                 
81 Creating a “rough cut” of a program on a lower quality system was often chosen as a cost-effective means of post 
production, so that the best equipment was only used for finalizing programs. The exportability of an EDL made this 
possible.  
82 Two years later, The Patriot would be the first theatrical release to be completely edited on this machine. Albert 
Abramson, The History of Television, 1942 to 2000 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2003), 215. 
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would take on-line editing to a new level with its ability to control sixteen devices including 
VTRs, audio and video switchers, and DVEs, and to generate a 600 line EDL which could be 
recorded on a portable twenty megabyte disk (Abramson 2003, 220). Out of reach of many 
television stations, it represented the very pinnacle of editing centralization: one person running 
sixteen machines. This was definitely a far cry from the early days of television editing, and 
clearly indicates the guiding principle of economic efficiency through staff reduction at work.  
3.3.2 Centralizing Technology #2: Smaller and simpler field cameras and recorders 
The partner to electronic editing that fueled the push for electronic journalism was the 
progressive miniaturization and simplification of field cameras and videotape recorders. In this, 
too, economics were the most important consideration; not only was videotape less expensive 
than film and quicker to air, but it eventually required a smaller crew to get the footage back to 
the station. By 1963, video recorders were small enough to be used in the field, which opened up 
many new opportunities for field shooting. Technological development in field cameras followed 
two paths, producing cameras designed to send back live pictures and cameras designed to 
record material for later broadcast. In both cases, television news was again embracing the 
practices created in radio news, which prized live coverage and speed in getting material on the 
air.  
The first demonstration of a portable camera combined with a backpack recorder took 
place at the 1966 NAB convention. The unit held 30 minutes of videotape and weighed in at 23 
pounds (Abramson 2003, 111). The design of the backpack recorder signaled that one operator 
would handle the shooting and recording duties, adhering to the guiding principle of minimizing 
staff through the use of technology. This particular unit never made it from prototype to 
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production, but it enshrined the concept of a single-operator camera setup in the equipment that 
followed. 
In 1967, Ampex released a new handheld camera able to run on cable or battery 
(Abramson 2003, 119-120), perfect for live events. One year later, the major networks debuted 
new portable cameras for the political conventions, each of which used the current wireless 
microwave technology to send the signal back to the control room (Abramson 2003, 123). A few 
years later, in March 1972, Philips Broadcast announced their new camera, which used triaxial 
cable.83 Weighing in at one-tenth the heft of the existing technology, it quickly became the 
standard for those that could afford it, allowing more efficient setup of cameras for live 
production in the field (Abramson 2003, 141).  
One of the first conceptual steps towards electronic journalism in local news began with 
the startup of television station KDUB in Dubuque, Iowa on July 1, 1972. Station executives 
decided to maximize their news covering ability and minimize costs by shooting news footage on 
Super 8 color film instead of the industry standard 16mm film. The cameras were cheaper, the 
film stock was cheaper, and the news people could each have their own camera due to the 
decreased costs (Abramson 2003, 143-144). The guiding principles at work in this decision are 
consistent with the thinking behind development of equipment for electronic journalism: cheaper 
media and cheaper labor overall, since now each member of the station’s news staff could fill the 
role of both shooter and editor, whereas with limited cameras the editors would be idle until the 
shooters returned with footage.    
                                                 
83 Standard television cable is coaxial, referred to generally as coax. It consists of a thick copper wire surrounded by 
insulating material, which is surrounded by a metallic foil shield and a rubberized cover. Triax adds another layer of 
insulation and another shield to the cable, which preserves the signal over longer cable lengths and allows the cable 
to be less thick.   
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KDUB was a notable exception at the time. Most local news was still shot on 16mm film 
cameras, which were less expensive and more widely available than the remote video cameras 
the networks were experimenting with. In addition, most stations already had the processing and 
editing equipment for film, while videotape editing stations were not part of the average station’s 
equipment; any editing they did was on the same machines used for program recording and 
playback to air (Abramson 2003, 148). However, at a NAB conference in March of 1973, Ray 
Schneider of CBS went on record as saying that videotape was the better choice for 
newsgathering because it could be put on the air more quickly than film (Abramson 2003, 149). 
In November 1973 CBS followed words with action, starting up new affiliate KMOX with an 
all-electronic news operation using new, lightweight cameras from Ikegami. The entire setup 
including videotape recorders and associated equipment cost $30,000 (Abramson 2003, 152). 
Professionals at the time crowed “The most significant new development [in electronic news 
gathering] is the system approach.” Using a video camera attached to a mobile unit with a 
microwave link to the station, “the editor watches the news as it comes in, is primed to put it in 
shape for airing the second he has seen it through – or may be able to air some of it ‘live’” 
("Tape and Film" 1974, 33). 
CBS’ network news division had made the switch to electronic journalism by January 
1975 using Ikegami cameras and Sony U-Matic portable recorders; NBC and ABC were less 
impulsive. The technical apparatus still required a two person crew to operate, but offered more 
flexibility in some cases than film (Abramson 2003, 157). By December of that year, all the CBS 
Owned and Operated (O&O) stations were using electronic journalism instead of film, and NBC 
was acknowledging that the ability to use these pictures live from the scene instead of waiting for 
film processing would cause the whole industry to adopt electronic journalism (Abramson 2003, 
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161). NBC’s perspective is illustrative of the continuing attempt to fit television into the cultural 
definition of radio; “live” coverage had been a defining characteristic of radio news since its 
inception. It also shows the economic concern with competition that has always helped to push 
technological innovation in the United States. A year later, NBC announced its intention to 
switch completely to electronic journalism, and shortly thereafter the majority of NBC affiliates 
also adopted electronic journalism, primarily because of economic concerns and the flexibility 
offered by video for covering live events. In addition, the relative inexpensiveness of videotape 
production led to its utilization in production of both commercials and long-form documentaries 
(Abramson 2003, 172-173). 
Local television stations followed the networks’ lead, and by 1975 many stations were 
making the change to electronic journalism, due to its increasingly lower cost and its immediacy. 
One station estimated that four “mini-cam” setups were equivalent in cost to film stock for a 
year. The immediate usability of videotape allowed stations to shoot stories “almost to air time,” 
eliminating the time lost to film developing. Stations could also now afford to shoot an entire 
event, such as a press conference, free of the restriction of high-cost film that allowed only short 
segments of recording (Zusy 1975). Two years later, a survey showed over half of the country’s 
television stations were using electronic news gathering. The use of ENG also changed the way 
that stations were presenting the news, with an increase in the use of natural sound and of 
reporter voice-over of images, and of course the ability to broadcast live from the field (Stone 
1977).    
At the NAB Convention in 1980, Ikegami introduced the “EC-35 electronic 
cinematography camera,” designed as an alternative to the 35mm film camera of which it was a 
physical duplicate. The camera could accomplish all of its internal setup functions (registration, 
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black balance, white balance, and gamma tracking) at the touch of a button when shooting a 
special test pattern. This eliminated the need for trained video engineers to accompany the 
shooter, and it also narrowed the skills required of the camera operator, both of which reduced 
the potential costs of fielding video crews. Modern day cameras share this principle, 
accomplishing these setups either without user intervention or with the touch of a few buttons. At 
the same show, RCA demonstrated the first charge-coupled device (CCD) camera, which 
eliminated picture tubes from the camera in favor of an integrated circuit to receive and 
transform the image into electrical information. This, too, would soon become an industry 
standard (Abramson 2003, 188). 
The 1981 NAB conference was a major turning point for electronic journalism with the 
debut of the RCA “Hawkeye” camera-recorder (camcorder). A tube-based camera with a 
recorder attached directly to the back, it used a VHS sized tape in the “M” format, could record 
for 20 minutes on a cassette, and weighed in at 23 pounds including batteries. Privately 
introduced at that same conference was Sony’s Betacam camcorder, which could record for 20 
minutes on each half-inch Betacam cassette, and weighed only 13 pounds including batteries. 
Finally, Panasonic showed its AUAK-100 camcorder which used a custom recording format and 
weighed about 22 pounds. Ikegami and Matsushita Electric also unveiled camcorders in the 
months following the NAB conference (Abramson 2003, 193-194).  
In December 1982, CBS engineers were unwilling to commit to a camcorder tape format; 
however, Corinthian Broadcasting, which ran five CBS affiliated stations, ordered 75 Betacam 
cameras and 50 Betacam editing systems to be delivered in the following 18 months (Abramson 
2003, 198). The Corinthian purchase is notable because it is one of the first examples of a group-
wide equipment purchase, which allowed the group to centralize research and decision making 
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and obtain a quantity discount, all of which are major benefits of group ownership.84 This is one 
of the early examples of this tactic at work; many more examples were soon to follow. In any 
case, Corinthian’s choice was a popular one, and by December 1983, Sony claimed to have sold 
over 1,000 Betacam units worldwide (Abramson 2003, 201). 
Not everyone embraced Betacam, however. As late as 1985, the format battles raged on, 
with CBS supporting Betacam, ABC resisting change with Sony’s U-Matic ¾” tape format, and 
NBC looking for a smaller format, eventually choosing to replace all of its old equipment with 
M-II format machines in April, 1986(Abramson 2003, 209-210). That same year, Sony 
demonstrated the new Betacam SP camcorder, which used 3 CCDs and cost under $25,000 
(Abramson 2003, 209-210), and in February of 1987, CNN weighed in on Sony’s side with the 
planned purchase of 200 systems. ABC finally gave in three months later when Sony offered 
them a quantity discount to switch to Betacam (Abramson 2003, 217-219). 
The benefit of each of these new formats was size. Smaller tapes made for smaller 
recorders, and smaller recorders made camcorders feasible. Camcorders, in turn, were simpler 
for the shooter to use, and made possible smaller crews for news coverage. Leavitt Pope, the 
President/CEO of New York’s WPIX-TV observed: 
When we used film cameras, you might have a three-man crew: a cameraman, a 
sound man and a man for lighting. When tape came into use, there might be two 
people – one for the camera and one for the recorder. With Betacam, we have 
one-person crews. So you either have more coverage with the same number of 
persons or the same coverage with fewer persons (Jaffe 1987). 
 
The efficiencies in personnel, reduced cost of material, and reduced time to air made electronic 
journalism a natural choice for stations across the country. This switch to electronic journalism 
                                                 
84 The practice of buying equipment for multiple stations became the norm at this time, but it wasn’t a new idea. 
Storer Broadcasting made a group buy of the MVR 15 tape recorder as early as 1963, outfitting five stations with the 
device. "Storer to Distribute Video Tape Recorder," Broadcasting, 8 July 1963. 
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changed the practices in the news departments of television stations, which both allowed for 
more efficient workflows and changed the ensuing news products of the stations to include a 
greater proportion of non-studio video. The ability to quickly and easily integrate field footage 
contributed to the proliferation of the Eyewitness News model described in Chapter One and 
greatly conditioned the television news practices and conventions of the present day.   
3.3.3 Centralizing Technology #3: Station Automation 
The arrival of videotape reconfigured operations outside news departments as well. One major 
opportunity that videotape afforded was automation of the on-air playback systems at television 
stations. Before videotape, programs were usually either generated live or played back using film 
projectors which sent their image into a video camera, a system called a telecine.85 This system 
was labor intensive, since an operator had to thread the film into the playback system reel by 
reel. Early videotape machines also used reels and a similarly labor intensive threading system to 
get the tape to properly traverse the playback heads. Several companies developed an alternative 
to increase efficiency, mounting the tape reels inside a cassette which would then self-thread 
when loaded into a tape machine. This opened up a wealth of possibilities, including the 
camcorders mentioned previously, and addressed the ongoing concern of reducing costs by 
simplifying jobs and/or eliminating labor.  
 Stations and manufacturers had experimented with various types of automation 
before videotape, but market penetration was minimal. In 1958, a mechanical system which used 
                                                 
85 The telecine was a set of  equipment usually comprised of multiple film projectors, a slide projector, a multiplexer 
(a series of mirrors or prisms that redirect images from several sources to one location) and a special television 
camera also often also called a telecine (television + cinematography). Herbert Zettl, Television Production 
Handbook, 4th ed. (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1984), 300-302. 
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metal foil strips taped to program scripts and fed through a reading device allowed for 
rudimentary control of lighting, cameras, and microphones ("Newest Gear" 1958). Even at this 
early date, automation focused on cost savings in combination with an effort to increase quality 
by reducing human errors. In 1959, two companies offered programming automation systems 
that can be considered the precursors to today’s systems. The first, from Visual Communications 
Corporation, accepted commands from a keyboard, from tape, or from punch cards and held 12 
events. The second, from GE, used punched tape to control switching between film, slides, audio 
tape, and network sources ("Automation for Radio-TV" 1959). One year later, RCA was offering 
automation in response to increasing operating costs, which had doubled in the previous decade 
("Equipment: Automation Spreads" 1960). WKRC-TV in 1960 Cincinnati was home to the $2 
million RCA system that used tape with holes punched in it to trigger eight film projectors, four 
slide projectors, two audio tape machines, two turntables, two remote cameras, and two 
microphones. The system could handle programming switches for an entire day; “confusion is 
eliminated and production is improved, using fewer people, according to WKRC-TV” ("An 
Answer to Costs: Automation" 1960).   
Ultimately, it was videotape that provided the momentum for many television stations to 
accept automation. In December 1969, RCA offered a video cartridge system designed to 
partially automate the playback and recording of programs at television stations.86 It had an 18 
cassette capacity, and each could hold up to three minutes of recording using the 2-inch tape 
format (Abramson 2003, 130-131). At the NAB convention in the spring of 1970, Ampex 
displayed its version of the cart machine, which could automatically play a set of tapes in 
sequence using two separate playback devices – one cued while the other was playing to air. The 
                                                 
86 This is another example of television technology following the technology of radio, which was using tape 
cassettes for automation purposes as early as 1959.  
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system handled 25 cassettes, each of which could store up to six minutes of material (Abramson 
2003, 133). Ampex delivered its first unit to KTEW in Tulsa in July of 1972, and claimed to 
have orders for the device amounting to $10 million (Abramson 2003, 144). The technology 
afforded stations the opportunity to automate concurrent with the need and opportunity to switch 
formats from film to tape; clearly, many stations saw the value of automating since they were in 
a position to spend on a new format anyway. A similar situation would occur 30 years later as 
stations contended with another format change, this time from analog to digital.  
As “cart” systems improved and proliferated, they added new functionalities allowing for 
an even higher level of automatic operation. In an advertisement in the April 1974 BM/E, 
Ampex touted its Automated ACR-25 cassette VTR, claiming it superior because “it can be 
rolled by the computer on cue, and now it actually can be programmed by the computer” to 
handle up to 63 events. They close with the statement “no matter how you use it, it saves money, 
manpower, and mistakes” (Ampex 1974), reiterating the guiding principles of television 
broadcasting technology. During the next decade, the number of machines and the number of 
cassettes that each system used increased, and the systems were able to handle both 
programming and commercial playback. At the 1986 NAB convention, Ampex showed its new 
AC-225 Digital Cart Spot Player, specifically designed for commercial playback rather than 
program playback. It could have 265 Betacam cassettes available at a time, each of which could 
hold up to 20 minutes of programming (Abramson 2003, 210). Commercial playback had always 
been a labor-intensive effort at television stations, and these cart machines made that a much 
easier task, allowing the two person team of on-air operator and tape operator to be combined 
into a single position.  
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Later modular designs allowed for stations to choose their own tape formats for use with 
the cart systems, and increasing cassette storage allowed for a full day of programming and 
commercial breaks to be automated. In these designs, equipment manufacturers consistently 
followed the guiding principle of labor reduction through mechanization in creating this 
technology. They also paved the way for a dramatic change in station operations in the decades 
to come, as cart machines formerly used as standalone islands of automation became the 
centerpiece of station-wide connected automation.  
 Another major innovation in station automation occurred just at the close of this 
time period, on March 7, 1988. Three years earlier, NBC News reached the conclusion that its 
facilities were far too decentralized, spread out over 15 floors. The proposed solution, which 
would gather all of their assets together around an on-air news desk, carried a price tag of $7 
million, which had to be offset by real cost savings in order to get permission from executives. 
The department assessed the situation, and realized that “some people add creative value to the 
news product, while other people merely translate someone else’s creative instructions to the 
technical equipment.” By replacing those ‘translators’ with robotic cameras, the news division 
would recoup the costs of the renovations and the depreciation of the robotic equipment in three 
years (Wolzien 1988, 16). 
 The challenge was that such a thing had never been done before. Automation 
existed to control some camera movements,87 but no one had yet made it possible for the camera 
pedestals to move across the studio floor. Eventually NBC settled upon an “X-Y tracking” 
concept utilizing a dual track system. The track itself moved left and right, and the camera could 
move forward and backward on the track. One operator was now able to operate three cameras, 
                                                 
87 Robotic technology at the time could move the camera itself on pivots horizontally or vertically, could zoom and 
focus, and could raise the camera up and down. 
 154 
with 300 preset shots stored for each and joysticks to make small adjustments. In addition to the 
cost savings achieved by cutting staff, the production crew could program complex camera 
maneuvers and repeat them flawlessly day after day (Wolzien 1988, 17). In succeeding years, 
robotic cameras would become an important component in the makeup of local television 
stations.  
 These three categories of centralizing technologies, along with the innovations 
that preceded them, had dramatic influence in the shaping of the television broadcasting industry 
during its first 48 years. The change from film to videotape, combined with new technologies 
based upon the new format, provided station owners with copious opportunities to slim down 
their operations in an effort to increase profits. These opportunities included station automation 
in both the studio and master control, reduced cost of materials, and opportunities to buy 
equipment for multiple stations at a time, securing better deals from the manufacturers; in 
addition, all of this equipment followed the guiding principles of staff reduction and job 
simplification, positioning the industry for further centralization of operations in the effort to 
achieve economies of scale and a resulting concentration of ownership in service of the same 
end.  
3.4 TELEVISION EQUIPMENT 1989-1996: STREAMLINING PROCESSES 
By 1989, the television broadcasting industry was primed for major organizational change. The 
first of two factors that would permit this change was the massive influence of computerization 
on the industry, both in the development of digital technologies and in changing the work 
processes in both station and newsroom. The second factor was the realization of a landslide of 
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changes in governmental regulation of the industry which were planted during the 1980s in 
combination with new technologies that either made new organizational structures possible, or 
made them more economically effective and desirable. In both cases, the technological 
developments continued to embody the guiding principles of consolidation and centralization, 
more dramatically in this time period than in any before. 
The choice of 1989 as a breaking point between time periods is in no way accidental. 
Changing technologies would be both the result of and cause for new ways of thinking which 
would dramatically alter the structure of the local television industry, and these new conceptions 
of what broadcasting could be were on deck at this moment in broadcasting history. As a result 
of these new developments, transformations would occur in both news production operations and 
on-air programming operations, with changes in one area often permitting or demanding changes 
in other station departments and operations. The industry was poised for this change in 1989, as 
many of the core technologies which would contribute to ownership consolidation and 
centralization of operations were already in place. These technologies included cart machines, 
traffic computers, newsroom computers, smaller and more durable camcorders, and early 
versions of computer editing. 
Many stations had on-air operations which utilized cart machines for partial automation 
of both programming and commercials, albeit still with human assistance in the form of a master 
control operator. Direct communication between computers in a station’s traffic department, 
responsible for creating the daily broadcast log which detailed what programming and 
commercials aired at what times on the station, and the computer which controlled the cart 
machine had been a reality for some time, whether by direct connection across a wired network 
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or indirectly by sneakernet.88 By 1989, there were cart machines capable of playing back 
hundreds of commercials and programs in sequence, including two Sony units purchased by CBS 
which held 1,000 cassettes each.  Ampex had sold 20 of its ACR-225 cart system by 1989, and 
Odetics boasted that it had installed 70 of its 280-cassette cart systems (Abramson 2003, 227). 
The following year, Ampex released the AMC-225 optional external device controller, capable 
of controlling up to 10 devices of varying formats from the same playlist as the cart system 
(Abramson 2003, 233). It is interesting to note that Ampex used the same thinking process in 
designing this device that it did on its ACE edit system: use computer technology to enable one 
person to control many machines from a central location, in this case the control screen for the 
playlist. In practice, this opened up the potential for master control operations, which had 
formerly mainly automated only commercial playback, to have machines control the entire on-air 
product of the station. 
Computerization exploded into other areas of the station as well during this time period 
as the expense of computer systems finally lowered to a point where station owners felt they 
would be a profitable investment. Television stations had dabbled in computerization for many 
years before widespread acceptance took place. In 1967, H-R Television (an advertising 
representative) installed computers at their offices and at the stations they represented which 
automatically contacted one another to transmit messages back and forth ("H-R Stations" 1967). 
By 1970, Data Communications Corporation was offering its Broadcast Industry Automation 
System. The BIAS communicated via telephone with a central computer at DCC headquarters 
and allowed for automation of many traffic functions, with the promise of accounting functions 
to be added in the near future ("Computer System Shown" 1970).  
                                                 
88 In an entertaining bit of broadcast engineer humor, the process of carrying floppy disks between computers is 
often called the “sneaker network” or “sneakernet.” 
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Options for computerizing the newsroom were also available for some time before they 
achieved wide acceptance. A 1978 RTNDA Communicator article previewed a new kind of 
computerized workflow, where reporters would write their stories on “video terminals instead of 
typewriters,” give that information on a floppy disk to a producer who would revise it, and then 
take a floppy disk to a computerized teleprompter for playback to the news anchor. UPI was 
already sending information to broadcasters via high-speed terminals at 1,200 words a minute in 
1978, up from 60 words just years before, and was working out the details to connect these 
terminals to the envisioned newsroom system. NBC planned to use computers to handle “news-
wires, future files, assignments, storage and retrieval, and even news budgets” ("Newsroom of 
the Future" 1978). WCVB-TV assistant news director Charles Kravets later bluntly stated the 
reasoning behind computerizing the newsroom: “Every radio and TV station will eventually save 
money and eliminate jobs through automation…. Our business is no different from others that 
are being forced to become more cost efficient and competitive.” Kravets goes on to say, 
however, that quality improvements should be the overriding concern, not cost reductions 
(Kravets 1991); in most cases, newsrooms were looking to achieve both. Acceptance of the 
newsroom computer was slow, however. By 1982, Basys had sold three systems in the United 
States, only one of which was to a local station. Five other companies had placed an aggregate of 
nine systems at local television stations. One other company claimed to have sold 65 terminals in 
various arrangements to television, radio, and newspaper newsrooms ("Computerization of 
Newsrooms" 1982).  
CBS News jumped on the newsroom computer bandwagon in 1985 with the purchase of 
a $1 million NewStar system for its New York and Washington newsrooms, joining 13 stations 
which already used the system. CBS figured the system would pay for itself in the elimination of 
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the wire service printers and associated material costs. CNN and NBC had chosen a system from 
Basys prior to the CBS purchase ("CBS News" 1985), and ABC followed suit in late 1985 with a 
$500,000 purchase from the company. Both the Basys and NewStar systems were compatible 
with UPI Telecast, which imported the United Press International wire service directly into the 
system ("The News" 1985). In September of 1995, 12% of stations claimed to either have 
computerized newsrooms or to have ordered them, and another 26.8% said they planned to 
computerize their newsroom in the near future ("Interest Growing" 1985). Over the next decade 
and a half, both on-air operations and news production operations would change dramatically, 
building upon these technologies, making new organizational structures and workflows possible. 
Television news production equipment was undergoing changes as new technologies 
emerged with the specific goal of streamlining the news production process in order to produce 
more news content with fewer people. News departments had been making money for the 
stations for many years, a situation far removed from the early days of local news when news 
operations were most likely to be money losers, and the concern now was with increasing that 
profit potential. New technologies in line with the guiding principle of staff reduction arose in 
every part of the news production process during this time period, and there was a concurrent 
and dramatic increase in the amount of local news programming on the air. These new 
technologies addressed the areas of shooting, editing, playback, integration of various video 
sources into the workflow, and overall control systems.   
The introduction of the camcorder proved even more revolutionary. At the start of this 
latter time period two specific innovations improved upon camcorder technology. First, CCD 
technology became the rule for new camcorders, replacing the dated vacuum tube technology of 
previous cameras (Abramson 2003, 227). CCD technology was an improvement in cost, 
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durability, and simplicity of setup, and the industry embraced it wholeheartedly. Second, tape 
formats for field acquisition, studio work, and on-air playback continued to improve in quality 
and/or shrink in size and cost, offering a variety of options to stations interested in new formats. 
Most news departments chose cost over quality, shying away from digital technologies in favor 
of analog upgrades. The most cost-conscious operations looked to new formats by Sony and 
Panasonic, Hi-8 and S-VHS respectively (Abramson 2003, 227). Although inferior in quality to 
Betacam SP, many smaller stations found the new formats appealing as a temporary upgrade, 
allowing them to delay the decision about digital technologies while still improving their 
newsgathering ability.  
Also in 1989, a small company called Avid announced at the SMPTE convention that it 
had sold 14 edit systems during its two years in the business. The Avid/1 was designed around 
the Apple computer platform, and foreshadowed things to come. Avid predicted tapeless editing 
within 2 years (Abramson 2003, 230), and was one of several companies to deliver upon that 
promise, eventually making it possible for a single operator to run an entire (virtual) control 
room’s worth of equipment on their desktop. Conceptually, the idea of tapeless editing was the 
logical intersection of many historical trends. As shown in the previous section, edit system 
manufacturers had been looking for ways to escape the linear videotape environment for some 
time. The use of optical disks as an intermediate format in many early editors was an effort to 
automate the input and output processes, and allow the user maximum flexibility and minimal 
time commitment when editing. Continuing advancements in computing made this a more and 
more tenable possibility as the quality of video digitized into a computer increased. Research 
into digital recording onto videotape had been going on for some time as well, and offered the 
necessary encoding process for creating the digital signal. Finally, editing equipment had almost 
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always followed the guiding principle of staff reduction, putting more machines in the computer-
assisted control of a single individual. These factors, in combination, made tapeless nonlinear 
editing almost inevitable.  
 Perhaps the most important happening of 1989, however, was the first ever 
transmission of digital high-definition television, sent by satellite from Malibu, CA to Tokyo, 
Japan on April 12 (Abramson 2003, 226). This event flung wide the door of opportunity for the 
eventual transformation of U.S. broadcasting from analog to digital, and the concurrent 
opportunity for major structural change as a result. Before advancing beyond 1989 in the 
technological development of the industry, it is helpful to rewind to the mid-1970s and look at 
the beginnings of digital and high-definition television.89  
3.4.1 Digital & High Definition Television 
Digital Television made its first inroads in June of 1974, as BBC engineers succeeded in 
recording color television digitally (Abramson 2003, 156). In September 1978, J.L.E. Baldwin 
presented a paper on digital television recording using two-inch tape. Additional demonstrations 
that year included digital recording on one-inch tape (Abramson 2003, 180), and in February 
1979 Ampex debuted the first all-digital videotape recorder. The quality displayed by a 
demonstration tape played on the new machine clearly signaled the future usefulness of digital 
video recording. One month later, Sony displayed its digital VTR at the NAB conference 
(Abramson 2003, 181-182). In 1980, Sony demonstrated a new version of their digital video 
recorder (DVR), suggesting that all such devices should be component recorders, which would 
                                                 
89 High Definition television is often erroneously equated with Digital Television. In reality there are digital formats 
which are not high definition, and high definition formats which are not digital. 
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allow the recorders to be used in NTSC, PAL, or SECAM systems, eliminating the need for 
manufacturers and purchasers to worry about format issues (Abramson 2003, 187-188). In 1981, 
the CCIR90 finally agreed on international standards for digital video equipment, allowing for 
both component and composite formats (Abramson 2003, 195). 
At the 1985 NAB conference, Sony showed its D-1 composite digital videotape format 
(Abramson 2003, 208). At the SMPTE convention that same year, the first all-digital television 
production was screened, a four-minute plus music video. The producers claimed significant cost 
savings over shooting with film (Abramson 2003, 209-210). At the following year’s convention, 
Sony showed a new DVR, claiming it had 312 orders for the machine (Abramson 2003, 210), 
and in May 1987, Ampex unveiled the D-2 DVTR, which was still composite digital but 
provided three times the recording capability of D-1 (Abramson 2003, 220). D-2 was the tape 
format of choice at 1989’s NAB convention, as Hitachi showed a studio recorder and Sony 
offered up both studio and camcorder recorders in the format (Abramson 2003, 226).   
As the equipment was being developed, broadcasters naturally became interested in how 
the new technology might affect their industry. At their request, the FCC began investigating 
advanced television (ATV) in 1987, establishing the Advisory Committee on Advanced 
Television Service (ACATS). It was shortly decided that advanced television would be digital 
television, and broadcasters and manufacturers created the Advanced Television Test Center 
(ATTC) in 1988 to test digital possibilities (Pescatore 2000).  
High-Definition Television officially entered the broadcasters’ awareness at the 15th 
annual SMPTE television conference in 1981, where Japan’s NHK Laboratories demonstrated 
the culmination of twelve and a half years of research: an analog HDTV signal with 1125 scan 
                                                 
90 Consultative Committee on International Radio. 
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lines of resolution (Abramson 2003, 180, 192; Inglis 1990, 475). CBS joined forces with NHK 
the following year for a series of demonstrations utilizing that technology, and would become a 
loud voice in discussions about the technology (Abramson 2003, 197).   
In early 1987, NHK again demonstrated HDTV broadcasting with antennas placed on the 
WUSA broadcast tower in Washington. Receivers were placed at NAB headquarters, the FCC, 
and at the U.S. Capitol, and signals were fed in the UHF band and in the DBS band. At the time 
of the demonstration, Ben Crutchfield of the NAB stated that broadcasters had to preserve the 
UHF spectrum from distribution or degradation by the FCC so that they would have the 
necessary bandwidth for HDTV, an early rumble of the storm that would eventually develop 
over broadcast spectrum for DTV (Abramson 2003, 215-217).  
On September 1, 1988, the FCC ruled that any HDTV system must be compatible with 
NTSC, and by the end of that year there were twenty systems under consideration as a standard 
(Inglis 1990, 482). The 1989 transmission via satellite was of Japan’s MUSE system, which was 
not NTSC compatible (Inglis 1990, 487); still, it illuminated the intersection of digital 
technologies and high definition technologies just ahead. 
Broadcasters were thus faced with a variety of concerns when it came to equipment 
purchases and other important business decisions at the start of the new decade. Digital 
technologies were undergoing rapid change and improvement, and the potential for the industry 
to move towards high-definition television loomed over every purchase. A representative 
example of one approach is Providence Journal Broadcasting, which was looking for HDTV 
solutions for all of their stations at once, rather than requiring the individual stations to figure it 
out. Other groups were hedging their bets by buying upgradeable equipment for their stations 
(Rosenthal 1993, 41). In a special advertising supplement on digital television, Television 
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Broadcast happily declared “It is 1993 and we are at the crossroads where technology and 
opportunity meet” ("The World of Digital" 1993, 31). Although admittedly this was rhetoric with 
a purpose, it was also a reflection of the truth. Digital technology would provide many 
opportunities for broadcasters to improve their bottom line during the years to come; it would 
also present endless challenge, as one article observes: “at any moment in the next 10 years, the 
costs of converting between analog and digital signals will be a major factor for managers to 
consider and the optimal configuration of technology to produce the maximum efficiency will 
change almost daily” (Adamiak, et al. 1995, S6-S7). It was in this environment that convergence 
of computers and video truly flourished, changing conceptions in news production, on-air 
programming operations, and overall purchasing and integration of new equipment at stations; in 
combination, these changes would permit new forms of organization and ownership to occur.  
3.4.2 Transforming the news: computers + video = profit 
One easy decision to make at the start of the 1990s, however, was to continue automating the 
news production operation when opportunities arose to do so. Robotic cameras, having seen first 
life at NBC News, were beginning to trickle down to local markets. The first installations were at 
large and medium sized stations, where reduction in union salaries returned the cost of the 
robotics in two or three years (Lambert 1992). KMTV in Omaha, NE purchased its robotic 
camera heads in 1989, reducing a five person studio crew to three, and breaking even after two 
years. The station’s news director described the staff reduction as a choice between losing people 
in the studio and losing reporters on the street (Tobia 1991). By 1991, Vinten Broadcast 
Incorporated’s Andrew Duncan estimated that of 200 major market stations, 10% had already 
adopted robotics, a number that could grow to 50% by the end of the following year. He also 
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stated that the technology was most appealing in big cities where labor costs were high, like St. 
Louis, where three stations were using robotics (Sanford 1991). A brief article in Broadcasting 
confirmed that CBS had plans to use robotics at the network and local station WCBS by fall of 
1991. Prices came down in 1992 as manufacturers began offering piecemeal upgrades, 
permitting stations to convert camera by camera or function by function (Lambert 1992). A 1994 
article stated “some networks and probably even some large market stations are using a single 
operator to control studio camera video, run the camera robotics, load tapes and handle lighting” 
(Adamiak, et al. 1994). No statistics are available, but with the clear economic benefit of staff 
reduction or redistribution, many local stations likely adopted the new technology in the 1990s, 
and robotic cameras are a component of most modern day automated news production systems. 
The most important component of newsroom automation was the nonlinear tapeless 
editor predicted by Avid in 1989, and delivered two years later. It was important as an individual 
technology, and equally as important because of the thought processes it represented and 
provoked. An example of this thinking is found in a 1993 Television Broadcast article, which 
enthused  
Let’s step into a fantasy newsroom for a moment. There on a desk is a single 
workstation that lets you script and edit video – it shows you video, stills, titles, 
and graphics at the touch of a button. And as long as you’re fantasizing, let’s say 
you can use the same workstation to write stories and edit accompanying video as 
you write, and even (why not?) perform pre-production or traditional post 
production tasks controlling production machines in other parts of the shop 
(Murrie 1993b, 29). 
 
The tapeless nonlinear editor was the first step toward fulfilling that fantasy, a process 
which would eventually affect acquisition and playback technologies as well. The same article 
goes on to discuss newsroom systems that allowed writers to see video on their desktop. 
Previously, desktop computer editors were mainly for offline use due to quality issues; however, 
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ImMix and Avid had achieved on air quality and were offering new products to entice television 
stations to buy. Avid’s NewsCutter system was designed to be used along with their Media 
Recorder system, which automatically recorded newsfeeds and other video, and the AirPlay 
playback device (Kaufman 1993a, 1,27); the company advertised that the combination  could 
reduce capital expense, operating and maintenance costs, improve video and audio quality, and 
reduce on-air errors, resulting in improved viewer satisfaction and higher ratings ("The World of 
Digital" 1993, #33).  
In February 1994, Sony entered the digital editing arena with a Destiny system that used 
disc-based nonlinear random access editing in order to compete with machines from Avid, 
ImMix, and Lightworks (Abramson 2003, 248).91 In that same year, Avid cemented its 
commitment to controlling the entire news process, acquiring news automation companies 
BASYS Automation Systems and SofTECH Systems. Avid planned a workstation where a 
producer would build the rundown, write the stories, and edit together rough cuts of video on the 
same computer screen, using video stored on a network so that multiple workstations could 
access it. To complement the system, Avid was working on the CamCutter, a camcorder which 
would record on a disk, offering faster ingest time into the server environment (McConnell 
1994).92 In April 1995, Avid proudly announced that it had sold over 7,000 units since entering 
the business in 1987 (Abramson 2003, 253). Also in 1995, Hearst Broadcasting signed a $1.5 
million order with Avid Technology to supply three Avid NewsView newsroom automation 
systems to its TV stations in Kansas City, Baltimore, and Milwaukee (Dickson 1995).  
                                                 
91  The ImMix product was primarily a standalone editor. Lightworks’ Newsworks editor, on the other hand, was 
designed from the ground up to interface with the News Maker automation system, made by a different company. 
Neither product made as much of an impact as Avid. Chris McConnell, "Lightworks Targets News for New Editor," 
Broadcasting & Cable, 27 March 1995.  
92  Avid wasn’t the only company working towards tapeless ENG; Ikegami and BTS also announced similar efforts 
at the 1994 NAB conference. Abramson, The History of Television, 1942 to 2000, 248-249. 
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Nonlinear editors were useful for things other than just news packages. One innovative 
use was the Morning Business Report on WPBT in Miami. The 15 minute show was recorded 
directly into an ImMIX Videocube, and aired five times during the morning. For each airing, 
new stories were dropped in as they were fed to the station; the nonlinear environment allowed 
producers to simply trim times from other stories or to shift them around at will in response to 
the new material. The show itself aired directly from the VideoCube, eliminating the time 
involved to dub it to tape (Adamiak, et al. 1995, S4). Eventually, nonlinear editors would find 
application throughout the station, in promotion, programming, and commercial production 
departments as a result of their versatility and their cost savings in both time and personnel. 
Acquisition technologies changed as well during this time period. Increased quality and 
recording time combined with decreasing size and cost were the guiding principles in videotape 
technology. In 1991, a host of manufacturers also showed tapeless recording devices, which used 
optical disks, offered Betacam quality video and audio, and up to program-length recording time 
(Abramson 2003, 239). In early 1992, digital videotape formats started to shift away from 
composite technologies such as D-1 and D-2 to new component technologies: that year Ampex 
showed a prototype, Panasonic announced its plans for D-5, and Sony previewed the following 
year’s release of Digital Betacam, which had the highly useful advantage of backward 
compatibility to analog Betacam SP, which was already in use at a large number of facilities 
(Abramson 2003, 240, 244).93  
 In 1996, Sony’s ENG videotape dominance was challenged by Panasonic’s new 
format, DVC-PRO, a composite format which recorded digitally on ¼” cassettes. That year, 
Panasonic announced the sale of 38 DVCPRO VTRs and 42 DVCPRO camcorders to CNN. 
                                                 
93 By July of 1994, Sony claimed to have sold over 150 Digital Betacam machines to Turner Broadcasting and the 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Ibid., 249. 
 167 
CNNSi chose the competing Betacam SX composite format in October of that year (Abramson 
2003, 254), and the format wars continued on three fronts: Disk-based94, DVC-PRO, and 
Betacam SX.  
3.4.3 Automating the on-air operation 
On-air operations increased dramatically in complexity in the early 1990s with the advent of the 
LMA. Instead of operating one station out of a facility, some broadcasters were operating two, 
stretching staff and equipment to the limit to achieve an economy of scale on the second station. 
Cart machine technology adapted quickly to the potential of this new state of affairs. In an 1993 
NAB preview article, Television Broadcast reviewed the Panasonic Type III M.A.R.C., claiming 
that it “can handle a two-station output” (Moneta 1993, 32), and pointing the way to the future. 
Another article from that same year discussing Cart machines and the potential for a switch to 
disc-based systems featured comments from several manufacturers. One of them, Panasonic, 
observed  
“Last year [the industry] saw a move toward a multi-station type of environment. 
Two completely different stations can broadcast out of the same building, sharing 
the same resources. Instead of a cart machine for each station, there can be a 
common library system to generate compiled reels of commercials, which would 
separate into two channels and go to each station.” 
 
A Sony representative agreed, saying “typically a commercial multi-cassette system works 15 
minutes per hour; obviously, there is room in a [Library Management System] for multiple 
channels and [to thus] optimize installed machinery” (Murrie 1993b). In an era of multi-channel 
                                                 
94 Sony, BTS, and Avid / Ikegami were all working towards optical disk recording at this time. 
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operation, this sort of automated playback allowed economies of scale which made the new 
organizational forms desirable. 
 One of the technologies that seemed custom-made for this new level of on-air 
operation automation was the video server, which quickly found use in news production 
operations as well. Servers offered a variety of savings and opportunities for broadcasters, 
including instant access, elimination of jammed tapes, access to the material from multiple 
locations, flexibility to change the order of playlists, easy upgradeability, increased efficiency, 
and reduction of capital costs associated with tape machines (Murrie 1993a, 21-22). In August 
1994, early adopter CBS announced plans to install a Hewlett-Packard video server at owned and 
operated WCIX in Miami for on-air playback. The basic model could store six hours of video 
and audio; fully loaded, it could store 51 hours of material (Abramson 2003, 250). As the cost of 
recording on disk lessened, stations would turn to server recording more and more, and to the 
benefits of automation that it entailed, including opportunities for staff reduction, lessened media 
cost, and increased centralization of operations. 
3.4.4 System Solutions with a smile 
This entire time period is marked by a change in thinking on the part of some broadcast 
equipment manufacturers, who began to envision themselves less as developers of independent 
pieces of equipment and more as designers and providers of “turnkey” broadcast systems  ("State 
of the art" 1989). At the 1989 NAB conference, Sony presented its new focus on systems 
technology, offering up new switchers, graphics, still stores, and recording devices. Sony’s new 
position was that customers should buy entire systems from one manufacturer, for two reasons: 
ease of maintenance and repair, and quantity-based cost savings to the consumer (Abramson 
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2003, 227). This clear attempt by Sony to increase their market share also made group ownership 
that much more appealing; other manufacturers would have to follow Sony’s lead to stay 
competitive, and with manufacturers ready to deal when purchases were made in quantity, the 
economy of scale offered by purchasing equipment for multiple stations at a time could not be 
denied. At the same time, Sony was positioning itself to be a trusted leader in systems design and 
implementation in preparation for the moment that switching to digital production equipment 
became a necessity, rather than simply a choice made for increased quality, for stations across 
the country eight years later. 
Other manufacturers also embraced the systems concept, switching their sales focus from 
individual items to systems of connected items. Ampex took the first steps towards becoming a 
systems provider in 1988, when they released their first character generator, the ALEX ("State of 
the art" 1989). Ampex followed that in 1991 with the ADAPT unit, which permitted existing 
analog switchers to use digital sources (something very beneficial to stations facing the 
changeover), envisioning a five year transition phase into digital serial switchers (Abramson 
2003, 236) and making a first mark as a potential leader in digital technology. The following 
year, at April 1992’s NAB convention, Ampex announced its own systems approach to 
component digital technology (Abramson 2003, 241). The system, which included tape machines 
and cassettes, a post production switcher, edit controller, and digital effects, was released in June 
(Abramson 2003, 242). Chyron Corporation, manufacturer of graphics equipment, planned a 
merger with a satellite equipment company, Midwest Communications Corporation, in 1989 to 
rival Ampex and Sony as a systems provider ("State of the art" 1989). 
In the same 1993 special advertising section that housed Avid’s effort to become a 
newsroom system provider with the NewsCutter and Airplay, Sony touted its total systems 
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approach again, attempting to position itself as a one-stop-shop specifically for the design and 
installation of digital equipment ("The World of Digital" 1993, 40).95 For the group owners, who 
were likely less involved in the day to day decision making for their stations than owners of 
single stations had been in the past, a one size fits all scenario for purchasing television 
equipment must have been pretty appealing; at the same time, the discounts being offered by the 
systems providers for bulk purchases reinforced the benefits of group ownership. In addition, 
Avid, Sony, and other manufacturers were redefining the relationship of television equipment 
pieces from individual units to pieces of an overall system, always in service of more efficiency 
and thus less cost in personnel. 
This was a time of dramatic change in the broadcast industry, as new technologies made 
possible operational decisions that radically altered the workflow in many television news 
departments, traffic departments, and on-air master controls. However, two major events were 
about to occur which would again give the television broadcasting industry both reason and 
opportunity for major changes in organization and operation.  
                                                 
95 The systems concept continued into the digital-themed SMPTE convention in October 1994. Harris Allied and 
Avid claimed to have contracts to design all-digital facilities for cable operations. Intel and CNN were working 
together to bring video to news producers’ desktop PCs, so that they could review news feeds without having to go 
to an edit suite to do it. Northwest Cable News had plans to be completely tapeless, using Avid technology including 
the Newscutter editor. (Abramson 2003, 250) The systems approach eventually became the norm, whether stations 
were dealing directly with manufacturers or using “systems integrators” to design and install their new facilities. 
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3.5 TELEVISION EQUIPMENT 1996-2006: CONVERGENCE, CENTRALIZATION, 
CONCENTRATION, AND CONSOLIDATION 
The first catalyst for change and centralization was the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which 
loosened restrictions on station ownership and media cross ownership in television, restrictions 
that would get looser in the years to follow. The second catalyst was the announcement in early 
1997 (but expected for some time before that) that the television broadcasting industry would 
migrate to digital broadcasting in the immediate future, with a planned signoff of analog 
channels and surrender of the NTSC spectrum by 2006. In combination, these two momentous 
decisions both required the broadcasters to purchase new equipment and offered them the 
opportunity to explore new forms of organization permitted by the regulatory relaxation. The 
equipment manufacturers were aware of these potentials as well, and joined the broadcasters in 
considering the new possibilities available for station and group operations. This time period is 
marked by an increase in “systems” selling and group-wide purchasing, a focus on multi-channel 
operation both within and among stations and markets, the development of a complete solution 
for newsroom automation, and a change to envisioning video and audio as data to be easily 
manipulated and shared, the ultimate blend of computers and video. Each of these changes 
contributed directly to centralization of operations, and also contributed to an environment in 
which interconnectedness and centralization among group stations was extraordinarily valuable.  
With the knowledge of these events just around the corner, at the 1996 NAB Sony 
reiterated its “total system concept,” a plan to “provide each component in the broadcast plant, 
from acquisition to transmission.” Other equipment manufacturers, not wanting to be cut out of 
the business but not willing to become systems specialists, called for “open systems with 
interoperable components from several suppliers” (Dickson 1996e, 63). Sony also announced its 
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first “total digital solution” sale, worth $13 million, to Cox Broadcasting for the digital facility at 
WSB-TV, Atlanta. The sale included desktop editing in the newsroom via Oracle Newsroom 
Manager and Sony DNE-1000 nonlinear editors. That same year, Providence Journal 
Broadcasting made a multi-station purchase from Avid Technology totaling $3.5 million and 
including 30 NewsCutter systems, AirPlay systems, Media Composers, and NewsView 
newsroom computer systems (Dickson 1996d).  
In April 1997, CBS purchased $24 million worth of DVCPRO equipment to distribute 
among their 13 owned and operated stations, and NBC purchased roughly the same amount for 
its O&Os (Abramson 2003, 255) (Dickson 1997a). Benedek Broadcasting followed suit, buying 
$2 million worth of DVCPRO equipment to upgrade 10 of its 22 stations (Abramson 2003, 255), 
as did Raycom Media, selecting DVCPRO for its 25 stations in a deal worth up to $8 million 
(Dickson 1997b). In December of that year, Panasonic released DVCPRO 50 and announced 
$2.5 million worth of new sales to Sinclair Communications, LIN Television, and Ziff-Davis. 
Also in 1997, Avid and Ikegami had finalized and released their CamCutter disk based 
camcorder (Abramson 2003, 255-257). Notable in this rush to digital is the fact that station 
groups were continuing to buy for multiple stations at once, capitalizing on discounts on the new 
equipment. This would become the rule for purchasing broadcasting equipment, and would 
provide one more impetus for groups to grow bigger.   
 Streamlining the newsroom with new tape formats, some of which could be 
loaded into editors at faster than real time speeds, nonlinear editing, server playback, and other 
time and staff saving devices was the first step towards the models of local television 
broadcasting present today. The combination of technological development and loosening 
regulation offered other possibilities as well. LMAs continued to be an attractive option for 
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broadcasters looking for economies of scale, as did acquiring extra channels on local cable 
systems; in most cases, broadcasters were now thinking about how to use their current 
investment in capital and personnel to air additional programming and garner those extra 
advertising dollars. New video server technology was appealing to broadcasters, and one of the 
prime concerns was the capability for multiple channels of output (Dickson 1996a).  
3.5.1 Multi-channel operations 
In the analog realm at the time, multi-channel was available through LMAs or additional cable 
channels acquired through retransmission negotiations. However, the FCC’s decision on Digital 
Television opened up new possibilities, because it did not force the broadcasters to carry high-
definition signals, but did provide them with adequate transmission space for HDTV. In the 
bandwidth allotted for their digital signal, broadcasters discovered they could provide one high 
definition signal, or up to four separate standard definition signals; in both cases some excess 
bandwidth was also available for other potential moneymaking opportunities such as datacasting. 
Station owners and networks faced the challenge of, as one article put it, “how to run those 
channels without adding personnel; the answer is automation.” Cosmos Broadcasting Group, for 
example, purchased Drake Automation systems for its nine stations in 1998, to be installed over 
a five-year period in preparation for multicasting (Anderson 1998). The groups now began to 
think in earnest about centralization and concentration, having finally achieved a high level of 
efficiency within the station. It was now time to connect that station to others in the group, a task 
made possible by technologies specifically designed for multi-channel operation. 
Early examples include Paramount Stations Group, which combined master controls for 
two affiliates in 1997, one in West Palm Beach, FL, and one in Miami. West Palm Beach 
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retained a sales staff, a community relations staff and a small engineering crew. In the two years 
following this experiment, PSG combined operations in four other markets and predicted 
programming all their O&O stations from one facility by 2005. USA Broadcasting was following 
the same strategy. Of concern, however, is the fact that between 1997 and 1999, PSG eliminated 
local news at all but two of its 17 stations to save money (Schlosser 1999a). This is one of the 
major challenges in this era of concentration, the balance of the profit motive and the need to 
program in the public interest; when programming several stations from a central location, it 
becomes more of a challenge to serve a given community and still satisfy the bottom line, it 
seems. That same year, the New York Times Broadcast Group planned to open up its centralized 
master control hub located at WTKR-TV in Norfolk, VA, to its other stations. The $5 million 
facility was developed in 1995 in response to the impending switch to DTV; as a result, the 
company was able to reduce master control operators by half, redirecting them to other jobs. The 
system also reduced errors by 70% (Anderson 1999b).  
Tribune Broadcasting made a group deal with Sony for the NewsBase automated 
newsroom server system for all of its stations in 1999, planning to migrate its stations to the new 
product at the rate of four or five stations per year over 3 years. “Our long term plan [for 
increased networking between the stations] is to have certain stations that are key gateways to 
take in the programming,” says VP of Technology and Engineering Ira Goldstone. “If you have a 
program that is bought by the whole group, like Friends, right now in most station groups each 
station takes down Friends and they have to record the show.” Under the new plan, one gateway 
station would record the show, enter in- and out- time data, and then feed the show and the 
information to the other stations, again allowing for reduction in manpower at the stations 
(Anderson 1999d). The notion of group-level purchases of syndicated programs again shows the 
 175 
power that the station groups were acquiring as their ownership stake increased; more stations, 
more economies of scale. Fox was thinking along the same technical lines as Tribune, and by 
April 1999, the Fox Network Center claimed to be running the industry’s first fully tapeless 
master control operation (Abramson 2003, 259). 
The model of running several stations from one centralized master control is 
appropriately referred to as centralcasting. In 1999, USA Television constructed a master control 
hub to centralcast 4 of its top market stations. Instead of spending $8 million per market on 
equipment and adding at least 20 engineers per market, the central hub required only one set of 
equipment and 40 operators. The group planned to build a second facility to handle another five 
owned stations as they switched to the new program format (Schlosser 1999b). When those 
“hubbed” stations are geographically proximate, that model of centralcasting is referred to as 
“clustering.” In 1999, The Ackerly group operated its 13 stations in three regional clusters, in a 
move expected to cut costs and boost profits. The hub station in each cluster held traffic, 
accounting, creative services, technical operations, and centralcast the other stations. Local 
markets retained sales, news, and community affairs staffers. To expand upon this plan, Ackerly 
was looking specifically to acquire stations to expand its clusters. Ackerly management 
estimated reducing traffic personnel in a cluster from 40 to 10. The subordinate stations were led 
by a station manager instead of a general manager, in charge of community relations, and local 
sales managers and news directors reported to superiors at the hub station (Anderson 1999a). 
Each hub cost an estimated $1-$2 million including hardware and software (Kerschbaumer 
2001).  
Other specific technologies were developed to assist with the centralization of operations. 
Tribune was again at the forefront, creating a Web-based control system in 1999 which allowed 
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“producers at one Tribune location to control cameras, switchers, lighting, tape decks, and video 
servers at TV stations, newspapers, and news bureaus.” Tribune tested the system at WGN 
Chicago, and planned to install it group-wide by the end of the year (Dickson 1999). Another 
development in 1999 was Associated Press Broadcast’s MOS (Media Object Server) protocol. 
MOS acted as a bridge between their ENPS newsroom computer system and equipment made by 
AP’s design partners, which included 20 of the biggest manufacturers in the business (Anderson 
1999c). This was a strong reply to companies positioning themselves as systems providers, 
because it allowed stations and resellers to choose the brands they wanted with the knowledge 
that their newsroom computers could talk to it. It also displays the sort of thought processes that 
were going on at the manufacturing companies; the focus continued to be on automation and 
connectivity. The new protocol was an immediate hit: the following year, Raycom, which owned 
37 television stations, ordered the ENPS system for all of their stations that carried news 
(Bowser 2000c). 
Raycom’s buy was representative of the direction of the industry, as more groups focused 
on connecting their stations and achieving every economy of scale that they could. In 2000, LIN 
Television, owners of 10 stations and operators of 4 LMAs, examined a different method of 
concentration, planning centralized control of video servers located at its various stations, with 
information transmitted to the server overnight (Bowser 2000b). E.W. Scripps was the black 
sheep of the station groups, generally letting individual stations decide on their technology; 
however, even they were working towards centralized storage and archiving, and were also 
investigating internet applications that would benefit all of the stations in the group (Bowser 
2000a). 
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A 2001 article in Broadcasting & Cable set forth the thinking behind centralcasting in the 
digital environment, emphasizing that many station groups were looking into the model because 
“turning an investment in digital technology into a way to cut operational costs is not only 
desired, it’s a must.” In order to accomplish this, “station groups need to look at what areas can 
be combined without having an impact on the local flavor of their broadcasts,” according to 
Sundance Digital president Robert C. Johnson. For the Ackerly group, the benefit came from 
making the investment in digital broadcasting technology once, and then using it to centralcast 
multiple stations (Kerschbaumer 2001). Another example of multi-channel digital efforts in 2001 
was WCYB in Bristol, VA. The station was an NBC affiliate which also operated the local WB 
affiliate, a Paxson channel, and a weather channel in its digital bandwidth. The NBC and WB 
channels were fully automated; before installation of a $150,000 system it took eight operators to 
run the NBC affiliate; after, it took two to oversee all four channels (Grotticelli 2001a).  
In 2002, other groups followed Ackerly’s lead and became centralcasters, including 
Emmis Communications, which operated a centralcasting hub from Orlando’s WKCF which 
provided programming to three Fox affiliates and one WB affiliate. One of these, WALA, built a 
new facility without a master control, saving $1 million in capital. Emmis claimed that the 
benefit was not staff reduction, but improved quality and accuracy since the workload is shifted 
forward by up to 24 hours (Kerschbaumer 2002c). Network stations employed the model as well, 
with NBC investing $10 million to create a centralcasting operation with hubs in New York, Los 
Angeles, and Miami.96 Each operator was given responsibility for monitoring up to four streams 
                                                 
96 The Miami hub has 12 operators and spokes in Raleigh, Dallas, Birmingham, AL, and Miami; the New York hub 
has 17 operators and spokes in Philadelphia, New York, Columbus OH, Providence, Washington, and Hartford CT; 
The Los Angeles hub has nine operators and spokes in San Diego and Los Angeles. 
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of programming, and local stations could still override the feed for breaking news 
(Kerschbaumer 2002a).  
Centralcasting and hubbing have become two of the dominant models for multi-channel 
operation in the present day television broadcasting industry. While these models offer 
seemingly vital cost savings and efficiencies to station owners, at the same time they jeopardize 
the fundamental “localness” of television stations. One of the major locations where localness 
resides is in the news content of these stations, and during this time period news, too, found 
profit in consolidation.     
3.5.2 ParkerVision and Newsroom Automation 
The very nature of automation was changing in 2002, according to an article in Broadcasting & 
Cable. “Where automation once meant robotic cameras, it is now best represented by the 
changing newsroom: automatic graphic systems based on templates, automatic ingesting video 
servers, and newsroom systems that can control it all,” making it possible to merge previously 
separate jobs into one. The article continues “one of the major things driving automation growth 
is consolidation, as groups follow the network model of sharing content among stations” 
(Kerschbaumer 2002b). In 2001, early adopter The Ackerly Group installed 15 of these 
ParkerVision control systems at 12 of its stations in a $5.5 million deal. As a direct result, short 
months later WWTI-TV in Watertown, NY raised its weekly total of news programming from 10 
half-hours a week to 39. In an article about the deal, ParkerVision President Richard Sisisky 
enthused “the stations are faced with all of the challenges of transitioning to digital and 
purchasing a ParkerVision system represented an affordable way to move to a fully digital 
operation, as opposed to acquiring separate digital production components.” Further, he claimed, 
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“it allows markets the size of Watertown efficiencies and ways to generate more news content 
and more revenue from additional advertising” (Grotticelli 2001b). Another example of 
ParkerVision success was a Fox/UPN duopoly in Jacksonville, FL, WAWS/WTEV, which was 
able to expand its 4pm newscast to an hour while eliminating nine part-time technicians 
(Whitney 2002). BBBB Gannett employed a part of the ParkerVision system, the CameraMan, 
which allowed Portland, ME station WCSH to control cameras located at sister station WLBZ, 
Bangor in a shared newscast (Dickson 2001).  
Originally, ParkerVision targeted mainly small market stations with their automated news 
solution, but in 2002, they expanded their focus with the release of the PVTV News CR4000, a 
$459, 995 system designed to reduce the live production crew for a newscast down to a single 
operator (Kerschbaumer 2002d). In an advertisement, ParkerVision claimed to be “changing the 
economics of TV News – one station at a time” (ParkerVision 2002). Indeed, manufacturers at 
the time saw three potential areas for automation development: “increased content localization, 
improved efficiencies, and turnkey systems for smaller stations” (Kerschbaumer 2002e, 30). The 
ParkerVision product line offered possibilities in all of these areas. It added two layers of keying, 
13 additional inputs, and additional audio compression features to earlier models (Whitney 
2002b). ParkerVision was apparently doing something right, as the company’s video division 
was purchased by Thompson Broadcast and Media Solutions for $14 million in 2004. Sundance 
Digital released a competing product designed to interface with a station’s current hardware, 
rather than buying a whole system from top to bottom as in the ParkerVision system. The 
NewsLink 2.0 was aimed at station owners who wanted to reduce headcount without the capital 
investment of a whole new system, and was priced at around $40,000 in 2004 (Kerschbaumer 
2004a).    
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The newsroom environment as a whole changed during this time period as well, 
attempting to meet the challenge of “managing multiple streams of news content,” including a 
stream (or streams, in the case of LMAs or duopolies) for the local market and another stream for 
other markets within the station group or affiliate network. Newsrooms were expected to create 
more programming while still cutting budgets, usually by eliminating labor costs (Kerschbaumer 
2003b). Interactivity among stations within a group was becoming a key means of cost control, 
and manufacturers were stepping up with products to assist in that goal. Proximity created the 
Artbox to solve this specific problem, which takes input from various television graphics 
systems, automatically uploading them to a central storage location and providing thumbnail 
graphics to producers. Once selected, the graphics are converted into the new desired format and 
delivered (Kerschbaumer 2004b). Historically speaking, graphics systems were one of the first 
locations for automation; as early as 1993, Chyron was offering an “intelligent interface” which 
would allow script information to be automatically converted into graphics information built 
upon a template, a function which quickly became standard among graphics devices. In 2002, 
Liberty Corporation planned to install a graphics system based on templates stored in a 
centralized server and accessed by its 15 stations. VP of Operations Guy Hempel observed 
“There are so many things in a TV station that we do 15 times in 15 stations, and we shouldn’t 
have to do that and should be freed to do stuff that is unique locally” (Whitney 2002a). Two 
years later, Pinnacle systems graphics product manager Caren Anhder observed that automated 
graphics were key to the new newsroom. “Coupling template-based graphics with a clip system 
gives graphics novices, such as TV news reporters or producers, the ability to place information 
in a graphic without changing the look.” Newsrooms without such a system would require “four 
or five artists. Those who have it need only one or two. The goal: More graphics with fewer 
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graphics personnel” (Kerschbaumer 2004d). Media General followed this trend in 2004, looking 
closely at centralized graphics operations modeled after NBC and Belo operations. “Centralized 
graphics facilities are viewed as a way to have a group’s best artists working on the most 
important projects. They also have chance to shape the look of all the stations in the group, not 
just one facility” (Kerschbaumer 2004e). Economies of scale come into play in equipment 
purchases, training, and potential staff reductions with the elimination of graphic artists at the 
individual stations (Whitney 2002a).  
3.5.3 Files instead of Footage 
A mental shift occurred with the impending switch to digital and the development of so many 
computer video hybrid technologies: manufacturers and broadcasters began to think of video in 
terms of files rather than feeds, files which could be stored centrally and moved around in a 
variety of ways. This new way of thinking was an additional impulse towards centralization, as 
computer files are connotatively ephemeral, whereas videotape is a physical, relatively immobile 
format. In 2001 the Pathfire Digital Media Gateway, a system initially developed for NBC’s 
News Channel service,97 was adopted by Sinclair Broadcast Group to distribute commercials, 
promotional spots, stock footage, and syndicated programming among its stations. The system 
uses satellite Internet-Protocol delivery to transfer files to dedicated servers at each station. 
Sinclair pays a set fee for the system and an additional fee per file sent. Quorom Broadcasting is 
the other station-group that uses the service, and networks NBC and ABC use it for their 
newsfeeds. Sinclair sees the biggest benefit to come in syndicated programming, where instead 
                                                 
97 A newsfeed distributed to NBC affiliates, which prior to this time was sent at regular intervals via satellite. 
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of 20 people in 20 markets making individual recordings of a given show, the show will simply 
appear on the server when it is needed for air (Grotticelli 2001c).  
Many newsrooms were ready to turn away from videotape as changing workflows in 
news operations, centered upon the use of servers for editing and playback, demanded new video 
formats, specifically Sony’s XDCAM optical disk and Panasonic’s P2 solid-state-memory 
system. Both formats store video as files, which enables the video to be dragged onto a nonlinear 
system rather than having to be digitized (Kerschbaumer 2004f). Both products were developed 
in response to the desire for faster ingest speeds, which had maxed out at 4x real-time. Sony’s 
optical disk is faster, and less expensive than Panasonic’s solid-state design; however, the lack of 
moving parts in the Panasonic system is a definite plus possibly worth the cost up front 
(Kerschbaumer 2004c). In addition, “The Sony format is expected to allow users in the field to 
transmit low-res “proxy” video back to a station at up to 30 times real-time speed” giving editors 
at the station a chance to pre-edit the proxy footage so that only the necessary full quality video 
needs to be downloaded into the system for the final edit (Kerschbaumer 2003c). ABC stations 
were also looking at the technology in 2004, since all of their stations edited on nonlinear 
systems, and all of the stations used tapeless master control facilities (Dickson 2004b).  
There can be no question that the ownership and organizational structures present in 
television broadcasting today were made possible by the technologies developed during the late 
1990s and early 2000s, and that those technologies have their roots in earlier decisions made as 
the industry developed. On-air and newsroom automation have become the standards, and groups 
now think it terms of many stations instead of one, and multiple channels per station instead of 
one. Staff reduction is a key desire, and redundancies of any kind are met with technologies 
following the guiding principle of staff reduction to combine those tasks. Without the technology 
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to support these goals, such structures would not offer the sorts of economies of scale that make 
them so appealing; and, of course, without these goals in mind, the technologies themselves 
would not have been developed. Once again, technology is both cause and effect, making 
possible many of these news forms of organization and workflows, and in turn being invented 
specifically to fill those needs in service of continuing profit. Ultimately, since the beginning of 
the industry broadcast television technology has consistently embodied the guiding principles 
placed upon it by the economic concerns at the heart of the medium. 
3.6 TRACKING THE THREE 
This chapter closes with an examination of the three exemplar station groups and the 
technologies and models they have embraced during the last two decades. Each group has met 
the demands of changing technologies and economics in a slightly different way, although each 
has conformed to the guiding principles of centralization and concentration. Sinclair 
Broadcasting, in particular, has embraced centralization and multi-channel operation in ways that 
have offered new potentials for the entire industry.    
3.6.1 Cox Broadcasting 
Cox broadcasting has been early to experiment with new equipment when it became available, 
but has generally been patient when it comes to large scale purchases or conversions. Affiliate 
station KAME-TV was one of the few in the country to use video servers as early as 1996 
(Dickson 1996b). Also in 1996, Cox agreed to purchase a single $13 million DTV setup from 
 184 
Sony, to be located at WSB-TV in Atlanta and to be completed by 1998 (Dickson 1996d). Cox 
added a second digital facility in 1999 at Oakland’s KTVU-TV, and planned to convert four 
more stations in the next year. 
In 2001, Cox was looking for ways to link its geographically separate stations, having 
already combined in-market duopolies and LMAs, specifically solutions for traffic, transmission, 
and automation. In addition, they were moving slowly on new technology, testing different 
systems at different stations before making a group commitment (Bowser 2001). In 2002, Cox 
decided to solve one geographical problem by relocating the studio for KICU in San Jose to the 
KTVU facility in Oakland. The two stations use separate Grass Valley switchers, and share one 
as backup; they also use Grass Valley Profile servers for playback ("KICU-TV and KTVU-TV" 
2002). The company’s switch to digital was being made only as existing technology was in need 
of replacement. In early 2002, Cox’s studios were only 15-20% digital, and as they looked to 
expand they also continued to look at centralcasting (Wind 2002). 
Finally, in 2003, Cox Broadcasting committed to a multiple station solution, making a 
deal with Avid for newsroom computers for six stations. The company also inked deals for 
digital transmitters and antennas for all the stations in the group (Kerschbaumer 2003a). The 
following year, Cox arranged another group buy, acquiring Panasonic’s solid state P2 
camcorders for seven of its stations ("Cox Favors Solid-state" 2004).  
Historically proficient at using its group assets to maximum benefit, Cox broadcasting’s 
most recent effort is to apply the clustering model to its stations surrounding the Pittsburgh 
market. Early decisions centralized management functions, and it is anticipated that the three 
stations will centralcast from Pittsburgh and share news content among their departments.  
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3.6.2 Hearst-Argyle Television 
In 1995, Hearst made one of its first group deals, buying Avid NewsView systems for three of its 
stations (Dickson 1995). Apparently enamored with group purchasing, in 1999 Hearst-Argyle 
acquired the Associate Press’ ENPS newsroom computer system for six of its stations and its 
Washington news bureau, bringing the total number of Hearst-Argyle stations with the product to 
13 (Dickson and Anderson 1999). The following year, the group outfitted seven more stations 
with DVCPRO, purchasing almost 330 pieces of equipment including camcorders, laptop 
editors, studio VTRs, and edit controllers to replace older Sony Betacam equipment in the news 
departments (Dickson 2000).  
By 2002, Hearst-Argyle was implementing a centralcasting model at its stations in 
Boston and Manchester, NH. A central automation computer at WCVB controlled Pinnacle 
video servers at both locations, with all materials being stored at a central server at WCVB. 
When needed, the central server would feed commercials and other materials to the Pinnacle 
server at WMUR in Manchester automatically over a DS-3 network. The advantage, according to 
Hearst-Argyle execs, is that the stations are in the same region and share the same network 
affiliation, so many of their practices are identical ("Centralcasting Facility Profile" 2002).  
In 2005, Hearst-Argyle upgraded the traffic systems at all 26 of its television stations, 
providing instant access to group revenue information instantly. Additional enhancements in 
scheduling and tracking of spots allowed the group to keep better track of available inventory 
group wide, allowing for more efficient operation (Keefe 2005). 
Hearst-Argyle has made a practice of group purchasing, and serves as a representative 
model for the entire industry when it comes to centralization efforts. Although not a huge risk-
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taker, Hearst-Argyle effectively leverages the economies of scale offered by its size whenever 
possible.  
3.6.3 Sinclair Broadcasting, Inc. 
Sinclair’s response to the possibilities of high definition television was representative of many 
broadcasters: they saw HDTV as relatively unprofitable, and preferred to consider multicasting 
in the available spectrum (Dickson 1998). As a group, Sinclair has been quick to see the potential 
for multichannel programming, and it is no surprise that such a focus extends into the digital 
plans as well.   
Sinclair quickly grasped the possibilities that new technologies afforded for consolidating 
LMA operations. In 1996, they were the first to purchase the Panasonic DVCPro SmartCart 
system, a robotic recording and playback system. They used it in conjunction with a Profile 
video server to combine the operations of WZTV and WXMT in Nashville (Dickson 1996c). 
One year later, Sinclair worked with Columbine JDS to develop a server based plan to automate 
the operations of WPGH and WPTT in Pittsburgh. They worked with Columbine to write special 
master control automation software that controlled a video server and a robotic retrieval system 
for computer storage tapes. When a spot was needed, the robot would load the appropriate tape 
and copy the needed file onto the video server for playback. This allowed the stations to keep 
over 100 hours of media in near-line storage, ready for automatic use (Suydam 1997). 
Conceptually similar to the WZTV operation, the WPGH setup chose computer storage of files 
in place of videotape storage of audio and video.  
Sinclair shut down news operations at stations in Winston-Salem, Tallahassee, and St. 
Louis in the years previous to 2002; it reversed that trend in late 2002 when it instituted “News 
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Central,” launching news in 30 markets where its stations were currently without. CEO David 
Smith:  
We developed a model, using current technology, that reduces or eliminates 
repetitive efforts and resources that can be produced from a centralized location 
[at Sinclair Headquarters in Hunt Valley, MD]…. With lower per-station costs, 
even the smaller markets are able to support a profitable yet high-quality 
newscast. 
 
The studios and News Central shared a branded look which would ordinarily be out of reach in a 
smaller market, but is possible through the economy of scale. Sinclair anticipated expanding the 
service to its stations that already had news (Trigoboff 2002b).  
In 2004, Sinclair Broadcasting make a large purchase of Avid news-production gear, 
including the iNews automation system, Unity server, and NewsCutter nonlinear editor to service 
seven new news operations and four existing ones (Dickson 2004a). The group also put together 
a test HD facility at KOVR in Stockton, CA, made up of a small HD server, Miranda Imagestore 
logo inserter, upconverter, and the ability to switch baseband HD to insert local commercials. 
‘We’re trying to come up with a cost-effective way for stations to air HD commercials,’ said 
Vice President of Engineering and Operations Del Parks (Dickson 2004).  
 Sinclair effectively leveraged “I.T.-based news production” in the creation of 
NewsCentral. The benefits of this model are many, according to an advertising supplement in 
Broadcasting & Cable: direct savings in tape stock, equipment maintenance, and labor; less 
hardware than analog work flows, easy repurposing of materials, and the workers who remain 
need fewer specialized skills. In the NewsCentral model, local stations gather video and send it 
via a Wide Area Network to Baltimore, where it is edited and sent back to the stations as finished 
pieces. Weather segments are prerecorded for each station and fed via WAN to them ahead of air 
time. Promos, commercials, and other video are distributed the same way throughout the day. Up 
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to 60% of the newscast is provided from NewsCentral, with the rest produced locally using an 
identical graphics template. Sinclair estimated it had cut news production costs by 50% 
("Cashing In On the News" 2003).  
The benefit to Sinclair of conceptualizing video and audio as files is clear, enabling them 
to move data around between stations at the push of a button in service of either news or 
programming operations. This, in turn, is what makes the news central model both possible and 
profitable, centralizing the newsroom operations for a plethora of television stations in one 
central location. This level of news centralization, when combined with the level of on-air 
automation and centralization that Sinclair has adopted, serves to make the group one of the most 
efficiently run organizations in the industry.  
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4.0  THE ECONOMICS OF CENTRALIZATION AND THE CHANGED 
STRUCTURE OF LOCAL TELEVISION BROADCASTING  
The preceding chapters have described the impact of a multiplicity of changes on the general 
practices and products of local television stations, specifically targeting the areas of 
centralization of ownership and operations and the conflicts inherent in the dichotomous 
relationship of economics and the public interest as expressed in the production of news and 
public affairs programming. Chapter One demonstrated the historical relationship between 
changing ownership structures, business practices, and journalistic practices from the earliest 
days of print news to the advent of television broadcasting. Chapter Two detailed the antagonism 
between public interest and private ownership in broadcasting and its impact on the structure of 
television broadcasting, as expressed in the regulation and deregulation of the broadcast media. 
The technological developments which served to both contribute to centralization of ownership 
and operation and which directly transformed the practices of television news were elaborated in 
Chapter Three.  
This chapter builds off preceding chapters by examining how the economics of 
broadcasting and the practices of local television stations have changed in response to the new 
structural forms resulting from the institutional drift towards centralization, policy decisions, and 
technological innovation. In doing so, the chapter will analyze two important characteristics of 
local television broadcasting in the present day. First, the industry is marked by centralization at 
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the local level as a result of the fundamental economics of the industry, the specific economic 
motivations of station groups, and changing governmental regulation. Second, this centralized 
ownership structure has resulted in specific changes in practice at the local level, as group 
owners take advantage of their size to invoke economies of scale.  
4.1 THE ECONOMIC AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT OF LOCAL 
TELEVISION OWNERSHIP 
As a prelude to investigating the characteristics described above, it is helpful to briefly review 
the regulatory concerns, ownership options, and broad economic issues which define local 
television broadcasting. As discussed in Chapter Two, the regulatory vision of television 
broadcasting in the United States encompassed a variety of viewpoints that changed with time 
and circumstance. However, two specific and often contradictory facts remained true from the 
days of Hoover forward: first, that broadcasting is a commercial medium, where local stations 
are expected to act in ways that will increase profit margins in an atmosphere of competition 
appropriate to a free market ideal; and second, that broadcasters use a valuable and scarce public 
resource, the electromagnetic spectrum, in order to meet their commercial goals, and are in turn 
expected to offer something of value in exchange for their free rights to the ether. This second 
fact refers to operation in the constantly reinterpreted “public interest.” This notion of the public 
interest was refined by the Davis Amendment to the Radio Act of 1927, which initiated a plan to 
arrange stations geographically to ensure that all local areas were equally served. This localism 
principle was buttressed by the FCC’s later decision to pursue a local television broadcasting 
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system comprised of a high number of lower-powered stations instead of a regional system of 
fewer high-power stations.   
In comparative evaluations of license applications, the FCC has used several criteria to 
differentiate between applicants, although in a generally inconsistent fashion. Among these 
considerations could again be found the commitment to localism, demonstrated by repeated 
decisions in favor of applicants headquartered in the market of their desired station and 
applicants who showed significant involvement in that community (Sherman 1995, 167-169). 
The FCC’s somewhat idealistic notion of locally owned stations providing service to their local 
communities was embodied in family ownership of television stations during the early days of 
the medium. Even then such arrangements were rare, and as television broadcasting developed, 
such models of ownership largely disappeared. Still, importantly, the burden of serving a 
particular local public has remained a part of the regulatory expectations of broadcast station 
owners to act in the public interest. The localism that has long underwritten regulatory 
understandings of the public interest has been subverted in many ways by the new organizational 
structures that this chapter will describe.  
In the modern day media environment, there are three types of television station owners: 
stand-alone operations, broadcast groups, and multinational conglomerates. The stand-alone 
operation is usually structured as a corporate entity in order to protect the owners, but operates in 
a fashion similar to the family-owned stations of the past, confined to a single market and 
arguably best representing the localism principle. Broadcasting groups are the next layer of 
ownership, and the variety with which this project is most concerned. These are generally 
corporations which own many broadcast outlets, and for whom broadcasting is the main line of 
business. They may also be part of a larger conglomerate as in the case of Hearst-Argyle 
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Television, which operates as a separate company but is owned wholly by Hearst, Inc. 
Multinational conglomerates include owners of broadcast networks, which in turn own 
individual television stations and as a result of their size and resources are often at the forefront 
of the structural development of the industry (Sherman 1995, 176-181). 
Television has long been a profitable enterprise for station owners. Successful businesses 
generally average between 5% and 10% profit margins; television stations are often able to 
deliver several times that number. For example, in 1985, a typical station returned 26% on 
investment. By 1990, that number had dropped to 10%, but stations still generally outperformed 
the market. The most profitable stations historically were those owned by the networks and by 
the largest station groups; these stations returned over 40% on investment in 1985 (Sherman 
1995). Further evidence of the profit potential of the industry is offered by a 1982 study which 
examined the profitability of broadcast divisions of conglomerates with non-broadcast holdings. 
In a study of 32 publicly-traded companies, researchers discovered that the broadcast segment of 
the conglomerate generated a larger return relative to its assets than that of the corporation as a 
whole more than 2/3 of the time. Five of these companies (CBS, Chris-Craft, Storer, Taft, and 
Wometco) had between 2 and 5 times the return expected. Four others (General Tire, Liberty, 
Outlet, and Westinghouse) received in excess of five times the return that the assets contributed 
would have been expected to generate. General Tire, notably, invested only 5% of its total assets 
into its broadcast operations, but the returns from those operations accounted for 30% of the 
company’s total income (Foley and Foley 1982, 677-680).  
The demonstrated profitability of television logically inspired station groups to acquire 
even more stations, and the resulting tensions among regulatory restrictions, public interest 
expectations, and the pursuit of constant growth and increased profit has created a tangled path 
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of structural change in local television broadcasting. The end result is an industry which is today 
marked by extensive concentration of ownership and control in television markets across the 
United States.   
4.2 SPIRALING INWARD: THE CENTRALIZING TREND 
The concentration of local television ownership is the result of interactions among station owners 
and government regulators, and was both permitted and abetted by technological developments 
and structural changes which allowed for an increasing centralization of operations. To 
demonstrate how these factors combined to create this level of concentration, this section will 
detail the basic economics of station structure, purchases, sales and trades; describe the 
interaction of regulation and valuation and the transactions which result from it; and offer 
examples to support the claim of centralizing momentum in the industry.  
According to Ozanich and Wirth, since the 1960s mergers and acquisitions in the 
broadcast industry have been influenced by larger economic trends, changes in valuation, and 
increases in capital available for expansion. Four specific factors have propelled these mergers 
and acquisitions: 
(1) the growth of the media; (2) significant barriers to entry in many media 
markets, which increases interest in existing firms with established market share 
and cash flow; (3) relaxation of ownership limits, which have encouraged 
investment in the broadcast and cable industries; and (4) tax advantages for 
buyers. (Albarran and Dimmick 1996, 42) 
 
Continued expansion of television broadcasting has resulted in increased profits, making stations 
a more attractive investment for those with the means to acquire them. For those without the 
means, options for financing such as general partnerships, limited partnerships, and public stock 
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issues have made it easier for both individuals and corporations to acquire stations, although the 
risks and lessened tax advantages of partnerships have made the corporation the dominant 
ownership model (Sherman 1995, 175-176).98  The trend over time to loosen restrictions on 
multiple- and cross- ownership demonstrated in Chapter Two has also contributed to the growth 
of groups by both allowing them to expand their holdings and by making it more difficult for 
smaller groups to compete.  
A representative example of this difficulty is Kelly Broadcasting, a family-owned station 
group whose third generation of owners held two television stations and a Local Marketing 
Agreement in 1998.99 In debt from a recent consolidation of ownership, Kelly was suddenly 
faced with an inability to acquire programming, as large station groups negotiated deals with 
syndicators for many markets at a time. “We had to get big or get out, and we were not in a 
position to get big” said Greg Kelly, describing the situation. As a result, the group sold one 
station and the LMA to Hearst-Argyle Television and the other station to Meredith Broadcasting 
at a sizeable profit (Higgins 1998).  
The increasing size and power of station groups as they rushed to meet each new 
maximum limit set by the FCC, in combination with the industry’s significant barriers to new 
entry, contributed greatly to the centralizing momentum in ownership of television stations. 
Statistics drawn from yearly industry indexes illustrate this centralization, as group ownership of 
commercial television stations increased steadily from 40.1% in 1955 to 73.3% in 1983 (1984, 
                                                 
98 Partnerships spread the cost of acquisition over a larger number of individuals, but place the personal assets of 
those involved at risk. Taxes are assessed at the individual’s tax rate. Corporations are legal entities in their own 
right, protecting the assets of those involved with them, and are ultimately taxed at a lower rate. Another ownership 
option which is virtually unused in present day television broadcasting is the sole proprietorship, where one 
individual holds full ownership of the station without the asset protection afforded by a corporation or the benefit of 
monies from other investors. Barry L. Sherman, Telecommunications Management: Broadcasting/Cable and the 
New Technologies (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1995), 175-176.  
99 A Local Marketing Agreement is an organizational structure which allows a group to control a station it does not 
own. This will be explained in greater detail later in the chapter.  
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60). The process of centralization continued under deregulation as well. In a study tracing shifts 
in small market media ownership during broadcast deregulation, Todd Chambers examined 52 
metropolitan statistical areas, ranking from the 222nd largest such area in the country to the 273rd 
largest. One of the changes he demonstrated was a comprehensive transition from local 
ownership to absentee ownership. In 1972, 60 owners accounted for 62 stations in those markets; 
43 of them were absentee owners, and 17 were local. Twenty-six years later in 1998, 107 owners 
accounted for 112 stations; however, the number of local owners had increased by only four to 
21, while the number of absentee owners had jumped to 87.100 As an overall rule, the study 
found that the number of total media outlets in each market increased during the time period, 
with an average reduction of one owner per market (Chambers 2003, 48-50, 55).  
4.2.1 Buying, Selling, Trafficking, and Valuing Television Stations 
Logically, one key component of this centralizing momentum in television station ownership is 
the actual buying and selling of television stations. This section will examine that process, which 
includes the participation of station brokers, regulatory issues, and questions of valuation. This 
section will also demonstrate the impact of regulatory changes on station valuation, and offer 
perspective on the growing gap between the largest groups and the rest of the industry in 
demonstration of this centralizing momentum.  
There are two potential motives behind an entity’s decision to purchase a television 
station: to profit by operating the station, or to profit by reselling the station. The choice to profit 
                                                 
100 A more dramatic shift in the same direction occurred in both newspaper ownership and radio ownership during 
the same time period. Additional statistics: Todd Chambers, "Structural Changes in Small Media Markets," The 
Journal of Media Economics 16, no. 1 (2003): 50. 
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by operating the station usually involves the expectation of increasing revenues through more 
efficient operation, which traditionally leads to centralization of operations and its associated 
economies of scale. The choice to profit by resale is most often an effort to improve the station in 
the short term, and then take the tax-advantaged capital gain from quickly selling the improved 
station at a profit. This latter case has been one of special concern for the FCC, which in the 
early 1960s instituted an “anti-trafficking” rule requiring an owner to possess a station for three 
years before it could be sold or traded to another owner. The objection to the quick sale of 
stations was inspired by public interest concerns: companies looking to quickly resell would be 
less likely to commit to serving their community’s needs (Bates 1989, 317).101 In addition, 
regulations limiting ownership also served to stem the flow of stations changing hands by 
reducing the pool of potential buyers.  
Whether investing for the long term or attempting to quickly “flip” a station, a crucial 
factor in the transaction process is determining the value of a given station, a requirement that is 
often fulfilled by a broker. Station brokers have been part of the business of station transactions 
since 1946, with duties sometimes including arranging financing, often scouting out potential 
acquisitions for the station groups they represent, and almost always determining the value of 
broadcast stations.102 Prior to the 1960s, brokers generally calculated a sale price by multiplying 
the annual gross revenue of the station by 2.5, or by estimating a sale price as a multiple of the 
                                                 
101 Bates tested this assumption by comparing growth rates of long and short term held television stations for 
evidence of the short-term holders acting differently. He found no such connection. Benjamin J. Bates, 
"Deregulation and Station Trafficking," Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 33, no. 3 (1989). However, 
this evidence is far from decisive, as it measures only growth rates and offers no evaluation of the avowed public 
service efforts by different owners. While illuminative, it is ultimately inconclusive.   
102 The first media brokers were Howard Stark and the partnership of Jim Blackburn and Ray Hamilton. By 1962, 
Blackburn and Hamilton were the heads of separate brokerage companies and Richard Crisler had started one as 
well, and these four individuals were responsible for all but one of the broker-assisted sales of television stations in 
1960 and 1961, amounting to 18 stations and $62.1 million. All four brokers also acted as middlemen in the sale of 
radio stations. "The Station Brokers: Middlemen to TV's Millions," Television Magazine, April 1962, 76-77, 84.  
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net profit before taxes. A new formula became the popular choice in the early 1960s, one based 
upon a multiple of “cash flow,” defined as the total of a station’s net profit after depreciation and 
federal income tax, plus the depreciation amount. Even at this early time, however, brokers 
differed on the amount of the multiple, setting five times cash flow as an ideal, but generally 
accepting seven times cash flow and acknowledging that 10 times cash flow was the top limit in 
the early 1960s ("The Station Brokers" 1962, 79).103  
In addition to this financial formula based on cash flow, there are intangible assets which 
influence the value and resulting selling price of television stations. Studies by Levin examining 
television station sales between 1949 and 1970 determined that audience size, television 
households in the market, station age, and network affiliation were also useful determinants for a 
station’s value. Later studies confirmed that the brokers’ initial areas of focus, estimated revenue 
and cash flow, were also important factors in valuation, and a final study in 1976 concluded that 
actual revenue figures were more relevant than estimated figures. The last study affirmed two of 
Levin’s earlier beliefs, stating that network affiliation was desirable because it carried reduced 
risk, and maintained that younger stations were more valuable because their lack of history 
allowed for easier programming changes (Bates 1988, 6; Marcus 1986, 12).  
Changes in FCC regulations altered the environment for station valuation during the first 
phase of deregulation. In 1982, the FCC changed its anti-trafficking rule, allowing owners who 
did not receive their license through a comparative hearing process (those who acquired the 
station from a previous owner, rather than a new application) to sell stations without a minimum 
                                                 
103 Even though it is the dominant means by which the industry computes and discusses station valuation, multiples 
are far from perfect. Benjamin Bates cautions that the use of multiples assumes a great number of things, including 
consistency in profits over time, which makes this formula somewhat unpredictable. He offers many other 
approaches to station valuation in addition to multiples. See: Benjamin J. Bates, "Valuation of Media Properties," in 
Media Economics: Theory and Practice, ed. Alison Alexander, James Owers, and Rod Carveth (Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1993), 106-109. 
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holding time. Three years later, the FCC relaxed the multiple ownership restrictions as well, 
eliminating the regional separation of 100 miles between an entity’s stations and allowing for 
ownership up to 12 stations whose combined maximum audience reach could not exceed 25% of 
the national audience (Krasnow and Shepard 1985, 20).104 These changes inspired a 
reexamination of the factors involved in station valuation. Benjamin Bates analyzed station sales 
between 1973 and 1986 in order to determine whether these policy changes influenced station 
prices. Bates contradicted one finding of the 1976 study at the outset, predicting that in fact older 
stations would be more valuable because of dominant channel positions and a “track record” of 
profitability. He hypothesized that the 1982 FCC decision would increase the supply of stations, 
leading to a decrease in valuation, whereas the 1985 decision would increase demand and 
therefore increase prices. His results confirmed his initial beliefs. He noted, however, that 
investigation over a longer term would probably be necessary to determine the ultimate impact of 
deregulation on station prices (Bates 1988, 8-10, 18-20). 
The fluctuation in the multiple used in station valuation confirms the influence of 
regulatory decisions on station trading. As Table 1 indicates, Bates’ hypotheses about the 
deregulatory moves in 1982 and 1985 were confirmed by the 2-4 point multiple increase in 1985. 
Changing multiples also reflected many other industry developments, and a combination of 
factors accounted for the lowered multiples at the start of the 1990s. First, there was a general 
economic slowdown. A second factor of concern for broadcasters was the 1989 decision by 
WPBF-TV to become the first affiliate to pay a network for programming, reversing the 
economic model of network compensation to stations which dated to the start of network 
                                                 
104 Audience reach is calculated based on the total number of households in the market, not on the number of 
households the station generally reaches. In other words, each station is counted as if it has a 100% share of the 
market’s audience. 
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television. Such compensation generally accounted for 4 to 5% of a station’s total revenue. 
WBPF’s arrangement with ABC to pay the network for an affiliation was seen at the time as 
having the potential to depress multiples in the future (Newcomb 1989). Finally, market 
encroachment by cable combined with uncertainty over the future profitability of the industry in  
the face of new technologies combined to hold down multiples through 1993 (Foisie 1993c).   
 
Table 2: Broadcast Multiples By Year 
 
Year Multiple Year Multiple
1983-1984 11-13 1997 14 
1985 15 1998 15-18 
1986 12-13 1999 13-14 
1987 13 2000 13 
1988 10-12 2001 12 
1989 10-14 2002 12-15 
1991 - 1993 8 2003 11-13 
1994 8-10 2004 10-14 
1995 12-15 2005 14 
1996 12-16 2006 13-16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Broadcasting, Broadcasting & Cable, Mediaweek 105
                                                 
105 Table information was taken from several sources. 1983-1985:"The Method Behind the Multiples," 
Broadcasting, 13 May 1985, 56. 1986-1987: Peter Newcomb, "Negative Ratings," Forbes, 6 February 1989. 1988-
1989: "BFM: Taking Care of Business," Broadcasting, 17 April 1989, 65. 1991: Geoffrey Foisie and Matt Stump, 
"Valuing the Big Three: Telcos Get Bigger.," Broadcasting, 19 August 1991, 19. 1992: "Cosmos Broadcasting 
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 In 1995, multiples rose sharply as demand outpaced supply with the addition of three 
new national networks, WB, UPN, and Bud Paxson’s Infomall television network, which 
competed for station acquisitions over the succeeding three years (Brown 1998, 34-35; West and 
McClellan 1995). 1998’s multiple increased as existing and prospective group owners responded 
to the FCC’s new duopoly rules. The new regulations allowed one entity to own two stations in a 
given market as long as two conditions were met. First, only one of the two stations could be in 
the top 4 stations ranked by total audience share. Second, eight or more “voices” must remain in 
the market after the purchase, with a “voice” defined as a full power, operational, and 
independently owned station. The demand for stations was tempered, however, by differing 
expectations of the benefits of duopoly by potential sellers and buyers. The sellers focused on 
reduced expenses and increased selling power, and asked for multiples in the 18-20 range in 
many cases, similar to the multiples received by sellers of duopoly radio stations. 
Potential buyers were more conservative, offering 12-13 times cash flow, unwilling to 
overreach because the specific benefits of the duopoly structure had yet to be proven (Higgins 
and McClellan 2000, 25). The 15-18 range of multiples indicated by several sales that year holds 
up as a meeting place for the different viewpoints. Finally, the 2002 upwards tick in multiples is 
attributable to another relaxation in ownership regulations by the FCC, allowing duopolies in 
                                                                                                                                                             
Corp. To Sell," Broadcasting, 29 June 1992. 1993: Geoffrey Foisie, "TV Station Logjam Begins to Break," 
Broadcasting & Cable, 26 April 1993. 1994: Eric Schmuckler, "TV Station Values Continue to Rise," Mediaweek, 7 
February 1994. 1995: "Tsp TVs Go for 12 Times Cash Flow," Broadcasting & Cable, 24 April 1995, Don West and 
Steve McClellan, "What's Going on (Interview with Steven Rattner, Part 1)," Broadcasting & Cable, 18 September 
1995. 1996: Elizabeth A. Rathbun, "Tribune's Renaissance," Broadcasting, 8 July 1996. BBBB 1997: Sara Brown, 
"Living Large in 1997," Broadcasting & Cable, 3 February 1998, 34-35. 1998: Sara Brown, "Hearst-Argyle Picks 
up Pulitzer," Broadcasting & Cable, 1 June 1998. 1999: Elizabeth A. Rathbun, "The King of KRON," Broadcasting 
& Cable, 22 November 1999, 26. 2000: Elizabeth A. Rathbun, "Liberty Exits Insurance," Broadcasting & Cable, 26 
June 2000. 2001: John M. Higgins, "Are TV Values Winding Down?" Broadcasting & Cable, 15 October 2001, 30. 
2002: Dan Trigoboff, "Less Is More," Broadcasting & Cable, 8 April 2002. AAAA 2003: John M. Higgins, "Acme's 
Got No Debt," Broadcasting & Cable, 6 January 2003. 2004: Miller, "On Hold: Rankings Change Little as 
Regulatory Uncertainty Keeps Station Trading in Neutral." 2005: John M. Higgins, "Are They Worth It?" 
Broadcasting & Cable, 12 September 2005. 2006: John M. Higgins, "Nice Price," Broadcasting & Cable, 20 
February 2006.  
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some markets where less than eight voices would remain, and in anticipation of additional 
relaxations due to an FCC review process begun that year. 
 The changing multiples demonstrate the intricate interaction between regulation 
and the economics of ownership in television broadcasting. Further, the specific events which 
cause positive variance point always towards centralization, as each new opportunity for 
consolidation is met with a corresponding increase in the multiple, indicating a greater demand 
for stations by those who are not blocked by the many barriers to entry; namely, those station 
groups who are already in the game.  
The centralizing momentum on the whole is perhaps rendered most clear when 
considering the purchase of entire station groups, rather than single television stations. Howard 
observed that between 1995 and 1997, 40 existing groups were absorbed through mergers and 
acquisitions and only 20 new groups entered the industry, resulting in a lower number of groups 
and a higher number of stations per owner. The newest groups typically only owned a minimal 
number of stations (1997, 26-27). These mergers and acquisitions consolidated power in the 
hands of the biggest owners. In 1998, the top 25 station groups owned or controlled 36% of 
commercial television stations, a 3% increase from 1997 and a dramatic jump from 25% in 1996 
(Brown 1998a). Table 2 shows the top 15 station groups in December 2005 and the 
corresponding mergers and acquisitions of other groups between 1995 and 2005, and also 
includes ABC’s merger with Capital Cities in 1985.  
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Table 3: Station Groups Buying Station Groups 
Group            FCC%    Total% Group Acquired/ Merged 
 1    Viacom                38.90        43.35 Westinghouse (1997), UPN (1996) 
 2    Fox  38.27        44.97 Chris-Craft (2001), New World (1996) 
 3    NBC Universal    33.99        39.08 Universal (2003), Telemundo (2002) 
 4    Paxson                 31.59        63.18  
 5    Tribune                30.24        40.58 Times-Mirror (2000), Renaissance (1997) 
 6    ABC                    23.55        23.79 Capital Cities (1985) 
 7    Univision             22.88        43.90 USA Broadcasting (2001) 
 8    Gannett                17.89        18.06 Multimedia (1995) 
 9    Trinity          17.10        34.20  
10    Hearst-Argyle     16.35        17.67 Pulitzer (1998), Hearst/Argyle Merge (1997) 
11    E.W. Scripps       14.14        22.09  
12    Belo Corp.           13.26        13.98 Providence Journal (1996) 
13    Sinclair              12.82        22.58 Heritage (1998), MaxMedia (1998), Sullivan 
(1998) 
14    Cox                     10.13        10.26  
15    Clear Channel       8.68        12.58 Ackerly (2002) 
Source: Broadcasting & Cable 106
 
The data in the table emphasize the centralizing momentum described by Howard, as 
station groups maneuvered to become maximum owners under the percentage of audience 
calculation, as they had with each previous increase in the maximum limit. Of the top 15 groups 
by audience reach in April 2005, 11 had acquired or merged with other groups to increase their 
holdings. Of the four others, Scripps and Cox relied on slow growth over time to increase their 
                                                 
106 The companies are ranked by FCC calculations of their audience coverage, which discounts UHF stations by 
50%. The Total % is the Nielsen calculation which does not include this discount, considering UHF stations to have 
full access to the market via broadcast and cable delivery. The percentages are drawn from: Bill McConnell, "Top 
25 Station Groups," Broadcasting & Cable, 18 April 2005. The group acquisition information was drawn from a 
variety of industry trade magazines.    
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holdings, while Paxson and Trinity relied on strategic purchases of duopolies and undervalued 
UHF stations which nonetheless accessed their entire markets via cable must-carry regulations. 
The disparity between the FCC% and the Total% figures for these two groups indicates their 
extensive UHF holdings.  
The preceding analyses of fluctuating valuations which indicate moments of demand and 
the economic model used by station groups to expand their reach by purchasing other groups are 
illustrative of the constant trend towards centralization of ownership and the desire of station 
groups to push towards maximum ownership levels. As they near the maximum levels, many 
groups engage in “trading up,” selling stations which are not part of duopolies or regional 
clusters to free up space and capital to acquire stations which better enhance their bottom line. 
Examples in 2006 of this trend included NBC’s efforts to sell four stations; Raycom’s plans to 
purchase Liberty Broadcasting and sell 12 of the acquired stations which lie outside the bounds 
of its regional broadcast model; and Viacom, which has sold former UPN stations in markets 
where it did not also own a CBS affiliate (Higgins and Romano 2006). The efforts to achieve 
better strategic positions in order to more fully exploit the possibilities of group ownership points 
to the next important factor in consolidation, the benefits to be gained by becoming a large group 
owner of television stations.      
4.3 THE MANY BENEFITS OF BIGNESS 
Economist Richard E. Caves offers a summary of the economic benefits of “bigness” in 
Switching Channels. Group ownership offers the opportunity for operating economies in 
management, business tasks, and sales. A second advantage can occur if the group owns several 
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affiliates of the same network, offering opportunities for increased cooperation as the group 
embraces the needs of the network. In addition, station groups have been used as the launching 
platform for several new startup networks. A third advantage arises in the area of programming, 
as station groups can either use their buying power to increase their leverage with syndicators, or 
instead produce their own syndicated fare for use on their group stations and for external sale. 
Finally, station groups can use their size to achieve economies of scale in station operation as 
well (Caves 2005, 214-218). This section will briefly address each of the first three areas in order 
to show the many economic advantages which have inspired the industry to achieve new levels 
of consolidation and centralization, and the resulting changes in practice and organization; 
station operations will receive a detailed treatment in the section that follows. 
Management benefits are similar to those enjoyed by branch operations in other 
businesses. Centralized planning, corporate oversight, and the opportunity to leverage the 
knowledge and experiences of other television stations offer the large-group-owned station an 
advantage over one that is part of a smaller group (Marcus 1986, 11). In a 1974 study on decision 
making in station groups, researchers Patrick and Howard found that economic decisions were 
generally made at the corporate level, especially budgeting for operational and capital expenses, 
although specific purchasing decisions were often a shared responsibility of corporate and station 
personnel (1974, 467-469). The continued use of centralized planning and centralized control of 
economics is confirmed in the increased amount of corporate-level equipment purchases across 
multiple stations detailed in Chapter Three, as station groups leveraged both knowledge and 
buying power in the selection and purchase of equipment. 
An additional example of centralized efficiency is offered by exemplar station group 
Hearst-Argyle Television. Hearst-Argyle has long been an industry leader in using economies of 
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scale in innovative ways. One of the most useful examples of this is in Hearst-Argyle’s decision 
to implement a single brand in 1998 for all of its owned stations, distributing new graphics and 
sound packages across the group. The immediate cost savings achieved by using only one design 
effort was significant, and later efforts in promotion and improvements on the brand could be 
easily shared throughout the group with little local customization needed. In 2004, the group 
embraced this model again, using TAG Creative to develop common materials for its stations; 
simultaneously, the group investigated centralizing the majority of its graphics storage and 
production.  
Hearst-Argyle was also forward-thinking in its realization that websites would play an 
increasingly major role in promoting such a brand. In 1999 the group purchased 24% of Internet 
Broadcasting Systems, and used the partnership to design a common web portal design for all of 
its stations. Since that time, Hearst-Argyle has used the partnership to develop additional revenue 
streams which combine broadcasting content and internet delivery.107  
The second benefit of bigness described by Caves is a privileged relationship with both 
networks and syndicators. It is no surprise that station groups would tend towards similarity 
rather than diversity among their stations, and this holds true in regard to network affiliation as 
well. Eight of the top ten groups in Table 2 are owned by or have an ownership stake in a 
network operation. Hearst-Argyle, which has no ownership connection with a network, is the 
largest holder of ABC affiliates and the second largest holder of NBC affiliates. Gannett is the 
exception to the rule, possessing balanced holdings across the big three networks. For those 
without an ownership stake in a network, owning large numbers of network affiliates can give a 
                                                 
107 Other station groups have echoed this strategy, some of whom have contracted IBS to develop the web portion. 
In some markets, IBS serves both the Hearst-Argyle affiliate as well as competing stations, pointing to the continued 
oligopolistic nature of the industry as a whole.    
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group the ability to decide not to clear network programs in cities where its stations are located, 
affecting the network’s coverage and national ad rates. Group owners can use this power in 
negotiating station compensation, network programming, and program scheduling (Marcus 1986, 
11). One notable example of this privileged network relationship existed in the mid-1990s, with 
Ronald Pearlman’s purchase of New World Productions and SCI Television. Initially, Pearlman 
planned to use the SCI stations as a platform for programs produced by New World. However, in 
1994 the entire group simultaneously switched affiliations to Fox in exchange for a $500 million 
payment and the promise that the network would buy several New World programs (McClellan 
1995). At the launch of the United Paramount Network in 1994, Chris-Craft made a similar deal, 
agreeing to commit all six of its independent stations to affiliations with the new network, 
supplementing Paramount’s four owned-and-operated stations ("Race to Be the Fifth" 1993).  
Instead of simple affiliation agreements, some station groups have either created their 
own networks or acquired partial ownership of networks seeking programming clearance on their 
stations. The 1994 debut of the WB network provided a representative example of partial 
ownership, with its deal to use six independent Tribune stations as its broadcast base ("Race to 
Be the Fifth" 1993). In exchange, Tribune received a 12.5% initial stake in the WB network, 
with the option to increase that holding to 25% by 1998. In 2006, Tribune owned 22 % of the 
WB network, and negotiated to trade that ownership stake in exchange for 10-year affiliations 
for 16 of its stations when the WB and UPN merged into the new CW network (McClellan and 
West 1996, 22; Romano 2006). A slightly different approach to networking propelled the station 
group owned by Lowell “Bud” Paxson, co-founder of the Home Shopping Network. Paxson 
purchased struggling and primarily UHF independent TV stations in order to create a television 
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network dedicated to infomercials and long-form advertising, demanding must-carry obligations 
from cable systems to increase the stations’ reach (Zier 1995). 
Syndicators see station groups as an easy way to clear their programming in multiple 
markets with a single contract, reducing the difficulty of getting a program on the air in as many 
markets as possible. Examples of these sorts of deals include Fox Television, which acquired 
King of Queens for all of its owned and operated stations (O&Os) in 2003, and CBS, which did 
the same thing for its O&O stations in 2002, acquiring the syndicated daily Who Wants to Be a 
Millionaire. A non-network example is again offered by Tribune, which used its group power to 
make an early buy for Friends in syndication two years in advance of its syndication date.  
Another advantage of group ownership is the ability to produce programming for use 
across the group. Tribune Entertainment produced programming for internal use and for the 
larger syndication market in the mid-1990s, including Geraldo and Soul Train, which were made 
economically viable by their guaranteed clearance on the Tribune owned stations (McClellan and 
West 1996, 22, 24). In 1993, E.W. Scripps followed a similar route, opening Scripps Howard 
Productions, and five other broadcast groups joined together to form the Partner Stations 
Network (PSN).108  Both were formed to produce television programming beyond the resources 
of their local stations. PSN planned to focus on unscripted shows such as talk, game, reality, and 
relationship programs (Kaufman 1993b). All of these examples show the benefits afforded by 
having a guaranteed number of stations willing to clear the programming, which effectively 
reduces the cost of program creation for each station in the group.  
                                                 
108 LIN Television, Malrite Communications, Pappas Telecasting Company, Providence Journal Broadcasting, and 
River City Broadcasting. 
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4.4 CHANGING STRUCTURES, CHANGING PRACTICES, AND ECONOMIES OF 
SCALE 
The combination of the overall economic operation of the industry which has resulted in an 
increased frequency of station transactions and the specific economic benefits derived from 
owning many television stations has fundamentally transformed the structure of the television 
broadcasting industry. Centralization of ownership in the hands of fewer, larger groups has 
increased from year to year, and these groups pursue economies of scale in all aspects of their 
business in an effort to profit from their size, as demonstrated in the previous sections. The place 
where the station groups achieve the greatest results is in the operation of their local television 
stations, invoking new structures in an effort to cut costs and increase revenues. These structural 
changes redefine the way that local television stations operate, and as a result influence the 
programming that the stations offer.  
Structural changes at the station group level are driven by two major efforts: reducing 
costs by eliminating perceived redundancies or inefficiencies, and achieving greater profits by 
pursuing sources of revenue complementary to over-the-air broadcasting. In both of these efforts, 
the ability to leverage the ownership and/or control of multiple stations is a defining factor, and 
the key to both is operational changes within and among stations to allow for peak operating 
efficiency. New structures such as Local Marketing Agreements, local stations acquiring “extra” 
channels on local cable systems, duopolies, centralcasting, hubbing, clustering, and multi-
channel operation in the digital environment are all examples of structural opportunities for 
multi-station owners to invoke cost saving economies of scale and acquire new revenues. 
Specific models to be examined include two of the three exemplar groups, which provide 
excellent illustrations of leveraging group ownership and control to achieve new efficiencies.    
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4.4.1 Local Marketing Agreements 
Local broadcasters casting about for an opportunity to both achieve economies of scale and 
additional streams of revenue found happiness through the use of the LMA.109 This 
organizational arrangement entered radio broadcasting in early 1991, allowing for an 
underperforming station (“A”) to lease some or all of its programming time to another station 
(“B”). Station B then used its personnel to sell and program the time leased from station A. This 
arrangement allowed station A to cut staff and operating expenses significantly while still 
making some revenue from the time leased to station B. Station B benefited by adding a new 
revenue stream at minimal cost due to the use of economies of scale (Sherman 1995, 172). The 
LMA was quickly embraced by both radio and television broadcasters as a new means by which 
to profit. 
Unquestionably, Sinclair Broadcasting is the company which most effectively leveraged 
this organizational structure. Sinclair President David Smith described broadcasting in a 1996 
interview: “There’s nothing complicated about it. The business is consolidating. There are going 
to be fewer and fewer players. Our objective is to be one of the survivors – period, end of 
discussion.” According to Smith, LMAs “[change] economies of scale in terms of the day-to-day 
operation. [They] provide us with some purchasing opportunities to buy product cheaper than we 
would have otherwise.” These economies of scale benefit traffic, operations, and engineering 
departments, according to Smith (Jessell and Rathbun 1996, 28). 
Sinclair’s first LMA was initiated in September 1991, and consummated three months 
later. It began with the sale of Pittsburgh independent WPTT to its station manager, who signed 
                                                 
109 LMAs are variously referred to as “Local Marketing Agreements,” “Lease Management Agreements,” and 
“Local Market Agreements,” depending on the article or author.  
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an agreement to carry the Home Shopping Network. Simultaneously, Sinclair purchased WPGH 
in Pittsburgh, and three months later WPGH signed an agreement to lease 13 hours of 
programming time a day from WPTT (Foisie 1993a). Two years after initiating their first deal, 
Sinclair and Edwards (the station manager who purchased WPTT) acted to acquire separate 
stations from ABRY Communications and Gaylord which would allow them to again partner for 
LMAs in Milwaukee and Baltimore (Foisie 1993b). By 1995, Sinclair was involved in four 
LMAs, with its biggest acquisition just around the corner.  
Sinclair’s decision to merge with River City Broadcasting LP in 1996 was clearly an 
effort to develop new LMAs. In the deal, Sinclair arranged to acquire the 10 television stations 
owned by River City one station at a time, allegedly to spread out the cost of the transaction. In 
markets where both River City and Sinclair held stations, Sinclair sold its holdings to Glencairn, 
Ltd. to avoid running afoul of the FCC’s prohibition against television duopolies. The parties’ 
independence in that transaction was suspect, however, given that majority ownership of 
Glencairn belonged to the mother of Sinclair’s controllers, David Smith and his three brothers. 
Carolyn C. Smith owned 97% of Glencairn in non-voting interests, which made them non-
attributable by FCC standards. Coincidentally, in 1995 Sinclair “acquired options from certain 
stockholders of Glencairn” to purchase a 97% equity in that company for $5,000 (Rathbun 
1996a).  
In its 1997 annual report, Sinclair called itself a “consolidator” which “consistently 
demonstrated [its] ability to combine synergies of revenue and expense, economies of scale and 
programming leverage to effectively integrate [its] acquisitions and rapidly improve 
margins”(1998, 4). In that report, Sinclair confirmed its commitment to actively pursuing LMAs 
whenever possible. In 1999, the year in which the FCC gave the go ahead to limited duopolies in 
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television, the group operated 25 LMAs which were often referred to by others as “back-door 
duopolies.” 
Sinclair was not the only station group focusing on LMAs, but it was definitely the most 
aggressive in its pursuit of the additional revenue streams and operating economies that the new 
structure offered. As the potential for relaxation of duopoly rules appeared on the horizon in the 
late 1990s, the group continued to pursue stations which would put them in position to convert to 
duopolies in as many markets as possible.  
4.4.2 Extra Cable Channels: Precursor to Multicasting 
The FCC’s adoption of the 1992 Cable Act further opened doors for broadcasters to implement 
centralized operational structures and economies of scale via regulation of the cable industry. 
Local stations could actively define their relationship to local cable systems by choosing a “must 
carry” option or a “retransmission consent” option at three year intervals. Selection of the second 
option required broadcasters and cable systems to negotiate an agreement permitting the cable 
system to use their signal. In many cases, broadcasters used this negotiation as an opportunity to 
acquire an “extra” station on the cable system.  
 A 1993 editorial on the topic offered two reasons for stations to use the additional cable-
only channel for news content. First, local news had long been local stations’ best moneymaker. 
Second, that profit came at a hefty cost, because news operations were expensive to run. The 
editorial stressed that the cable channel could be used to repurpose existing news content from 
the main station, effectively spreading the overhead across both outlets and generating profits 
from each  (Merrell 1993). Early adopters of this idea included Multimedia’s WBOR in 
Knoxville, TN, Jefferson Pilot’s WWBT in Richmond, VA, and Chronicle Publishing’s KRON-
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TV in San Francisco. WBOR planned to launch its 24-hour news channel by April 1994, in 
partnership with Scripps Howard’s cable system. KRON planned its 24-hour news channel 
launch in summer 1994, as did WWBT in partnership with two local cable systems. All three 
stations expected to start the new cable stations with minimal investment, supplementing their 
existing equipment and personnel only to the minimum extent necessary (Kurz 1993). This 
economic model mirrored one which had already been proven valid by CNN’s success: take a 
high-fixed-cost asset (such as a news gathering operation) and use it to produce a great deal of 
programming; once the system is in place, adding an additional broadcast, whether on the same 
outlet or an additional one, costs comparatively little (Owen and Wildman 1992, 178). 
The first station to actually debut the second channel was Cox Broadcasting’s WPXI in 
Pittsburgh. In partnership with TCI, the Pittsburgh Cable News Channel (PCNC) was launched 
on January 1, 1994, carried on cable systems with 270,000 combined subscriptions. The cable 
channel simulcast and rebroadcast all of the local station’s news programs, and WPXI produced 
the market’s only 10pm newscast exclusively for PCNC. Planned expansion by 1996 would 
bring the channel to over 750,000 cable subscribers ("Pioneer Local All-News Channel" 1994).   
In 1995 and 1996, just in time for the second round of retransmission decisions, 
broadcasters were again encouraged to negotiate an additional channel, this time by the WB 
network. In partnership with stations operated by Benedek, Smith, Retlaw, and several other 
station groups, the WB put together a package of programming called the WeB that local stations 
would use to create an LMA-style setup on their local cable systems. Local stations would 
negotiate the arrangement with their cable systems and sell advertising on the channel, and were 
further encouraged to provide local programming. The WB network provided its programming 
as well as syndicated programming to the channels. Under the WeB plan, cable systems received 
 213 
between 7.5% and 10% of the gross advertising sales, and the network and local station split the 
balance (McClellan 1997). 
These cable channels are significant in several ways. First, they were instituted with 
either no additional staff or minimal additional staff, both reinforcing the desire for maximum 
efficiency and setting standards of minimal costs for similar expansions by other groups. Second, 
this early implementation of multi-channel operation demonstrated the feasibility of such a 
model and previewed later structural choices for stations. Finally, the emphasis on repurposing 
of existing content, the choice of news as a profitable form of repurposed programming, and the 
addition of new revenue streams for the local station would figure strongly in decisions on 
structure and content from this time forward.  
4.4.3 Duopolies 
Broadcasters broached the issue of television duopoly as early as 1992, forcing the FCC to weigh 
the costs and benefits of allowing UHF-UHF and UHF-VHF combinations in some markets. The 
economic argument for this structure was twofold. First, broadcasters claimed, the fragmentation 
of audience resulting from cable and satellite television necessitated multiple revenue streams in 
order to assure profitability; a second station in a given market would provide such assurance. 
Second, in medium sized markets where the addition of a new independent station wasn’t 
economically viable, the economies of scale afforded by duopoly would allow an owner 
currently in the market to add one (Flint 1992b, 4). ABRY Communications offered a breakdown 
of the costs of station operation in the 30th market to prove the benefits of duopoly. In summary: 
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Table 4: ABRY Communications Duopoly Calculations 
Item One Station Duopoly 
Program License Fees  $2,500,000 $4,500,000 
Production & Operations 800,000 1,000,000 
Promotion & Advertising 800,000 1,200,000 
Sales & Marketing 1,325,000 1,600,000 
General & Administration                  800,000 1,200,000 
Source: (Flint 1992a) 
 
The total expenses associated with one station amounted to $6,225,000, but an owner could 
operate two stations as a duopoly for only 52% more, offering a substantial cost savings to the 
broadcaster (Flint 1992a, 23).  
In 1999, the FCC made the broadcasters’ dream a reality, and as described previously 
allowed duopolies in any market where at least 8 “voices” would remain. At the time of this 
ruling, the FCC indicated that LMAs were de facto duopolies, and set a deadline of August 6, 
2001 for any LMA established after November 5, 1996 to separate if it violated the new duopoly 
rule.110 In January 2002, 95 combos were operating of which 75 were duopolies (McConnell 
2002). As a result of the FCC’s position on LMAs, many groups moved quickly to convert 
existing LMAs to duopolies, and started actively trading to acquire duopolies in other markets as 
well. At the start of 2006, Sinclair had 12 duopolies and 9 LMAs in operation, and was in a 
protracted legal battle over converting 4 of the LMAs to duopolies, challenging the FCC’s “eight 
voice” test in court (McConnell 2004). One innovative duopoly effort came from Fox Television, 
which after purchasing the Chris-Craft station group, embarked on a strategy to establish 
duopolies in markets where it owned regional sports networks. Fox quickly made deals with 
                                                 
110 Several exemptions were permitted in small markets for buying stations that were in bankruptcy or dark for four 
months, stations with total-day audience shares below a 4 and no out-of-market buyers interested in owning them, 
and for construction permits that were not yet built. Bill McConnell, "Duopolies: The Pair Necessities," 
Broadcasting & Cable, 21 January 2002. 
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Clear Channel and Viacom to establish duopolies in the hopes of being able to produce more 
locally oriented programming by merging the efforts of the duopoly and the sports network. In 
addition, Fox negotiated with syndicators to get multiple runs on both duopoly stations to create 
a cross-platform buy for advertisers (McConnell, et al. 2001, 5). This upset the standard 
exclusivity rights granted to a station with the purchase of syndicated product, but offered the 
syndicator larger audience numbers which would increase the sales price of barter spots included 
in the programs.111 The duopoly station benefited as well by having access to syndicated content 
it would have been blocked from due to those exclusivity rights (Ault 2001). 
The economies of scale and additional revenue streams offered by LMAs, duopolies, and 
multicasting with a cable channel influenced ownership trends, programming decisions, 
workflows and technical operations of local television stations across the country. Moreover, 
they created an opportunity in which to explore these new avenues of potential profit while 
refining their practices towards greater efficiency of operations; as Chapter Three demonstrated, 
these structures were both cause and effect of technical innovations which made those tasks 
easier. In turn, and combined with another regulatory relaxation, additional new structural 
arrangements to increase efficiency were rendered both possible and economically viable.   
4.4.4 Clusters, Hubs, and Centralcasting 
With the elimination of the rule requiring a 100-mile separation between owned stations that 
accompanied the duopoly legislation in 1999, the door was opened for groups to extend their 
                                                 
111 Television stations often pay for syndicated programming in two ways, one direct and one indirect. First, stations 
usually pay a fee to the syndicator to license the program. The indirect payment is in the form of “barter” spots, 
which are commercials already sold by the syndicator that arrive as part of the program, and which the broadcaster 
airs as part of the programming. Barter decreases the license fee, but also decreases the available inventory in the 
program for the broadcaster to sell.   
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economy of scale efforts beyond the boundaries of a single market. The groups did so by 
centralcasting, or controlling the programming of stations in multiple markets from a central 
location. There are two specific kinds of centralcasting, hubbing and clustering, which differ on 
geographic criteria: a cluster is made up of geographically proximate stations which do not share 
a market and a hub serves geographically distant stations.  
Whichever model is being used, hub or cluster, the ability to operate stations in multiple 
markets from a central location offers many levels of cost savings. The most obvious savings 
come from staff reduction. One master control operator can oversee the operation of several 
stations, given appropriate operations automation. Additional operational savings can be gained 
from centralized storage of programs and commercials, allowing duplicate tasks such as 
syndicated program recording and timing to be accomplished only once for all of the stations. 
Yet another layer of savings is offered by the reduction of capital monies spent on new facilities, 
which can be built without master control hardware installed. From an operations standpoint, 
centralcasting exists at the pinnacle of economy of scale savings.   
Clustering offers a number of extra benefits, and Cox Broadcasting’s Pittsburgh-centered 
cluster of NBC affiliates is an excellent example.112 First, the three NBC stations can share a 
single feed of programming, which in many cases can also include regional commercials, 
allowing for a reduction in labor costs. Under the hub system, the stations would have to trigger 
different regional commercials. Second, the cluster also allows the stations to act as news 
bureaus for one another, offering regional news more relevant to the market than spokes on a hub 
might provide. Finally, the regional nature of the cluster allows for less expense in 
                                                 
112 The cluster is made up of three NBC affiliates in three sequential markets, Steubenville, OH; Pittsburgh, PA; and 
Johnstown, PA. It is interesting to note that, although the various divisions of Cox Enterprises claim independent 
operation, the cable business of Cox Communications also arranged itself in regional clusters dating back to at least 
1996, as shown in its annual reports.  
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interconnecting the stations, which often can use line of sight microwave technology in place of 
more expensive fiber.     
Centralcasting also acts as a conceptual model for the multicast operations of digital-
stations-to-be. As demonstrated in Chapter Three, since 1990 many new digital products have 
addressed the possibility of multi-channel operation, with automation, disk playback, and video 
switchers all offering multiple streams of output for the broadcaster. In turn, these technologies 
helped to frame broadcasters’ choices about structure as they considered the benefits of multi-
channel operation and the economies of scale it could provide. In 2006, on the cusp of the final 
switch to digital broadcasting, virtually every station operator is thinking along the lines of 
partial-day multicasting, providing a multiplex of at least 4 standard-definition channels out of 
each local station’s digital bandwidth. This option offers additional revenue streams, but the 
challenge is how to accomplish such a task at the lowest cost possible, and centralcasting is the 
answer for many broadcasters.  
Taken as a whole, these examples of new operating and ownership structures which 
exists across the television broadcasting industry illustrate the second truth of the chapter, that 
structure changes practice. The implementation of LMAs, acquisition of additional cable 
channels, and the formation of duopolies have forced changes in workflow as station groups 
grapple with putting economies of scale in place. LMA operations and cable channels created the 
need for new and more efficient workflows to utilize the second revenue stream without adding 
additional expense to the process. The relaxation of the duopoly prohibition took those efforts a 
step further, allowing station groups to physically and operationally combine television stations 
within a market. An increased maximum allowance for ownership of stations permitted further 
economies of scale, this time on a regional basis, as stations consolidated their positions in 
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various areas, which led to centralcasting hubs and clusters. Finally, all of these set valuable 
precedents for considering the transition to the multi-channel operation that most stations will 
employ for their digital stations.113  
The influence of the increasingly centralized structure of local television broadcasting on 
operational practices is made most clear as stations approach the switch to digital television and 
embrace new operational and ownership structures to protect and enhance their profitability. The 
opportunities available to enhance the public service efforts of local television stations through 
multicasting are enormous. Theoretically, every local station now has the opportunity to provide 
four times as much programming at a drastically reduced cost per channel than the single 
channel it is currently operating, made possible by advances in technology and regulatory 
relaxation. However, as Coase pointed out in Chapter Two, broadcasters are more likely to act in 
their own financial interest than on the public’s behalf. This truth is evidenced by the immediate 
use of news on an “extra” channel as inexpensive programming designed to attract and maintain 
an audience, rather than a public service in exchange for use of the public’s airwaves which 
entails financial sacrifice on the part of the broadcaster.   
 
 
                                                 
113 It is interesting to note that the WB network had planned to acquire “digital affiliates” in markets where they did 
not already have a broadcast or WeB cable affiliate, using one of the station’s multi-channels to carry WB 
programming. UPN was planning to do the same. The new “CW” network arising from the announced merger of the 
WB and UPN has not specified its intentions in this regard as of February 2006.    
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5.0  COMMODIFYING THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
There is no suggestion here that networks or individual stations should operate as 
philanthropies.... But I can find nothing in the Bill of Rights or the 
Communications Act that says that they must increase their net profits each year, 
lest the Republic collapse.  -- Edward R. Murrow114
 
 
The previous chapters have detailed the many ways that economics, structure, and practice have 
changed since the humble beginnings of the broadcast industry. Changing regulations, advancing 
technology, and increasingly efficient business practices and modes of organization have resulted 
in dramatic changes in television news. Once primarily used in fulfillment of public interest 
obligations, broadcast news followed the model of print news before it, becoming increasingly 
commodified over time.115 In this final section, the project will illustrate the many changes 
wrought upon the product of local television news in response to changes in structure, 
interpretations of the public interest, and emergent technologies.    
Harvey Levin states the overarching issue well: “Broadcast regulation has from the very 
outset sought to sustain a diversified and balanced program service through licensing-allocation 
policies geared to alter industry structure and conduct” (Levin 1969, 452). The choice to directly 
regulate the local stations, rather than the networks or other program providers, for instance, has 
                                                 
114 Quoted in: Lawrence K. Grossman, "Murrow Said It All in 1958," Columbia Journalism Review  (2002). 
115 Clearly, news was used as a commodity in the hands of newspaper owners and of radio broadcasters. However, in 
the earliest days of television, the only reason many local station operators claimed to have newscasts was to fulfill 
their public service obligations.  
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effectively placed the burden of “public interest” squarely in the hands of the owners of local 
stations. However, it has generally not been in the broadcasters’ direct economic interest to meet 
this burden by offering informational programming. In a pure marketplace scenario, there is 
insufficient demand for such programming, especially that involving public affairs content. The 
theory of “rational ignorance” suggests that the return on the time invested in consuming public 
affairs programming is insufficient to motivate the consumer to watch. Other types of 
information, such as business, consumer, and entertainment information require the consumer to 
experience it first-hand in order to make use of it. In the case of public affairs information, a 
general lack of belief in consumers’ minds as to their ability to put the information to use 
restricts their demand for it (Hamilton 1996, 1181).116  Because of this fact, public affairs 
coverage is considered a “market failure.”117
Protracted public affairs programming was therefore largely rejected by broadcasters as a 
means to meet their public interest obligations, and beginning in the late 1940s many stations 
turned to local news to fulfill the FCC’s expectation for local public interest programming. Local 
news broadcasts through the 1950s used on-air talent from radio stations, and were generally 
limited to 15 minutes at six o’clock and 10 minutes at eleven o’clock. There were no network 
feeds, and the resulting broadcasts were mainly a talking head occasionally supplemented with 
infrequent pieces of film from a syndicated news service or station photographer. The content 
was generally compiled from wire service copy, public relations handouts, and press releases. 
                                                 
116 This conclusion is the result of a complicated formula: “(Benefit of Candidate A versus Candidate B) x (Increase 
in probability that voter makes the correct decision) x (Probability vote is decisive) – (Costs of becoming 
informed).” In short, the consumer feels that their vote doesn’t count, and as such, the effort is not worth the cost. 
Although the formula specifies political activity, I contend it applies equally to important local issues of public 
concern.  James T. Hamilton, "Private Interests in 'Public Interest' Programming: An Economic Assessment of 
Broadcaster Incentives," Duke Law Journal 45, no. 6 (1996): 1182. 
117 Educational programming for children, indecent programming, and violent programming also fall into this 
category, the latter two because of the potential for children to view them  Ibid.: 1184.  
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The show titles often included the sponsor’s name (Kaniss 1991, 102; Marcus 1986, 92). 
Although sponsorship paid part of the program’s costs, news in the 1940s and 1950s was almost 
universally a drain on station profits.  
While this minimal news model was the standard for many years, the space race, 
beginning with the Soviet Union’s successful launch of the Sputnik I orbiter in 1957, instilled a 
sense of worry in the country that reinforced the importance of information and educational 
programming in the minds of many government officials and industry leaders. CBS President 
Frank Stanton noted in two separate 1958 speeches the necessity for increased broadcast 
journalism efforts to serve the public, an ironic move considering that Stanton played a pivotal 
role in the economically-based elimination of Edward R. Murrow’s See It Now that same year. In 
the first speech, Stanton warned “we must ourselves take a fresh look at the public interest, 
convenience, and necessity, never forgetting that without devotion to this basic element of our 
charter, we can become just another industry.” In the second, Stanton positioned broadcasters as 
part of the overall press effort and as a public service, while acknowledging the economic 
aspects of the arrangement: “no matter how compelling the news may be, there simply is not 
enough time in a broadcast day to treat in detail the full panorama of news; not if we are to do 
the other jobs which we must do in order to make possible the fulfillment of our news functions” 
("Survival Hinges" 1958, 36-37). 
Stanton’s comments, whether they were sincere or simply a public relations effort, 
emphasized two important industry beliefs: news was a kind of public interest programming, and 
such programming did not pay the bills. Westinghouse Broadcasting was determined to change 
that arrangement, and began the annual Conference on Local Public Broadcasting in 1957 with 
the dual purpose of improving public service programming and improving the bottom line in that 
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category. The third Conference recommended that public service programming in primetime was 
the best option for increasing revenue and improving stations’ image with the public ("How to 
Make Public Service Pay" 1959). A 1959 study for Corinthian Broadcasting added support for 
the potential profitability of television news, finding that television news had a stronger impact 
on its audience than radio or newspapers. The research claimed to be impressed with the size of 
the television news audience and its interest in television news programming ("Why News" 
1959).  
In 1959, CBS News became the first “autonomous” network news division, created by 
the merging of the Public Affairs and News departments of the Programming division. In its 
1960 annual report, CBS emphasized the increasing importance and popularity of news 
programming, as well as its growing potential to draw significant sponsorship (Mickelson 1998, 
202). Network news in 1960 had expanded to include morning news programs and a Sunday 
evening broadcast. By 1961, the combination of President Kennedy’s unprecedented availability 
to the medium and the Cuban crisis had emphasized the value of news programming at the 
network level, and it would continue to increase through the tumultuous social environment of 
the 1960s.  
Local television news increased in importance along with the networks’ efforts. Near the 
end of 1961, local television stations were expanding the length of some local news broadcasts 
and adding news broadcasts in other parts of the schedule. These efforts received support from 
viewers, who watched local news programs in increasing numbers, and from sponsors, who were 
highly interested in accessing those viewers. The 1963 decision by NBC and CBS to increase 
their evening broadcasts to 30 minutes from 15 necessitated a matching increase on the part of 
local television stations, resulting in an hour-long block of evening news. News broadcasts at 
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10pm also began to appear on independent stations in the first half of the 1960s (Kroeger 1965, 
29). Even in this period of increasing news programming, however, regulators were concerned 
that broadcasters were not living up to their public interest obligations. Newton Minow in 1961 
issued his famous statement describing the industry as a “vast wasteland,” and urged 
broadcasters to do better in no uncertain terms: “Gentlemen, your trust accounting with your 
beneficiaries [the public] is overdue. Never have so few owed so much to so many.” Throughout 
his term as FCC Chairman, Minow championed the efforts of noncommercial broadcasters. He 
was also responsible for regulation requiring all television sets manufactured after 1962 to have a 
UHF receiver as well as VHF (Barnouw 1970, 196-201). Minow’s concerns would resurface a 
decade later, but in the meantime, there was profit to be made in news broadcasting.  
A 1965 study of 167 stations offered a baseline economic analysis of the local television 
news industry. According to that study, 56.3% of the stations offered at least 30 minutes of local 
news adjacent to the network evening news. 59% of stations were making a profit from local 
news, 21.5% were breaking even, and 19.3% were taking a loss from their news operations. 
Interviews included in the study indicated that most stations still viewed the news as a public 
service effort at this time, and approached it as a necessary task imposed by the FCC, accepting 
that news was generally not expected to pay its own way (Kroeger 1965, 30-31). Broadcasters 
did recognize, however, that they received less tangible benefits in the form of community 
goodwill from their news efforts.   
Another Television Magazine survey in 1966 confirmed the importance of local news:  
“prestigious, well-sponsored and widely viewed, news appears to have established itself as the 
bulwark of local programming, and from all indications, it will continue to grow.” In 1964, news 
accounted for 24.9% of the average station’s locally produced programming; by the time of the 
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survey in 1966, it had risen to 38.2% and local news accounted for fully 6.1% of the station’s 
total on-air schedule. 59% of stations included in the survey indicated that news was their highest 
rated local program (Hornberger 1966, 104, 111). As the 1960s drew to a close, broadcasters 
were beginning to understand the profit potential of news in larger numbers. 
By 1970, FCC concern about the growing trend towards profit instead of service in news 
broadcasting had returned in force. In a speech to the RTNDA, Commissioner Nicholas Johnson 
offered his views. “My thesis is a very modest and simple one,” Johnson began, continuing  
Management has the power, if it wishes to exercise it, to abuse the use of this 
medium by serving its own economic interests and the economic interests of its 
friends; it has the incentive to want to do this; and it has on occasion, done it. 
 
Johnson reinforced the point with a quote from a RTNDA Member. “The television documentary 
producer must fight… the pressures from advertisers and sales departments. More often than not, 
he has been fighting a losing battle” ("Johnson Cites News" 1970). 
Johnson’s concerns notwithstanding, it was during the 1970s that station managers finally 
and fully realized the profit value of local news. Local programs in general had an advantage 
over network programming because all of the commercial time belonged to the local station. In 
addition, news was less expensive to produce than most other forms of local programming. As a 
result, local stations again expanded the length of existing news programs and added new ones to 
the schedule in the mornings, noon, evenings, and weekends (Kaniss 1991, 102). This switch to a 
commodity concept on the part of upper management also resulted in an increased emphasis on 
the use of news consultants. In 1974, the biggest names in news consulting were Frank N. Magid 
Associates and McHugh and Hoffman, Inc. A RTNDA survey from that year found that these 
consultants offered similar advice on several topics designed to increase viewership. First, 
stations should emphasize interaction between their newscasters, including field reporters. 
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Second, they should use as many film segments as possible. Third, when not using film, stations 
must keep stories less than 30 seconds long. Finally, stations should emphasize “news about 
people” or human interest stories. Notable is the fact that none of these recommendations are of a 
journalistic variety; the stations were less interested at this time in the public interest aspect of 
newscasts than their profit potential. This truth is further reflected by the fact that in only 2.5% 
of the cases did the news director request consulting. The rest of the time, either the station 
manager or the corporate owner desired input from the consultants (Shelley 1974). The news 
consultants also embraced the “Eyewitness News” formula and spread it throughout the industry, 
as described in Chapter One. 
News expansion through the 1970s was aided and abetted by the switch to electronic 
journalism, allowing for faster and more dynamic integration of content from outside the studio. 
By 1975, 76% of news operations were profitable and 79% of them were expanding, having 
spent more on news than in the previous year (Stone 1975, 8-9). By 1978, estimates maintained 
that local news programming was responsible for between 40% and 60% of an average television 
station’s revenue. Such profitability led to high levels of competition, compelling stations to 
spend large amounts of money on new sets, new graphics systems and artists, and salaries of 
their main news anchors, who were often compensated “more in line with entertainers than news 
presenters” ("Special Report" 1978, 38).  
In economic terms, the market for television news was an oligopoly in 1980, as a small 
number of stations in a given market provided similar product and shared the audience. The 
oligopoly was preserved by consistently high profits for stations, high barriers to entry, and few 
innovations in pricing or products. The overall characterization of this time period is one where 
the stations engaged in cooperation to maximize overall profits, preserving the status quo. 
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However, the advent of cable and increasing numbers of television stations caused a change by 
the latter part of the decade to an economic model of monopolistic competition, defined as a 
large number of outlets producing very similar programming, news in this case (Powers 1990, 
37-40). 
The addition of new channels by cable or independent station entry, whether or not they 
were offering news product, drew viewers from the existing stations and upset the cooperative 
atmosphere. As cable systems and independents prospered, they added news programming and 
further eroded the audience share of the original stations (Powers 1990, 42-43). Stations 
responded to this changing economic structure in their market by engaging in product 
differentiation. They added unique stories, increased reporter live shots, and extended the length 
of newscasts (Powers 1990, 48-49). In doing so, they embraced a concept of “market-driven 
journalism.”118
The majority of the discussion about news in industry trade magazines during the 1980s 
no longer centered upon journalism or public service issues, except for the rare special issue. 
Instead, discussions of how to maximize the effectiveness of product sales – eyeballs tuning into 
the newscast – covered the pages of the trade magazines. This market focus resulted in a massive 
increase in promotional efforts. As early as 1982, “at virtually all of the more than 600 [network 
affiliate] stations in the United States, promotion of news has the highest priority…. [T]he station 
that is number one in news ratings is usually number one in overall ratings and in total dollar 
revenue” (Minnucci 1991, 156). It was the realization of this fact that prompted such extensive 
efforts on the parts of news broadcasters to improve the consumer appeal of their programs.  
                                                 
118 For an excellent discussion of market-driven journalism, see Brent MacGregor, Live, Direct, and Biased? Making 
Television News in the Satellite Age (New York: St. Marin's Press, 1997). 
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Achieving market leadership in news was the topic of a 1985 commentary by Group W 
executive Richard Sabreen, where he spelled out the ramifications of market-driven journalism. 
“A marketing approach demands that [broadcasters] treat a newscast as a consumer durable 
good, a commodity that a viewer ‘purchases’ by spending time watching it.” Sabreen 
recommended specific strategies for positioning a station’s news broadcasts in a way that would 
both appeal to the viewer and create an identity for the station based around its news product 
(1985). One year later, Tom Brokaw reinforced the truth of this commodified view of television 
news, even as he spoke against it: 
[T]he packaging is the final step; it should not be the motivation…. I worry that 
we have become hostage to these matters, that we are a profession so bedazzled 
by the technology available, so frantic in our determination to prevail in the short 
run that we have lost sight of the fundamental reason for our privileged place in 
this universe ("Broadcast Journalists Ask" 1986, 35).  
 
Market-driven journalism lived on despite Brokaw’s comments, and profit margins continued to 
rise throughout the decade. In 1983, 83% of stations reported that their news operations were 
making money or breaking even. Continued expansion was also indicated, with 77% of stations 
spending more on news that they did a year before (Stone 1983, 20). By 1985, the number of 
news operations making a profit or breaking even rose to 92% (Stone 1986). Shortly thereafter, 
the booming business of broadcast television news faced a new challenge as the overall 
economic climate brought financial concerns to the forefront. 
As with many things in television broadcasting, the first indication of the changing 
landscape was provided by the networks. The costs of their news broadcasting efforts, including 
documentaries and newsmagazines, amounted to $900 million in 1986. Unfortunately, the 
corresponding revenues resulted in a $70 million loss. This was not the first year that the 
network news operations had been in the red, but apparently network executives no longer found 
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such an arrangement acceptable, and they proceeded to cut costs by increasing efficiency and  
reducing staff. They also looked for ways to increase income through the development of new 
revenue streams ("The Shaky Symbiosis" 1987).  Local broadcasters faced the same concerns, as 
the number of stations making money or breaking even with news in 1986 decreased to 89.8%, 
the first such reduction since the start of Stone’s surveys (Stone 1987b, 9). Independents were 
the hardest hit, and for the first time in decades, the number of full time news employees at 
independent television stations decreased in 1986, and the industry as a whole reduced news staff 
the following year by an average of 1.2 full time employees and .6 part time employees (Stone 
1987a, 7; Stone 1988, 30). These staff reductions were made easier by new, lightweight field 
cameras which allowed a single technician to replace the 2-person technical crews of the past.  
By 1990, staff sizes had stabilized at levels slightly lower than those in 1986, and news 
profitability was again on the rise, a trend which would continue to the present day. However, 
the industry from this time forward was a changed place, where the attitude that privileged 
newsgathering over financial concerns which existed during the early days of news was 
abandoned. In its place, market-driven journalism ruled and efficiency became the standard for 
decisions on personnel, equipment, and news content. In service of this effort towards efficiency, 
several new practices were introduced, in many cases tied to larger organizational structures. 
5.1.1 Local News Efficiencies, Changing Structures, and Changing Content  
It would be untrue to say that the desire for efficiency sprang fully formed from the ether during 
the 1980s, however. Early efforts towards lessening the cost burden for local television news 
were offered by NBC and CBS in 1958. That year, NBC offered affiliates the rights to record 
film segments shown on its nightly news program on Kinescope or VTR and reuse the footage 
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for their own local purposes at a minimal cost, as long as they agreed to broadcast the network 
program. The network considered extending the recording rights to include its morning and 
evening news programs as well, and also debated allowing independent stations to purchase the 
rights. Previously, NBC had delivered film to affiliates via airplane, but that was discontinued 
due to its prohibitive cost. CBS still offered film to CBS Newsfilm affiliates by airplane delivery, 
and considered copying NBC’s plan and allowing Newsfilm subscribers to record the programs 
for free ("NBC, CBS to Sell" 1958).  
In 1961, the Television Affiliates Corporation was formed by Trans-Lux Corp. TAC 
planned to review local programs from across the country in an effort to build a library for its 
affiliate stations to draw from. The programming would be limited to cultural, informational, and 
educational topics; in other words, perfect fodder for fulfilling the stations’ public interest 
obligations on an inexpensive basis. TAC planned to keep about 17% of the license fees that 
affiliates would pay, turning the rest over to the stations which produced the programs ("New TV 
Markets" 1961). The following year, UPI also stepped forward to assist broadcasters with their 
efforts to serve the public, offering four weekly documentary series. The topics of the 1962 
series were varied, but stayed in the realm of news and information. The first detailed the history 
of Communism, and was produced in cooperation with Storer Broadcasting. The second series 
addressed a single news story in depth each week, co-produced with 20th Century Fox. The third 
and fourth series were a standard newsreel and a science news program ("UPI Expands" 1962). 
ABC joined the other networks in taking care of its affiliates’ news needs in 1964 with 
the debut of the ABC Daily Electronic Feed. The service allowed ABC affiliates to record a 
separate feed of programming transmitted via the network signal at 5pm each day ("The 
Blueprint " 1964). This, and the comparable NBC and CBS feeds, quickly formed the backbone 
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of local news operations’ coverage of non-local events; these feeds continue as video-on-demand 
for affiliates into the present day.     
Station groups were leveraging their size to both cut costs and improve news coverage as 
news expanded in the mid-1960s. Stations within groups considered one another sister stations, 
and often shared relevant news information. Network news divisions required a bureau in 
Washington, and many station groups followed their lead; in 1965, Westinghouse, Time-Life, 
Storer, and CBS’ O&Os (operated independently from the network’s news organization) had 
their own Washington bureaus (Kroeger 1965, 50).   
In 1980, the Independent Network News network was started with 30 affiliates. It was 
both a resource for stations doing local news, which could draw upon the network’s news feed, 
and a twice-daily half hour broadcast comparable to that of the big three networks for those 
affiliates who did not carry local news ("INN Starts Life" 1980). Another contributor to 
expansion of local news in the 1980s was the new Cable News Network (CNN), which made its 
newsfeed available to broadcast stations across the country; also, because the feeds were 
extensive and high quality, the broadcast networks improved their affiliate newsfeeds in response 
(Owen and Wildman 1992, 176-177).  
The challenging economics of news in the mid-1980s spawned several more resources for 
broadcasters to use in reducing costs of news coverage. Gannett and Telepictures partnered in 
1985 for a half-hour feature program called Newscope. Local affiliates were fed all the pieces of 
the program via satellite, along with scripts and graphics. The local station merely had to provide 
an anchor team and some production effort. Telepictures also had another offering, the News 
Information Weekly Service, which distributed feature stories to 125 affiliates via satellite or 
videotape. Westinghouse Broadcasting was the center of Newsfeed, a consortium of 48 stations 
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in the U.S. and several abroad generating and sharing hard news and sports stories from their 
markets. Other companies also offered similar feeds to stations willing to pay the price for them 
("What's On the Minds" 1983, 58, 62). 
Another broadcast partnership formed in 1983, as four stations owned by three different 
station groups joined together in Florida to form a “KU Collective.” The collective was similar to 
an 11-station partnership started a year earlier by the Hubbard group called Conus. In both cases, 
the involved stations purchased Satellite News Gathering trucks and downlink equipment for 
their stations, and agreed to share any important news coming out of their markets. Two years 
later, the Florida collective had expanded to become the Florida News Network with the addition 
of three more affiliate stations ("KU Collective in Florida" 1985, 187). 
These cost-cutting efforts were a mere shadow of what was to follow in the 1990s and 
beyond. In a fine example of the shift of news as service to news as commodity, the News 
Corporation of America launched in Pittsburgh in 1990, offering a turnkey newscast production 
service to local Sinclair affiliate WPTT under a five-year contract. The group claimed to have 11 
other potential affiliates interested nationwide ("The Fragmenting" 1990, 40).119 Other markets 
embraced this idea the following year, as many independent stations took their first steps towards 
an LMA by outsourcing their newscasts to an in-market competitor or by rebroadcasting another 
station’s news program ("More Indies Airing" 1991). With the official debut of the LMA in 
1991, even more markets took advantage of the economic benefits of outsourced news.  
                                                 
119 Station groups also began looking inward for non-news content during the early 1990s. CBS’ five owned stations 
all cleared a program produced by the Los Angeles CBS O&O called Studio 22 in 1990. In addition, the station 
group had acquired the rights to a British game show called Everybody’s Equal and were working out an 
arrangement to produce it for the group. NBC partnered with Group W to create the short-lived House Party for use 
on the two groups’ affiliates in 1990 as well "CBS Looks to Local Training Ground," Broadcasting, 19 November 
1990. 
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Many stations were forced to add news broadcasts in 1995 as a result of the decision by 
New World Television to switch its stations affiliations to Fox Television, which set of a round 
of affiliate switching across the industry. Former independents wound up affiliated with the big 
three, and immediately set to starting up news broadcasts. Fox Television suggested strongly that 
its affiliates start news operations as well, in preparation for the debut of the cable Fox News 
channel (Robins 1995). Fox Television would eventually require local news as part of its 
affiliation agreements. The high costs associated with news startups and ongoing operations 
resulted in many of these stations searching for cost efficiencies and new revenue opportunities.  
In 1998, an unprecedented structural arrangement in the Wilkes-Barre, PA market offered 
signs of things to come under duopoly. Under a “shared services agreement,” CBS affiliate 
WYOU moved into the facility housing NBC affiliate WBRE. In return for a fee paid by 
WYOU, WBRE planned to operate both of the stations, sharing facilities, engineering, and staff 
wherever possible. WBRE installed identical master control and production control equipment 
for each station, upgraded news sets and built two newsrooms. The stations’ owners were quick 
to clarify that this was not an LMA, because each station maintained separate programming and 
sales departments. Instead, the owners claimed, the arrangement was the broadcast version of a 
joint operating agreement in the newspaper industry. The stations claimed that the two newscasts 
counted as separate voices because they were under the control of separate executive producers, 
even though both news operations shared a news director (Trigoboff 1998).  
Technological innovation combined with economic strain raised the possibility of “one-
man-bands” rising into medium and large market television from their birthplace in the smallest 
markets. Just as the initial development of smaller, lightweight gear allowed stations to reduce 
technical crews for field shooting from 2 to 1, the reporter/photographer combination reduced the 
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standard 2 person crew – 1 reporter, 1 technician – to a single person who handled both jobs. A 
standard element in the smallest news markets, the combined position became more attractive to 
larger markets with the creation of even smaller cameras (Coffman 2000).  
Several networks revisited the cooperative concept in 2000, agreeing to share news feeds 
to reduce the expense of sending redundant crews to the same events and to increase their ability 
to access breaking news. ABC, CBS, and Fox agreed to allow the other networks’ affiliates to 
record and use their previously affiliate-only newsfeeds. Affiliates were given the option to sign 
up for the service in return for waiving their rights to exclusivity outside their market for any 
video sent to the network. The arrangement was instigated by Fox, which was in a position to 
gain the most from it as Fox affiliates nationwide struggled with low-rated news startups 
(McClellan 2000).             
The most dramatic moves in news, however, belong to the most aggressive of the three 
exemplar groups, Sinclair Broadcasting. The group started its first newscasts the same year it 
started its first LMAs, outsourcing news in Pittsburgh and building its own experimental 
operation in Baltimore. “We really wanted to do a prototype, to understand what the news 
business was about, what the cost structures were, what the politics of being in the news business 
were,” explained David Smith. What the organization learned was that news offered dual 
benefits, higher ratings and improved image in the market (Jessell and Rathbun 1996, 30). In its 
2002 annual report, Sinclair detailed its intent to expand local news on its stations. This 
expansion was predicated on Sinclair’s belief that between 25% and 30% of local advertising 
dollars were earmarked for local news, which resulted in $400 to $500 million of revenue that 
Sinclair had no access to across its markets without newscasts. However, the group recognized 
that news was a costly endeavor, and approached the expansion in a spirit of minimal cost and 
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maximum revenue. As a result, Sinclair News Central (SNC) was born (Sinclair Broadcast 
Group 2003).  
The technologies which made centralcasting possible were at the core of Sinclair’s news 
model. SNC eliminated redundancies by offering national and regional news, sports, and weather 
from its home facility in Baltimore. As it had done with its Baltimore news experiment a decade 
before, Sinclair “beta tested” the new model on one station, WSMH-TV in Flint, MI. The 
success of the experimental station led to expansion into other markets without news product; 
Sinclair estimated that its methods resulted in a 50% savings over those of other news startups 
thanks to the centralized model. The company also estimated additional cost savings as it 
reduced syndicated product in favor of news broadcasts (Sinclair Broadcast Group 2003). 
In 2003, Sinclair changed its expansion plans, moving ahead with the news central model 
in several cities which were already producing newscasts, rather than focusing solely on markets 
without local news. The company made the change upon realizing that it could effectively 
improve and expand the length of local broadcasts at minimal cost by applying the SNC model, 
and immediately doubled the length of existing broadcasts in each city (Trigoboff 2003). In order 
to make the news seem local even when being centralcast, Sinclair built new sets in its news 
central stations to match the one at headquarters, and instituted identical graphics across its 
stations which could be customized during the broadcast at the local level (Bachman 2002). The 
group also invested in a Washington bureau.  
Sinclair’s efforts can be viewed as nearing the pinnacle of news commodification and 
centralization. Economically, there is no question that the model is a brilliant example of cost 
savings in service of producing a high-profit margin product. However, where the public interest 
is concerned, the results are less brilliant. Even as the FCC considers “voices” in a market to be a 
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defining concern in ownership, the News Central model puts one central voice in editorial 
control of many outlets, amounting to one national voice for all of the Sinclair stations. Hints of 
this strong editorial position could be found in Sinclair’s intent to air the “Stolen Honor” anti-
Kerry documentary during the 2004 presidential race, and in “The Point” editorials distributed 
for air in its various markets. Media Matters examined a prominent SNC segment called “Get 
This” in late 2004, and discovered it to be explicitly pro-republican and anti-progressive 
(Sinclair's News Central Provides 2004). Regardless of whether Sinclair happens to be 
progressive or conservative, the ability to provide a coordinated message in the guise of a local 
voice is worrisome for those concerned with the public interest in television broadcasting.  
Another fitting example of the new reality of local television news is offered by the 
efforts of NewsProNet, which produces news segments carefully devoid of local references and 
distributes them to subscribing stations to air as part of their newscasts. In March of 2003, the 
company’s client list included 93 stations, some of them in the country’s largest markets 
("Canned News " 2003). The company continues to provide content to local stations, 
accompanied by market research and web-extras in the present day. Although the service could 
be considered a descendent of the newsfilm companies of days gone by, the very breadth of 
services offered by the company in an effort to help stations attract viewers proves the point: 
local television news is a commodity designed to attract an audience to sell to advertisers. This 
view of the news is what has led to the sacrifice of journalistic endeavor on the altar of structural 
efficiency and economy of scale.  
As much as this chapter and the project as a whole would benefit from a final turn to 
positivity, a message that everything will be alright, the economic demands of broadcasting in 
the present day have overrun the public interest concerns of regulators and critics alike. Although 
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the industry is indeed on the edge of major change in the form of digital broadcasting, it is 
unlikely that the ability to offer more channels of programming will result in an increase in 
quality news provided to the public. More likely, given prior experience with multi-channel 
programming, existing news personnel will be asked to fill more time with the same resources, 
and the quality will decline as a result. In the State of the News Media 2006 report, the authors 
share this position. They describe one of the six major trends in news:  
At many old-media companies, though not all, the decades-long battle at the top 
between idealists and accountants is now over. The idealists have lost…. An 
executive at one of the three broadcast networks told senior staff members in a 
meeting last year that “the ethical anvil has been lifted,” meaning the producers 
could dispense with traditional notions of journalistic propriety. (State of the 
News Media 2006) 
 
It is fitting that in 2005, George Clooney reminded a portion of the United States that 
journalism was not always free of idealism, introducing Edward R. Murrow to some who had 
never heard his name. Sadly, however, the days of crusading journalists like Murrow seem to 
have passed, replaced by camera-friendly and overly empathetic news personalities like 
Anderson Cooper. It is also fitting to note that the family tree of this new breed of journalist can 
be traced back to the Biltmore Agreement, which spurred broadcasters to recast their news as 
commentary, allowing them to profit in spite of the Agreement.  
In his 1958 keynote speech to the Radio and Television News Directors Association, 
from which the quote that heads this section is drawn, Murrow shared many warnings with 
broadcasters, after cautioning “this might just do nobody any good.” One of those warnings is as 
true today as when he first said it almost half a century ago: 
Our history will be what we make it. And if there are any historians about fifty or 
a hundred years from now, and there should be preserved the kinescopes for one 
week of all three networks, they will there find recorded in black and white, or 
color, evidence of decadence, escapism and insulation from the realities of the 
world in which we live. (1958) 
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Murrow was referring to the programs carried during prime time on the three networks 
when he made this statement. Ironically, today these words apply equally to local television 
news, conditioned, controlled, and commodified by the economically determined structures and 
practices of a profit-hungry industry. If there is hope for local television news, it lies in the hands 
of today’s hard-working old school journalists who still remember the legacy of Murrow, and in 
the hands of the next generation of broadcast journalists, to reincorporate the true meaning of 
“the public interest, convenience, and necessity” into local news. 
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